Developed and Less Developed Societies

by

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Introduction

One of the most common criteria for categorizing and comparing societies is the concept of development. Scholars, policy makers, and ordinary people frequently rate countries according to their level of development, with societies often placed into categories such as developed and less developed. This practice has been common for centuries in the Western world, and globalization has spread it internationally.

I discuss the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this practice of rating societies on development. I begin with the developmental paradigm and its assumptions about social change. I then discuss how this model and cross-sectional data led scholars to create hierarchies of countries distributed along a developmental trajectory. I then briefly critique the model of development, developmental hierarchies, and the language of development. In the last section I discuss how the model has been globalized through its international dissemination and is currently used by numerous governmental and nongovernmental agencies and at the grassroots level by ordinary people. My goal is not to endorse these developmental models, but to discuss their history and continuing influence.

The Developmental Paradigm

The division of groups and societies into hierarchies has long been a common practice in much of the world. In the West differences among groups were frequently interpreted within a developmental paradigm that contains assumptions about change that can be applied to both individuals and societies (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1980; Sanderson 1990). The essential assumption of the developmental paradigm is that change is uniform and directional, with societies moving through uniform stages (Harris 1968; Nisbet 1975/1969; Sanderson 1990). The movement of societies through these trajectories is called development, and the general model of change is labeled developmentalism (Mandelbaum 1971; Sanderson 1990).
Many versions of the societal development model relied on a biological metaphor comparing societies to biological organisms (Bock 1956; Nisbet 1975/1969; Pagden 1982). Societies were seen as developing through stages of growth and decline much as individual biological organisms were believed to do. Each stage was perceived as having its own identifying features (Robertson 1860/1762; Millar 1979/1779; Ferguson 1980/1767).

The idea of uniform societal developmental trajectories was part of ancient Greek and Roman thought (Bock 1956; Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1975/1969; Pagden 1982). The ancient Greeks viewed individual societies like individual humans who were born, matured, and declined, with the sequence repeated for each society just as it was repeated for each individual person. St. Augustine, an early Christian theologian, modified this approach by applying the model of birth, growth, and decline to all of human history rather than to individual societies. He said that mankind would experience this trajectory only once, with individual societies forming part of the overall story.

A new twist was added to the societal development model during the seventeenth century when “...the metaphor of genesis and decay was stripped, as it were, of its centuries-old property of decay, leaving only genesis and growth” (Nisbet 1975/1969:109). This approach assumed that knowledge accumulated and that at any historical point people had the knowledge and expertise available earlier, plus the knowledge and expertise acquired later. This perspective of continuous growth was also applied to other societal domains, including government and economics, with the likelihood that humanity would experience indefinite improvement and progress (Hegel 1878/1837; Godwin 1926/1793).

Although the belief in indefinite social and economic growth has played a significant role in subsequent thinking about social and economic change, it has not entirely dominated developmental thinking. The old version of growth and decay continued to be important for many, and there has been a tension between the two versions (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1975/1969). However, during the last two
centuries the optimistic outlook emphasizing growth and improvement has been much more common than the pessimistic version emphasizing decline and decay.

It was believed that societies with the same level of development possessed the same basic characteristics. The model was sometimes described as having strict uniformity, but more often a less unilineal approach was followed (Carneiro 1973; Sanderson 1990). The societal development model was usually applied in such a way that it maintained the unity of the developmental trajectory while also recognizing country idiosyncrasies (Bock 1956; Carneiro 1973; Harris 1968; Sanderson 1990).

Some scholars described developmental trajectories in detail with many levels of development, while others collapsed development into three or four broad stages. For example, Scottish scholars during the 1700s identified developmental stages according to the means of subsistence and suggested four stages: hunting; herding; agriculture; and commerce (Smith 1978/1762-3; Millar 1979/1779). Another popular approach used a three-stage sequence of development: savagery; barbarism; and civilization. Many simple dichotomies were also common, for example: rude to polished; backward to developed; traditional to modern; and undeveloped to developed (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1975/1969).

Although the stages of development were seen as generally uniform, the velocity and even the direction of development were believed to vary (Robertson 1860/1762; Tylor 1871; Millar 1979/1779; Ferguson 1980/1767; Mill 1989/1859). For example, China and India were widely perceived as once being great civilizations that had become stagnant. Many believed that northwest Europe had recently emerged from backwardness and had risen to that period’s peak of progress. Some indigenous groups in America were believed by some as having retrogressed from higher levels of development. The rise and fall of ancient Greece and Rome was for many another example of uneven development.
According to this view of uneven development over long periods of time, it was perceived that some societies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had advanced a great distance along the developmental trajectory, that others had progressed very little, and that others were distributed widely along the pathway between the least and the most advanced. This differential progress along the trajectory of development, thus, provided a framework for accounting for the social, economic, and cultural differences that Europeans observed in their international cross-cultural observations.

Describing the Developmental Trajectory

A major pre-occupation of many scholars from the Enlightenment onward has been describing the trajectory of development. They were interested in the dynamics of societal development as it had played out in human history, in the laws of societal change, and in the forces that led to differential rates of development. Many were less interested in the idiosyncrasies of any society’s development than they were in development as a universal process.

Describing social change in a society with the proper historical data is relatively straightforward. The time periods are arranged in chronological order and changes across the periods are described. However, the scholars of this era only had limited data, and appropriate data for describing universal trajectories were particularly scarce. However, these scholars had large quantities of cross-sectional data, and they invented methods that they believed could be used for describing universal trajectories.

Scholars used a method that I call reading history sideways to extract descriptions of universal developmental trajectories (Thornton 2005). This approach does not follow one society across time, but compares different societies cross-sectionally. This method uses the assumption underlying the developmental paradigm that at any particular time, all societies can be located along one continuum of development. It assumes that the past situation of a society considered to be more advanced can be imputed from the circumstances of a contemporary society that is believed to be less developed. That is,
the contemporary society believed to be less developed substitutes for the unobserved circumstances of a
more advanced society during an earlier period. Thus, instead of documenting the changes in actual
societies chronologically, these scholars read history sideways across geographical categories.

Reading history sideways from cross-sectional data required a procedure to order societies along
the uniform developmental trajectory. It is not surprising that ethnocentrism encouraged northwest
Europeans to place themselves, especially their middle and upper classes, at the apex of development.
The idea that northwest Europe was developmentally superior may have also been enhanced by
Europe’s military, economic, and political ascendancy at the time and by the motivation of Europeans to
legitimize their territorial expansion and colonization (Jennings 1975; Berkhofer 1978; Pagden 1982).
Other rationales used by northwest Europeans for locating their countries at the top of the developmental
ladder were their education, technology, scientific knowledge, and urban life (Pagden 1982).

Having placed the top of the developmental hierarchy in northwest Europe, the least developed
societies could be identified as those that were most different from northwest Europe in technology,
education, scientific knowledge, and urbanization (Bock 1956; Meek 1976). With northwest Europe
identified at the top level of development, Tylor (1871: 23-24) enunciated additional criteria that
included “the definiteness of moral principles, the condition of religious belief and ceremony, the degree
of social and political organization, and so forth”.

Identification of the specific contemporaneous societies to represent the lowest level of
development proved to be challenging (Myres 1916; Hodgen 1964; Meek 1976; Pagden 1982). Some
European scholars believed that some non-European populations were so different from Europe that
they could have experienced very little, if any, development. Many observers of Native Americans
believed that some of these groups had so little development that there were not even basic attributes of
society such as governments, laws, and social organization (Myres 1916; Pearce 1967/1953; Berkhofer
1978). This led to the belief that social organization in these places was so negligible that people were living in a “state of nature” (Robertson 1780/1777; Montaigne 1946/1580). Many identified the beginning of time, before any development, in Africa, America, and Australia (Robertson 1780/1777; Tylor 1871; Rousseau 1984/1755; Locke 1988/1690; Hobbes 1996/1651)

Although the least developed places were believed to be somewhere in America, Australia, or Africa, it was not easy to agree on exactly which people anchored the lowest point on the developmental trajectory (Myres 1916). For example, Tylor (1871) identified the lowest level of development among the Australian aborigines, Malthus (1986/1803) said it was the natives of Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of South America, and Thomas Jefferson said it was the Native Americans in western North America (cited in Nisbet 1980: 198).

With the highest and lowest levels of development identified, scholars believed they could array other populations between the least and most developed, with the judgment primarily resting on a population’s degree of similarity to northwest Europe. Tylor (1871) summarized his view of the developmental hierarchy by specifying the following trajectory of development: Australian [aborigines], Tahitian, Aztec, Chinese, and Italian. Stocking (1987: 235) later suggested that Tylor implied in this ordering “an unstated higher reference point northwest across the English Channel.” Tylor (1871: 24) was probably close to the truth at the time when he suggested that “few would dispute that [these] races are arranged rightly in order of culture.”

This methodology of reading history sideways was not limited to documenting northwest Europe’s past history. Scholars also believed that it provided a lens into future changes for societies outside of northwest Europe. These scholars believed that by looking at the developmental trajectory thought to have been followed by northwest Europeans, observed from reading history sideways, they could project the trajectory of future changes that would occur in Asia and Africa.
The list of scholars using the developmental paradigm, comparative data, and the reading of history sideways to create descriptions of developmental hierarchies and trajectories presents a “who’s who” of major scholars from the 1500s through the beginning of the 1900s. Acosta, Montaigne, Hobbes, and Locke were luminaries from the 1500s and 1600s. During the 1700s there were such scholarly giants as Smith, Rousseau, Voltaire, Millar, Turgot, Robertson, Home, Condorcet, Hume, and Malthus. The scholars using this approach during the 1800s included such luminaries as Comte, Tyler, Maine, Morgan, Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Westermarck, and Le Play.

Critiques of the Developmental Model

During the twentieth century strong challenges were mounted against the developmental paradigm and its associated models and hierarchies (Boas 1940; Bock 1956; Hodgen 1964; Mandelbaum 1971; Cesair 1972; Jennings 1975; Nisbet 1976/1969; Tilly 1984; Wallerstein 1991; Szreter 1993; Böröcz 2000; Chakrabarty 2000). The criticisms include the fact that the model is teleological and that the strong assumption of uniform, directional, and necessary change cannot be defended in analyses of societies. Scholars have also become much more aware of the pitfalls of reading history sideways with cross-sectional data. Alternative theories also suggested that differences across countries were not caused by differential developmental, but were the result of unequal and dependent relations among countries in the world system. Consequently, although the developmental paradigm, its assumptions, and reading history sideways still occur in academia, they now appear much less frequently than previously (Thornton 2005).

Even the language of development has come under serious criticism in recent decades (Thornton 2005). Most important has been the recognition that developmental hierarchies include hierarchies of value and honor that impute to societies perceived to be most developed—almost all Western—the characteristics of respect, goodness, and honor, while societies perceived as low in development--
invariably non-Western—are equated with negativity and inferiority (Williams 1985/1976). This was apparent in the perjorative nature of many of the labels used to describe societies perceived as having low levels of development—rude, savage, barbarous, backward, primitive, unpolished, undeveloped, and uncivilized—and these terms have largely been dropped from our language. However, in many discussions these words have been substituted with less perjorative terms, including developing, less-developed, traditional, and newly-developed. Most of the old words used to describe societies perceived as having high levels of development—such as developed, progressive, modern, enlightened, and advanced—continue to be used frequently in scholarly and policy discourse. Consequently, developmental language and hierarchies provide legitimization for unnecessary pernicious distinctions across societies (Thornton 2005).

Current Use of Developmental Models

It is becoming increasingly recognized that despite the criticisms heaped upon developmental approaches and language, developmental models, hierarchies, and language continue to be used in many settings, with important effects. For example, Ferguson, an anthropologist studying Africa, has indicated that “the narrative of modernization was always bad social science; it was (and is) a myth…But on the other hand, the myth of modernization…gives form to an understanding of the world, providing a set of categories and premises that continue to shape people’s experiences and interpretations of their lives” (Ferguson 1999, page 14). He went on to say that Urban African workers’ conceptions were “not simply compatible with the modernist narratives of social science; they were a local version of them. Modernization theory had become a local tongue…” (page 84).

Two anthropologists studying South Asia and the Arabian Peninsula, Osella and Osella (2006, pages 570-571), have also emphasized the continuing importance of modernization and developmental models in the lives of both scholars and the people they study. They write that “concepts, ideals, and
practices of something called ‘modernity’ certainly do exist and are continually appealed to in people’s economic endeavours, political projects, and identity crafting…’Modernity’, as an historically and ethnographically specific body of ideals and practices, will remain central to our understanding of contemporary societies”.

The validity of these observations is supported by evidence that knowledge of development and developmental hierarchies has been spread globally. Ethnographic data from Subsaharan Africa, China, Egypt, India, Nepal, and New Guinea indicate that many people believe in developmental hierarchies and use developmental models in their everyday lives (Caldwell et al. 1988; Amin 1989; Dahl and Rabo 1992; Pigg 1992, 1996; Blaut 1993; Wang 1999; Ahearn 2001; Abu-Lughod 1998).

The developmental model and developmental hierarchies have also been disseminated widely among public elites, policy makers and many government and nongovernmental organizations (Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Nisbet 1980). They are also regularly used by the United Nations to divide the world into developed and developing countries, with a subgroup of the latter designated as least developed (United Nations Statistics Division 2009). Similarly, the World Bank divides countries into the categories of developing and industrial, and the International Monetary Fund divides countries into two major groups, the advanced economies and the emerging and developing economies (World Bank 2010; International Monetary Fund 2009).

Just as many in the 19th century designated a ladder of development, with societies arrayed along a continuum from the lowest to the highest, today the United Nations regularly publishes its Human Development Index (HDI) which places countries on a continuum from low to high development (United Nations Development Programme 2007/2008). The HDI is much more sophisticated than the indices produced during earlier periods, as it explicitly designates its components
(income, health, literacy, and school enrollment) and combines them systematically to form precise ratings of a country’s development extending from zero to one.

Despite the added sophistication of the UN HDI scale and estimates, the distribution of countries on the scale bears considerable resemblance to the rankings of the 19th century. For example, in 2005 the HDI ordered a set of countries from low to high as follows: Central African Republic, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Egypt, China, and Italy, with several northwest European countries and northwest Europe’s overseas diasporas situated at the peak of the index (UNDP 2007/2008). Interestingly, Japan is an important non-Western country that has cracked the list of countries at the top of the hierarchy.

Survey evidence also indicates that ordinary people around the world have hierarchical models of development. My colleagues and I have conducted surveys in twelve countries in which we have asked people to rate countries on their levels of development (Binstock and Thornton 2007; Thornton Binstock and Ghimire 2008; Thornton et al. 2010). The twelve countries are: Albania; Argentina; Bulgaria; China; Egypt; Iran; Iraq; Lebanon; Nepal; Saudi Arabia; Taiwan; and the United States. Although the precise questions asked varied somewhat in the different surveys, our approach was similar across surveys. We told respondents that we wanted them to think of a development scale from zero (or one) to ten, with the least developed places rated zero (or one) and the most developed places rated ten. We then asked respondents to rate several countries on the 10 or 11 point development scale.

The interviewers in these surveys were instructed not to tell respondents what development meant, but to let the respondents use their own definitions. We followed this strategy because we wanted to evaluate whether ordinary people had models of development in their heads, and, if so, what those models were like.

These surveys provide strong evidence that people in these twelve countries have frameworks of societal developmental. The average ratings given by respondents in each of the twelve countries on
development closely match the ratings of the UN HDI (when the HDI is multiplied by ten to make the metrics more comparable). The United States and Japan consistently dominate the ratings, with the highest scores. China and western European countries are also rated highly. At the low end of the distribution of respondent ratings are Nigeria, the Central African Republic, Pakistan, India, Cambodia, and Yemen, countries that are also rated low by the HDI.

As a summary of the correspondence between average respondent scores and the HDI scores for the various countries rated, we calculated Pearsonian correlations between the average respondent scores and the UN scores. For the twelve countries surveyed those correlations range from a low of .74 to a high of .95. Even the lowest correlation of .74 reflects a remarkable correspondence of the scores of ordinary people with the HDI scores, and the .95 correlation is even more impressive.

In order for the survey ratings of ordinary people to match the HDI scores so closely, respondents must possess the concept of societal development and be able to use it in rating countries. The development concept held by respondents must also be very similar to the concept contained in the UN index. Respondents must also have some knowledge of the countries they were asked to rate and be able to utilize reliably our crude development rating scale. If any of these elements were missing, the observed correlations would be very low. The high observed correlations, therefore, suggest that, on average, ordinary people understand the concept of development similarly to the way it is used by the United Nations and that they know enough about various countries to apply the concept to them.

Our surveys in these twelve countries were not meant to represent the entire world’s population, but the settings surveyed are geographically and culturally diverse. The widespread understanding of development and developmental hierarchies in the twelve countries surveyed suggests that such understanding has become global.
It is important to understand that the developmental worldview is more than a categorization system (Thornton 2001, 2005). Instead, it is like other systems of belief and gives scholars, policy makers, and ordinary people models for understanding the organization of the world, how the world operates, and how people should act in dealing with the world. Such models also provide orientations to evaluate goals and the appropriate methods for achieving them.

By locating the societies of Western Europe and North America at the pinnacle of development, the model informs us that it is these societies that define what is modern (Ferguson 1999; Melegh 2006). In addition, the model often defines high levels of development as good, thereby providing moral authority to countries rated high in the development hierarchy (Böröcz 2006). Consequently, many elements of Western society are defined as modern, good, and to be followed (Ferguson 1999; Thornton 2005). My point is not that these models are good or bad, true or false, but that they provide goals and mechanisms that can have powerful effects on beliefs and behavior.

Development models have also played significant roles in international affairs. These developmental elements played a significant role in justifying colonialism, Western domination, and the interruption, sometimes by force, of long-held indigenous social institutions and ways of life. Wolff (1994) has suggested that the perception of Eastern Europe as less developed than Western Europe was important in the division of Europe after World War II between “east” and “west”. Böröcz (2000) has suggested that in recent years perceptions of Eastern Europe as less developed than the West played a role in the process of admitting the countries of this region into the European Union.

By providing a developmental view to society, the model pictures social change as normal and to be expected. Modernization can also become both an individual and societal goal that motivates societal change (Ferguson 1999; Wallerstein 1991). As a result, the model delegitimizes the old and legitimizes the new (Wallerstein 1991). Furthermore, the model shows the direction for change, with that direction
typically oriented towards the West (Wallerstein 1991; Chakrabarty 2000). It also specifies what changes in the familial, religious, economic, and political institutions are useful for a society to become developed and what dimension of life are changed by development (Thornton 2005). Of course, the model of social change presented by the model frequently contradicts long-standing practices and beliefs and is often rejected, resisted, or modified.

In addition, the models are frequently used by leaders of social movements (Thornton 2005). This is true both of communist and democratic movements. It is also true of many of those advocating gender equality, racial and ethnic equality, and family planning and low fertility.
References and Further Readings


