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REVIEW

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ABSTRACT: Prophesying the end of Europe is a popular pastime. The idea that civilizations and nations, just like human beings, go through a cycle of rise, shine and decline is part of the attempt to make sense of, and to seek regularities in the flow of history. The rise and decline approach to universal history no longer has credibility amongst professional historians. However, it still echoes in the halls of learning and is popular among commentators and publicists. This paper discusses various approaches to universal history, some recent views on the future of Europe, and argues that the continent’s current demographic situation and outlook can be much better understood if they are considered in the perspective offered by Arland Thornton’s developmental paradigm and the concept of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) or revolution.

UNIVERSAL HISTORY

For many, the notion that historical developments are simply a reflection of a succession of essentially accidental events is not easy to accept. It is equally obvious that while faithfully recording chronological events or the life and times of great and important people has its charms, it also has severe intellectual limitations. The basic drive behind the idea of Universal History is the assumption that events do not occur haphazardly, but that they follow meaningful patterns. Thus, attempts to read certain meanings into them have a long history. Their aim is to discover regularities and patterns – even ‘laws’ – that might be hidden in them that govern the development of human societies. For the classical period, reference is usually made to the work of the Greek Thucydides (ca. 460-ca. 399 BC) and the Roman Tacitus (ca. 56-ca. 117 AD). In the medieval period (500–1500 AD) historical interests remained largely restricted to recording of the chronology of events, the life history of saints or kings, and to telling the stories of wars and conflicts. The work of Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who was born in Tunis and died in Cairo, would appear to be the exception to this rule; he is considered to be an important founder of sociology because he had great interest in the development of cities and the ups and downs of larger geographical entities.
MODEL OF PROGRESS TOWARDS AN END-STATE

The first Universal Histories carry, one might say, a Christian signature. Francis Fukuyama (1992: 56) specifically mentions the following points as being characteristic: they stress the equality of men in the sight of God, the shared destiny of all people, the redemption of man as man, and the view that history will be finite in time: the end of history will usher in the kingdom of heaven. Such a final end would, in Fukuyama’s terms, make particular events potentially intelligible.

Secular versions were developed during the Renaissance of the 16th and 17th centuries, following the formulation and adoption of scientific methods. It was felt that an accumulation of knowledge was bound to occur. As time went by, successive generations would build on the foundations laid by their predecessors, thus ensuring continued progress. This principle is reflected well in a quotation borrowed from Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757) from a work dating from 1688. As provided in English by Fukuyama it reads, in part, as follows:

“A good cultivated mind contains so to speak, all minds of preceding centuries; it is but a single identical mind which has been developing and improving itself all the time”.

In his famous “Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind” that was published posthumously in the year after his death, Antoine-Nicolas Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) stresses the prospects of perfecting society through continued progress and through the growth of our insight in its functioning. In his sketch he distinguishes nine great epochs of the past, and a tenth epoch that he sees as heralding the future. He expects to see inequalities in wealth, access to resources and education diminish. Moreover, he sees no limit to the ‘perfection’ of the human species. Interestingly, he argues that improvements in agriculture are likely to make it possible to feed the growing population. He predicts that life expectancy will increase indefinitely and that people will live more of their lives in good health and be more robust than in his own time (de Condorcet 1795). Malthus wrote his famous essay on the principles of population largely as a reaction to this.

An important characteristic of Condorcet’s thinking is that he does not see any reason to assume a role for divine providence, for God, or for supernatural powers in steering or enabling progress. In fact, he was reportedly highly antagonistic towards religion, particularly so towards the Christian religion. In his view thinkers and scientists before him had established insight on the true rights of man, which followed from the fact that man was endowed with sensation, capable of reasoning and understanding his interests, and of acquiring
moral ideas. He particularly acknowledged the work of Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) and René Descartes (1596–1650) who worked during the ‘eighth epoch’ of his developmental scheme.

Other authors of the 18th century, the Age of Enlightenment, also foresaw progress towards an end-state in the development of societies, but were much less anti-Christian. They predicted the development of civil society, and assumed that strong forces would bring people, even against their will, to a state of harmony and understanding. Leading figures included the German philosophers Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1811). Kant is rightly famous for his essay on the “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1784) and his booklet on “Perpetual Peace” (Zum ewigen Frieden) (1795). He sees perpetual peace as being ensured by nothing less than

‘... that great artist nature [i] whose mechanical process makes her purposiveness manifest, permitting harmony to emerge among men through their discord, even against their wills’.

According to Kant we could call that ‘fate’, but

‘... if we reflect on nature’s purposiveness in the flow of world events, and regard it to be the underlying wisdom of a higher cause that directs the human race toward its objective goal and predetermines the world’s course, we call it providence’ (Quotations taken from a translation by Ted Humphrey, Hackett Publishing, 2003).

In the work of Hegel, who together with authors such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) is a representative of the movement commonly called ‘German Idealism’, a cyclical element is present. He recognises that a people may during a certain period be ‘das Herrschende’, the dominating power, but will not be able to maintain that position (Hegel (1820:§ 347).

MODEL OF RISE AND DECLINE

Comparison with a human being’s life makes this particular model of Universal History particularly striking, since it is based on the idea that during their existence all living organisms, institutions, and civilisations pass through a clear cycle of rise, shine, and decline. One might well assume that this model has been with us since times immemorial. But this is not the case. It would appear that, at
least after the classical period, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) was the first to voice the idea that we are not subject to magic, mysterious and unpredictable forces, nor heading straight towards a better future. If Italy had lent him an ear, so Paul Hazard argues (1963: 25), they would on the contrary,

“... have known that the peoples of the earth are a prey to constant vicissitudes, now emerging slowly and painfully out of a state of barbarism along the road to civilization, whereto attaining, they relapse once more into barbarism. All their ideas, their whole intellectual attitude would have been fundamentally changed”.

But in Italy his ideas didn’t find a great deal of support. It required the efforts of Charles Montesquieu (1689–1755) as an intermediary to have them more generally accepted by contemporaries. Montesquieu, who was the author of a well-known study on the grandeur and decline of the Roman Empire, was greatly impressed by Vico’s concept of ‘corsi e recorsi’ in history. As Hazard expresses it:

‘In their earliest state, nations are barbarous, they make conquests and become amenable to law and order; they grow greater and at the same time more polished, this weakens them, they are conquered in their turn and relapse into barbarism’ (op.cit.: 246).

In his study Montesquieu adhered to the idea of growth, maturity and decay and so impressed his readers that Hazard observed that: “there was scarcely a single contemporary historian who did not adopt it”. The fate of nations and civilisations is no longer seen to depend on the will of heaven, but to have its roots in changing circumstances and specific causes. Giambatista Vico provided a new philosophy of history and modernised that discipline greatly. His works are considered as marking the beginning of modern historical writing.

Some scholarly works of great repute have an element of that cycle in their title: the seven volumes of Edward Gibbon’s “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire” (1776–1788) is a prime example. Equally well known are the two volumes of Oswald Spengler’s “Der Untergang des Abendlandes” (1918–1922) and his very pessimistic view on the future of that part of Europe, where the evening sun sets. The massive work of Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889–1975) called “A Study of History” published in the period from 1934 to 1961, similarly looks at human history from a very broad perspective. Such approaches have in common that the world is no longer a magic garden where things move as a result of the whims of the mysterious forces of nature and the equally unpredictable influence of deities, God or heaven, but as part of an arena where distinct processes are at work and their effects can be predicted. In fact,
Spengler’s contemporary and adversary, German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) has argued that this ‘Entzauberung’ (de-enchantment) of the world is an integral part of the modernisation of society in the 19th century, which from an ethical point of view created an enormous diversity of interpretations of man’s role in the world.

It would appear that ‘Rise and Decline theories’ of historical development have lost most of their appeal amongst present day professional historians. But writings from the 1960s, and even later, testify to their considerable elaboration. Carroll Quigley (1910–1977) provides the best example. He taught at Princeton, Harvard and Georgetown and must have influenced numerous American politicians. As Condorcet once did, he worked out a fairly precise scheme of the stages that civilisations go through before their inevitable demise. After a shaky beginning with numerous groups or peoples involved, and a long gestation during which some unity and sense of common purpose is achieved, the civilisation expands. It comes into conflict with others, conquers them and achieves ‘empire’ status: a stage “of peace and relative prosperity. Peace arises from the absence of competing political units in the area of the civilization itself… Prosperity arises from the ending of internal belligerent destruction, the reduction of internal trade barriers. The vested interests have triumphed and are living off their capital” (1961: 88). Then decay sets in, invasion follows and a new cycle can begin. Thus we have sequentially:

1. Mixture,
2. Gestation,
3. Expansion,
4. Age of conflict,
5. Universal empire,
6. Decay,
7. Invasion.

It runs largely parallel to the common life cycle: rise, shine and decline.

CURRENT VIEWS REGARDING THE MODEL OF CONTINUED PROGRESS: THE DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGM

Professional historians now shy away from Universal Histories, considering them grandiose, even metaphysical conceptualisations of processes on a world scale affecting all people. However, in a marvellous book published in 2005, American social scientist Arland Thornton shows that “reading history sideways” is quite a common practice. In fact, expectations about the future are frequently based on such a research approach. It is, in words directly borrowed
from Thornton, a conceptual framework composed of “a set of assumptions about individual and social change”, the essential assumption being “that change is uniform, natural, necessary, and directional”. It is assumed that “individuals, organizations, and societies necessarily go through natural and uniform sequences of change”, with irresistible forces moving them to some end state.

The key method is that it compares different societies at one point in time using cross-sectional data, and then ‘pegs’ societies at various stages along a developmental continuum. What is perceived as less advanced is interpreted as being historical, while what is perceived as more advanced is interpreted as showing the way societies considered to be less advanced are likely to go.

Thornton shows that this approach has been around for centuries and discusses examples, such as the work of 19th century English ethnographer Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917) and the inquiry of Finnish anthropologist Edvard Westermarck (1862–1939) into the history of marriage, which was translated into many languages.

No attempt to defend the developmental paradigm can be found in Thornton’s work. He notes its fallacies, but also its enduring impact. In fact he stresses that as regards modernisation and the family a set of powerful propositions can be formulated, which define what he has called ‘developmental idealism’. Together these propositions seem to drive the modernisation process and changes in the family. As follows:

1. Modern society is good and attainable,
2. The modern family is good and attainable,
3. The modern family is cause as well as effect of modern society,
4. Individuals have the right to be free and equal, with social relationships being based on consent.

It would seem that the views of Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet and Immanuel Kant echo through in the writings of Thornton. Thornton does not endorse the views of Condorcet and Kant, but argues that such views have been incorporated into developmental idealism and have become forces for family change. He also refrains from speaking of ‘progress’ and from suggesting an end-state. He is currently conducting an extensive research programme in a large number of countries spread all over the world, in an attempt to assess the spread and impact of ‘developmental idealism’.
CURRENT VIEWS REGARDING THE RISE AND DECLINE MODEL

The Rise and Decline model no longer has much credibility in academic circles of historians. In the introduction to his well-known study about the rise and fall of great powers, Paul Kennedy (1986) writes, however, that the history of their rise and fall “has in no way come to a full stop” (XXIII). In his view a causal relationship is detectable between the general economic balances of powers and the position occupied by such powers in the international system. Although some regularities may be formulated, they do not really represent a model. While Kennedy focuses on great powers, political economist Mancur Olson (1932–1998) looks at the post-war development of a large group of nations. In his “The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities” (1982) he argues that stable nations tend to start suffering from ‘institutional sclerosis’ with the result that under the influence of the activities of ‘distributive’ interest groups their economic performance falls short of what it could have been. His theory has been both applauded and severely criticised. It would seem that it is currently mainly appreciated in the political sciences as a theory of collective action. In the study of international relations the ‘succession’ theory also plays a role in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” (1993), and in the study of what is known as evolutionary world politics. “Long Cycles in World Politics” (1987) by George Modelski is written from that perspective.

It would seem that against all that, the Rise and Decline model is still warmly embraced in the popular press and by the population at large. The idea of a life-cycle affecting people, civilisations and cultures remains appealing. In fact, it is not particularly difficult to see Europe as having reached the tail end of Quigley’s seven stages. Lowest-low levels of fertility may then be interpreted as reflecting a fatal lack of vitality, while the currently high levels of immigration into the region may be seen as heralding the cycle’s final stage: invasion. As a matter of fact, the metaphor is so powerful that predicting doom for ‘our type of’ civilisation has become a booming industry. Other interpretations would, of course, be possible and could then, conceivably, lead to a rather different view about the future of the continent.

PROPHESYING THE END OF EUROPE

As it is, the ‘doom’ literature prophesying the end of Europe, commonly described as an ‘old’ continent, seems to take pride of place. And it must be said that North American authors are extremely well represented amongst the announcers of Europe’s impending demise as a force to be reckoned with on the world scene. British student of international relations Timothy Garton Ash sees
the emotional leitmotif of European anti-Americanism as being “resentment mingled with envy” whilst American anti-Europeanism is characterised as “irritation mingled with contempt” (2004: 112–113). Be that as it may, the titles which popular North American writers and journalists Walter Laqueur, Bruce Bawer, Mark Steyn and Christopher Caldwell have within the last five years given to their books leave little to the imagination. Laqueur (2007) speaks of ‘The last days of Europe’ and writes an ‘Epitaph for an old continent’. Bawer (2006) sees the West being destroyed from within by radical Islam and all ‘While Europe slept’. Canadian Mark Steyn (2006) argues that ‘America is alone’ at the ‘end of the world as we know it’ with precious little to expect from the old continent. Finally, Christopher Caldwell (2009) sees a revolutionary Europe in which immigration and the Islam play a prominent role. They are sombre and concerned, as can be shown by selecting some suitable quotations.

The sub-title Mark Steyn gives his book (The end of the world as we know it) is no doubt more appropriate than its full title. Societies of Europe are changing with dizzying speed. It is an emotional experience. It creates uncertainty, anxiety, and in many, a feeling of alienation, of no longer belonging to the society to which one is born. Seeing one’s job taken by a cheaper painter or plumber from a country that newly entered the European Union creates anger; riding in a city bus without being able to understand the majority of fellow passengers quickly makes people feel uncomfortable. Indeed, the books of Bawer, Caldwell and Steyn paint the economic, social and cultural situation in Europe in the stark colours of a pamphleteer. In their assessment, European civilisation is in a bad state. Caldwell (op.cit.: 15) after noting that in any individual European country with European and non-European immigration the second type is going to predominate, writes:

“That is because Europeans are not having enough children. Whether due to prosperity, decadence, or some other factor of national morale, the birth rate of native Europeans has been plummeting for years”.

And a little further on (op.cit.: 19):

“Whether Europe can, for the first time in its history, successfully accommodate non-European minorities will depend on whether natives and newcomers perceive Europe as a thriving civilization or a decadent one”.

Mark Steyn rides much the same wave. After suggesting that the blue states of the US

“... ought to apply for honorary membership of the EU”, he casts his diagnosis in the following terms “the salient feature of much of the “progressive
UNIVERSAL HISTORY AND POPULATION CHANGE

agenda” – abortion, gay marriage, endlessly deferred adulthood – is that, whatever the charms of any individual item, cumulatively it’s a literal dead end. As fertility dries up, so do societies. Demography is the most obvious symptom of civilizational exhaustion, and the clearest indicator of where we’re headed” (op.cit.: 12).

Bruce Bawer, the least demographically oriented of these writers simply states “a single colossal fact: Western Europe desperately needs immigrants. The native population is aging and its numbers are on the wane” (op.cit.: 68). He further notes that Pope Benedict XVI “bemoaned the contrast between the Islam’s vigorous rise and Christian Europe’s tired decline” and states that he could not argue with the Pope’s assertion that Europe is suffering from “a hatred of itself, which… can only be considered pathological”, and displaying a strange lack of desire for the future (op.cit.: 218).

Walter Laqueur, obviously familiar with both Gibbon and Spengler, counsels that Europe has been declared dead or dying countless times during the last two hundred years, but that it has “always surprised the doomsayers by its vigor” (op.cit.: 124). Even so, he writes that if current fertility trends continue, “and it is difficult to think why there should be a lasting reversal”, in a hundred years the size of the population of Europe will only be a fraction of what it is today and “in two hundred years some countries may have disappeared” (op.cit.: 22). Clearly he has been influenced by demographers that let their computers run too many cycles. He can see Europe, in any case considerable parts of it, “turn into a cultural theme park” with the guides saying: “Ladies and gentlemen, you are visiting the scenes of a highly developed civilization that once led the world” (op.cit.: 10).

The gist of such statements and conclusions is clear: European civilisation is in retreat. It is decadent and exhausted. In large measure this is due to the fact that the rate of reproduction of the native population is, in most countries, way too low to ensure the replacement of generations. Immigration of non-Europeans, necessary though it may be, further erodes the civilisation from within as these immigrants, especially those adhering to Islam, cannot or will not identify with, or blend into, the host society.

FEAR OF POPULATION DECLINE

Demographers have a long history of contributing to doomsday scenarios. Populations were successively seen to implode, explode and in Europe are now ‘imploding’ again. When analysing the period that elapsed after 1870, Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter concluded in 1985 that the fears expressed about possible population decline resulted largely from the following:
Perceptual distortions based on historical experience,
Misinterpretations of population projections,
Ideological considerations: political, nationalist, religious, or value oriented,
Economic or social welfare considerations,
Keynesian economics and its relation to population growth,
International politics or geopolitical considerations.

Now, a quarter of a century later, the same factors appear to play a role even though the issues coming to the fore strongest have changed under the influence of the altered circumstances. Immigration, integration, and assimilation of migrants – and their religious orientation – are important while in the 1930s this was not the case. Even so, the view that Europe is past its peak again is strong. One might argue that, on the contrary and more objectively, Europe is closer than ever before to Kant’s ‘Ewigen Frieden’, but that view is not shared widely. This is partly – no doubt – because while the new common currency of a large number of European states requires greater political unity, support for such further political integration meets with strong resistance in the population at large. The interpretation of demographic information by journalists, authors and the broader public clearly remains difficult. This is particularly true of long-term projections of fertility held constant at the lowest-low level. Similarly, illustrative calculations meant to show what might happen if period data remains the same only yield conditional results that cannot be interpreted in a straightforward fashion. Other complex issues such as of the processes of postponement and recuperation of births are difficult to grasp. And what to say about the value of studies dealing with the demographic impact of immigration, if it is assumed that settlers never return and their demographic behaviour does not change as generations succeed one another?

NATURE OF THE BOOKS AND DEMOGRAPHIC SOURCES CONSULTED

The four books prophesying the end of Europe referred to above have been written by journalists and opinion makers. Thus, on the whole they are much better written and the reasoning much more forthright than is common in demographic books or papers. Still, there is a great deal of difference between the four, and there is a fair amount of variation in the demographic information they use as well. They also differ widely in the authors they have relied upon for their demographic data and knowledge. From the materials they have consulted, the news items they have collected, the interviews they have conducted,
and their personal observations, they conclude that Europe is, in Mark Steyn’s terms, at a literal dead end. The Rise and Decline model still has wide appeal.

Their conclusion does not seem farfetched if one carefully examines the references to demographic literature provided in their books. Evidently, their bibliographies are a bit one-sided. Colleagues whose views about Europe’s demographic future highlight risks, drawbacks and ‘unwelcome’ changes, are better represented than those intent on stressing the advantages of smaller populations and the benefits accruing to individuals and couples from the expansion of human rights in population matters. People no longer have to live in fear of an unwanted pregnancy and, partly as a consequence of better birth control measures there have been significant improvements in the status and educational opportunities of women.

Walter Laqueur, who has many books to his name and really is an authority on the history of Europe, has provided an impressive list of literature for each main topic treated in his book. For ‘demography’ the literature comprises work by the well-known demographers Herwig Birg, Jean-Claude Chesnais, Robin Cohen, David Coleman and Paul Demeny as authors or editors. And, under the heading ‘Reflections on the Future of Europe’ Birg’s book “Die Weltbevölkerung” is mentioned, while under ‘France’ he refers to a work on immigration and assimilation by Michèle Tribalat of the French National Demographic Institute (INED). Laqueur has further consulted the largely statistical publications of the Council of Europe and the United Nations. In the two and a half page bibliography provided by Caldwell the only demographic name that appears is that of Michèle Tribalat, while the UN publication on replacement migration also features. In the Index one further finds the names of David Coleman, Wolfgang Lutz, Sergei Scherbov and Michèle Tribalat and the book contains nearly 50 pages of notes. When one takes the trouble of checking these it becomes evident that Caldwell has used a much wider range of demographic documents. As immigration is one of his central topics and there are many historians, economists, sociologists and other social scientists dealing with this important societal issue, selecting the demographers amongst these is not particularly straightforward. However, in addition to those mentioned above, one can list the names of Anne Coujon, Katrin Fliegenschnee, Françoise Legros, Poul Chr. Matthiessen, Vegard Skirbekk, Pawel Strzelecki, and Maria Rita Testa at least as a co-author. Caldwell’s demographic data are mainly taken from the Data Sheet published yearly by the Vienna Demographic Institute, with which in fact, quite a few of the authors encountered and named above have been or are associated. He also made use of information collected by the OECD and the international migration organisation (MPI).

In the notes and indices that form part of the books of Bawer and Steyn, one may find a very large number of widely known names of politicians, publicists, columnists and commentators though I have not been able to identify any de-
mographers amongst them. In part this reflects a difference in orientation and, more likely, a difference in the level of scholarly ambition.

CONSIDERATIONS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOGRAPHIC THINKING AND LITERATURE

It would require an extensive survey and study of recent demographic literature to be able to state categorically to what extent different Universal History considerations influence the thinking of contemporary demographers. As yet, no such an investigation has been undertaken. From simply observing what is being published one may gain an impression. It would seem that in current demographic literature, opinions on the way observed demographic changes might fit into a larger scheme of historical development are hardly, if at all, expressed. Explicit discussion about how observations can be appreciated against a backdrop of historical processes of change in the developed world is commonly absent. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to say that the two distinct approaches sketched out earlier can still be recognised.

Authors describing recent developments in somewhat alarmist terms, stressing the potentially negative impact of declining population numbers on the power and influence of the developed region, and on Europe in particular, probably lean toward the Rise and Decline model. Laqueur, Bawer, Caldwell and Steyn would have had no quarrel with such writings. They may have seen them as confirming their point of view that Europe is in a bad state and that its demographic prospects, and hence its future, are quite simply dismal. The recently published illustrative calculations by a group of reputable demographers, stating that through a set of self-reinforcing mechanisms the populations of low fertility countries could be moving along a path leading to a difficult to reverse downward spiral in the number of births, could quite possibly be interpreted as a new warning that the end of the continent as a world power is in sight (Lutz et al. 2006). It is, no doubt, more spectacular than the finding by Tomáš Sobotka that a rise in fertility appears more likely than a further decline if one carefully lists all factors influencing future childbearing. Such a finding is probably a bit too nuanced if one wants to make strong statements about Europe’s demographic and political future.

Studying the Rise and Decline model of demographic change and contrasting this with demographic trends in Western Europe during the last half century or so does not necessarily imply a strong belief in it. One may be more intent on sketching a possible sequence of demographic developments and a scenario of its conceivable geo-political repercussions and social economic consequences, than attempting to predict the future.
Another approach advanced after the mid 1980’s aims to be more predictive. It fits the developmental paradigm concept described by Thornton like a glove fits onto a hand. It does not predict an end-state but assumes the continued development of Western societies, indeed the continuing development of all societies. The basic idea is that from the mid 1960’s onward a new demographic regime came to be established, first in Northern and then in Western Europe. The proposition was that a ‘second demographic transition’ was spreading over Europe and, presumably, would affect Southern, Central and Eastern Europe at a later stage. The finding that fundamental changes were underway was first presented by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986) and elaborated repeatedly thereafter (Van de Kaa 2008; Lesthaeghe 2010).

The second transition concept was developed far earlier and is thus entirely separate from Thornton’s work. Upon sober reflection, however, it appears to stand in the developmental paradigm tradition. It shares observation of demographic trends in a global developmental context. Important changes in demographic trends and behaviour observed in the ‘most advanced’ parts of Europe during the last 45 years or so are interpreted as signifying the advent of a new demographic regime. This new regime is bound to affect the demographic future of developed societies profoundly. It is very difficult to fully appreciate the current demographic situation in Europe without recognition that in the decades since the mid 1960’s the demographic constellation in the different countries of Europe has changed quite fundamentally. The demographic shifts can be summed up in very few points. The strong bonds between sexuality, marriage and procreation have been disrupted; cohabitation and childbirth are no longer the prerogative of the married. Conception requires the conscious choice not to practice contraception, not to use a ‘morning after pill’, and not to resort to abortion when pregnant. Consequently the number of children now born commonly remains below what people as adolescents or at any other point in their lives may have desired or considered ideal. Mortality levels are now largely determined by biological and individually controllable factors, instead of economic or social factors and exposure to infections. And, finally, immigration while not commonly encouraged, replaces the long tradition of emigration that existed in the most open societies of the continent. In sum, Europe’s period of population growth has most probably come to an end.

Caldwell (see his note 242) apparently became aware of the discussion session on the second transition that took place at the European Population Conference held in Warsaw in 2003. But he must have seen no reason to incorporate the concept in the European ‘revolution’ he has sketched in such stark terms. If he had, he would have seen that all other parts of Europe had indeed followed the trendsetters in the North and West. And, further, that there is ample evidence that other developed regions, the ‘blue’ states of the US, for example, have started to exhibit the same pattern. He could have grasped that
regions as they are developing appear to reduce their population growth and experience a shift in demographic regime. Fuelled by ‘developmental idealism’ as defined by Thornton, ultimately, all parts of the world will experience this new demographic regime so that, in due course, humankind will live without fear for the dire consequences of an ever-expanding world population.

It really is a pity that the authors writing about the ‘end of Europe’ have not learnt from the demographers they consulted, that in their broadest context the shifts in population and demographic behaviour they so lament reflect the fact the populations in different parts of the world are subject to different demographic regimes. Moreover, they might then have understood that the situation is far from settled. The developed world, and Europe in particular, has a period of immense expansion behind it. Mortality declined and fertility was slow to follow. Consequently, natural population growth was unusually rapid and excess population was siphoned off to other parts of the world. As stressed before, this expansionist regime came to an end by the mid-1960s. Now Europe and developed countries more generally have entered a new regime. Here and there in the developed world it has not, as yet, fully played itself out. But where it is most advanced it appears to be cognisant of the limits to growth and to be highly responsive to individual rights and decision making. People voluntarily limit the size of their family to such an extent that (illegal) immigrants readily find a place on the labour market. The basic dimension of the current demographic situation in the world is that while the developed world has left its expansionist phase behind, parts of the developing world are still experiencing its effects. Even though many are at the tail end of the first demographic transition, they are still growing and have population to spare. As against that, in the developed world a new regime has been – or is being – established that takes control of reproduction very seriously. And, fertility can now be controlled close to perfection. Couples and individuals weigh the pros and cons of having a(nother) child, and the way it will affect their lives, quite carefully. At least for the moment they have little regard for the way this works out on the aggregate level.


It must have been in the late 1960s that I picked up a thin pocketbook entitled (in Dutch) “24 July to 4 August. The last 12 days of the Old Europe”. The author was a British journalist called George Malcolm Thomson. The dates mentioned concern the summer of the year 1914. The author describes in detail, and day by day, how through a series of erroneous decisions and false assumptions about the intentions and reactions of others the murder of Franz-
Ferdinand of Habsburg-Este and his morganatic wife in Sarajevo led to the First World War. It is the sort of book Walter Laqueur might well have read and enjoyed. I found it fascinating. The First World War did indeed change the face of Europe. It probably had been at the peak of its powers at the time of the Boxer rebellion, precisely at the turn of the 20th century, when foreign troops entered Beijing. It has been in proportional decline ever since, in a long drawn out global process that is likely to continue for decades. But, while successive generations will see the ‘Europe as they knew it’ disappear, that does not imply the end of European or Western civilisation and neither does it mean the end of the continent. European civilisation has penetrated everywhere and appears attractive to many different peoples. The population composition of the continent will change; it may well become multi-ethnic and will certainly no longer be exclusively white. Religions, some new, some less new to the continent may thrive. In certain areas and countries the population may, as we have seen, also decline somewhat but at this time further growth is widely regarded as being quite unattractive. Thus, developments go at least in the right direction and Europe may well benefit from them. Conceivably it might increase material wealth, help protect the environment, and increase the educational and other investments in the children who are born. Europe should again set an example for other continents to consider.

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ABSTRACT: I examine the international influence of developmental idealism in changing people’s beliefs and values, in producing family and demographic change, and in bringing cultural clashes within and between societies. Developmental idealism is a belief and value system stating that societal and familial attributes defined as modern are better than attributes defined as traditional, that modern societies produce modern families, that modern families facilitate the achievement of modern societies, and that freedom and equality are human rights. I discuss the international dissemination of developmental idealism and how it has clashed with local cultures, been resisted, and changed lives and social systems. I discuss the influence of developmental idealism in international human rights treaties, including those focused on children and women, in the modernization programs of such countries as China and Turkey, in campaigns to eliminate polygamy and female veiling, and in efforts to spread gender equality, family planning, low fertility, freedom of spouse choice, older ages at marriage, and the recognition of same-sex relationships. It has also been an influence bringing more personal freedom, with implications for divorce and sexual relations and childbearing outside marriage. I also discuss how developmental idealism produces resistance against it, national and international clashes of culture, and tensions within and between generations. Likely effects of developmental idealism in the future are also considered.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I examine the influence of developmental idealism on family change. Because we live in a globalised world, I take an international perspective, which requires national and sub-national perspectives. This is an impossibly difficult task, but the advantages of taking an international perspective are well worth the downside associated with falling short. With both historical and international perspectives, it is necessary to describe things in very general terms, and examples and details of specific arguments must be limited.
Many material and ideational forces have produced current marriage and family patterns, and many forces will shape the future. In this paper I focus on ideational or cultural factors, with an emphasis on developmental idealism, because these factors are important and have not received adequate attention. My focus on the ideational does not suggest that I believe other factors are not important, as I believe that a full understanding of family change requires consideration of a broad range of ideational and material factors and their intersections.

CULTURAL MODELS

Cultural models help people understand the world and how it operates. They specify what is good and moral, provide motivations for actions, and specify appropriate means to reach desired ends (Geertz 1973; Fricke 1997). These cultural models provide schemas or scripts that give categories for describing the world and specifications for appropriate behavior, relationships, and roles (Johnson-Hanks et al. in press; Thornton et al. 2001). As Johnson-Hanks and colleagues (in press) suggest, these models reside both within the heads of individuals and in the beliefs and values shared within communities. Cultural models are sometimes sufficiently shared that they are taken for granted. In other instances, multiple schemas exist within the same community and even within the same person. These models may be mutually reinforcing or conflicting. These cultural schemas have important implications for decision-making and behavior. They can change dramatically, especially across long periods of time.

For thousands of years the peoples of the world have had their own local cultures that have provided models for understanding the world and how it operates. These local cultures have also provided schemas specifying appropriate behavior and relationships.

A large literature documents a world culture that is in many ways different from the numerous local cultures existing around the world (Krücken and Drori 2009; Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987). This world culture is described as having originated from Christianity but being different from Christianity, even being its own quasi-religion (Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987). It is described as Western and modern, but as spreading throughout the world. This world culture places the autonomous individual at the center of its rational worldview. It emphasizes science, education, progress, development, freedom, equality, justice, consent, and human rights.

This world culture has been a powerful force changing the world. It has generated international increases in school attendance and in homogenizing school curriculums and programs (Baker and Letendre 2005; Chabott 2003). It
has given science enormous international prestige and funds to support its work (Drori et al. 2003). It has had an important role in the spread of support for human rights (Cole 2005; Meyer, Bromley, and Ramirez 2010; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004), in the spread of family planning (Barrett and Frank 1999), in expanding women’s roles (Berkovitch 1999), in advocating individualism (Bromley, Meyer, and Ramirez 2009), in changing laws regulating sexual expression (Frank, Camp, and Boucher in press), and in bringing legislation against female circumcision (Boyle 2002).

The world culture literature often emphasizes the influence of world culture on change outside the West. This is a natural emphasis for a worldview originating in Christianity and the West, but, as I have argued elsewhere (Thornton 2001, 2005), such influences have also been powerful in the West.

An important element of world culture is developmental idealism, a set of ideas specifying what constitutes the good life and how to achieve it. Developmental idealism indicates where social change is heading and that freedom and equality are human rights. Developmental idealism has direct implications for marriage and family life, and its international dissemination has been a powerful force for family change. Understanding developmental idealism is essential for understanding both the past and future of marriage and family.

Many mechanisms have spread developmental idealism internationally. Among these are colonialism, Christian missionaries, education, mass media, foreign aid programs, government policies and programs, national and international non-governmental organizations, and international treaties and conventions. As Luke and Watkins (2002) argue, such messages can spread because of the persuasiveness of the ideas and because powerful governments and non-governmental organizations provide financial incentives and legal sanctions for their adoption. My emphasis here is on the persuasiveness of the ideas, but I also mention the influence of money and power.

I do not endorse or reject developmental idealism or any of the local cultures of the world as good or bad, or true or false. I present developmental idealism, its intellectual underpinnings, and its consequences only to understand how it has influenced past marriage and family changes and how it is likely to influence the future. I now turn to a discussion of developmental idealism.

MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT

Models for Understanding the World

The ideas of modernity and development have been important in world culture. They have influenced Western thought from ancient Greece and Rome, through a millennium of Christian theology, the Enlightenment, and in much
social thought and policy of the 19th and 20th centuries. The modernization model posits a trajectory of development with all societies passing through the same stages (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1975/1969). The speed of modernization was assumed to vary, resulting in societies at different stages at the same time. Societies believed to be low in development were labeled as backward, undeveloped, traditional, or even barbarous, and societies believed to be developed were labeled as advanced, progressive, or modern.

It was commonly believed that societies of northwest Europe and its overseas migrant populations were the most modern, with other societies distributed at various lower levels (Thornton 2001, 2005). It was also assumed that the past situations of so-called modern societies could be observed within contemporary so-called traditional societies and that currently traditional societies would one day become like the advanced contemporary societies. The world was, thus, portrayed as dynamic, with the West providing a goal or model for modernization.

The family attributes of northwest Europe were often labeled as modern or developed, while many attributes in other places were labeled as traditional, undeveloped, or backward. This occurred despite the fact that there were extensive family variations within northwest Europe and extensive family variations within and across other world regions. It also occurred despite the fact that some places outside northwest Europe had many family attributes seen as characterizing northwest Europe (Szoltysek 2011; Todorova 1997). The family attributes of northwest Europe that came to be seen as modern included: little family solidarity, great individualism, low parental control over adolescent children, marriages arranged by mature couples through courtship, monogamy, gender equality, the absence of veils for women, and small and nuclear (or stem) households. In contrast, the following attributes were labeled as traditional: extensive family solidarity, little individualism, high parental control over adolescent children, marriages arranged at young ages by parents, polygamy, gender inequality, veils for women, and large and extended households. Also, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries northwest Europe experienced trends toward greater control over childbearing and toward lower fertility, and controlled and low fertility was labeled modern, and uncontrolled and high fertility was labeled undeveloped.

Industrial and urban societies with high degrees of education, technology, wealth, and health were called modern or developed while societies with the opposite attributes were labeled traditional or underdeveloped. Scholars of the era also argued that changes from traditional to modern societies would produce modern families and that movement from traditional to modern families would bring modern societies. These perspectives and conclusions have been exceptionally influential for centuries (Thornton 2005).
Models for Dealing with the World

The ideas and conclusions from developmental approaches form the basis for developmental idealism (Thornton 2001, 2005). Developmental idealism provides policy makers and lay people new goals and methods. It provides beliefs and values suggesting that modern families, as defined above – including individualism, intergenerational independence, monogamy, marriages at mature ages, courtship as part of the process leading to marriage, gender equality, no veils for women, and planned and low fertility – are good and should be striven for. Developmental idealism also indicates that modern society – including being urbanized, industrialized, highly educated, healthy, and wealthy—is good and should be striven for. It also stresses that modern societies and modern families are causally interconnected in reciprocal relationships that give governments and individuals guidance about the means for achieving societal development and about what family changes to expect as a result of societal development. Also note that the ideas of modernization and development specify that science, secularism, free markets, democracy, and the separation of church and state are modern, good, and causally connected to the other elements of modernity. Also, developmental idealism locates the highest point of development in north-western Europe and its overseas populations, suggesting that these regions can serve as models for those living elsewhere.

Developmental idealism not only defines what it sees as modern as good and moral, but frequently views what it defines as traditional and undeveloped as bad, backward, and immoral. Thus, developmental idealism not only strives for the so-called modern and moral, but fights against what it defines as backward and immoral.

Many elements of modernization models have come under heavy criticism in many sectors of academia during recent decades (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1975/1969; Wallerstein 1991; Chakrabarty 2000). The criticisms indicate that the developmental model is teleological and that its assumptions of uniform and directional change cannot be sustained. Despite these criticisms, many of
the ideas associated with modernity are increasingly recognized as exceptionally powerful forces internationally within both governments and non-governmental organizations (Krücken and Drori 2009; Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997). In addition, qualitative studies have identified the existence and influence of modernization ideas, including developmental idealism, among lay people in many international settings (Dahl and Rabo 1992; Ferguson 1999; Osella and Osella 2006; Pigg 1992; Abu-Lughod 1998; Yount et al. 2010). Survey data also document that lay people in many settings have development models and endorse many of the elements of developmental idealism (Binstock and Thornton 2007; Mitchell 2009; Thornton, Binstock, and Ghimire 2008; Thornton et al. in press).

Because the cultural models that have existed for centuries in local populations are often very different from developmental idealism, the introduction of developmental idealism is usually not followed by simple adoption, but is resisted and modified, often producing a clash of cultures. Although the pathways of change and continuity frequently vary across populations, the spread of developmental idealism has had enormous effects on many dimensions of life, including marriage and family, around most of the world. In almost every place, there is resistance, and the resisters have slowed change and succeeded in keeping many aspects of local culture. Nevertheless, almost everywhere there have been changes, with a common outcome being hybridization.

Although the West has for centuries been seen as identical with modernity, the emphasis on modernity and the contrast with other places brought the West an “other” to compare itself to and to move away from. Thus, the West could emphasize as good the elements of its culture that it defined as the most modern and move even more in that direction. Also, the Enlightenment principles of freedom, equality, and consent gained power in the following centuries for changing hierarchical and authoritarian aspects of the West that had existed for centuries (Thornton 2005). As the West changed, the definition of modernity itself changed, and modernity took on diverse and sometimes competing meanings.

I now discuss some ways that developmental idealism has influenced family and marriage. Because many family issues are controversial, I emphasize again that my purpose is not advocacy but analysis and that my intent is not to endorse or condemn any of the elements of developmental idealism or their effects. Instead, my purpose is to evaluate the influence of developmental idealism on past family changes and to analyze its relevance for the future. I also do not believe that developmental idealism is the only force producing family changes.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Important manifestations of developmental idealism and forces for its spread are international agreements or conventions. By the early 21st century there were more than 100 human rights instruments in force (Simmons 2009, page 37). Almost all were adopted after World War II. They cover many things, ranging from freedom from torture and servitude, to freedom of movement and assembly, and to freedom of religion and thought. Three such conventions are particularly relevant to family and marriage: Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Marriage Convention (MC). All three are aimed at restructuring marriage and family relationships along the lines of developmental idealism.

CEDAW provides for the equality of women and men in all aspects of life. It calls for the empowerment of women in both family and non-family spheres through education, employment, and reproductive rights. Parent-child relations are also modified by changing female education, employment, and reproductive rights. All such movement is in the direction of developmental idealism.

The Convention on the Rights of Children specifies a wide range of rights for children. Boyle, Smith, and Guenther (2007) indicate that the central principles of CRC are individualism and universalism, suggesting that children everywhere have the same universal rights. Boyle et al. (2007, page 273) indicate that these standards are “Western in their orientation” and directed toward the construction of modern individuals. CRC separates the interests of children from their parents, emphasizing children as “autonomous, agentic, and responsible” (Boyle et al. 2007, page 267). Children are given the rights of free expression, thought, religion, and association (Simmons 2009). CRC also protects children from what are seen as harmful cultural practices, with this protection aimed at practices in non-western countries seen as problematic (Boyle et al. 2007).

The Marriage Convention assumes that parents and children have different interests in children’s marriages (Boyle et al. 2007). It specifies that there should be complete freedom of spouse choice. The Convention also specifies that young people should not marry until they reach adulthood and permits states to determine the appropriateness of marriages.

There is disagreement on whether international conventions change government programs and people’s behaviour. Recent studies indicate from both statistical and case study methods that conventions are often effectual (Simmons 2009; Tsutsui and Shin 2008). There are several mechanisms for such conventions having effects. They carry normative significance and international legitimacy for principles, empower people, provide tools to support mobilization, have an education role, raise rights consciousness, and change values.
SOME PAST EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENTAL IDEALISM

China

I now discuss the effects of developmental idealism in several countries, beginning with China. Before the middle of the 19th century most people in China considered China to be the middle kingdom, or centre of the universe. Beginning in the 19th century, China experienced a long period of defeat and humiliation at the hands of the West and Japan and launched its campaign to find and/or create “modern China” (Spence 1999/1990). China sent numerous emissaries to the West to learn the secrets of Western wealth, technology, and power. These emissaries discovered the ideas of developmental idealism, and they and Westerners in China distributed these ideas inside China. Campaigns were launched, with considerable success, to eliminate foot binding as a backward and harmful practice (Lang 1968/1946; Levy 1966). White wedding dresses from the West were introduced and competed successfully with red wedding dresses previously prevalent in China – a remarkable occurrence since white was historically associated with death in China (Lang 1968/1946).

Both the Nationalist and Communist parties adopted many ideas of developmental idealism and worked towards the transformation of the Chinese family. The success of the communist revolution in 1949 brought a new marriage law, implementing many elements of developmental idealism (Cartier 1996/1986; Whyte 1990). Family planning and low fertility were not initially included in the reform package of the Chinese Communist Party, but by the 1970s China had launched its aggressive one-child policy to facilitate development. These programs have helped to reduce substantially arranged marriages, family lineages, concubinage, and the marriages of young children (Davis and Harrell 1993; Greenhalgh 1994). The campaign against the ancestral chain has been so effective that it has been possible in recent decades for Chinese to reach adulthood without knowing about the ancestral chain and its previous centrality in Chinese society. In addition, age at marriage has increased dramatically, and fertility has fallen to the very low level of 1.5 children per woman, on average (Guo and Chen 2007).

Turkey

Many elements of the Chinese story exist in Turkey, although there are important differences resulting from Turkey’s own culture and interactions with the West (Kavas 2010; Nauck and Klaus 2008). The Ottoman Empire had been
one of the world’s powers, but during the 18th and 19th centuries, many Ottomans became fascinated with Western wealth, technology, and power. This led to a desire to adopt Western ways, and innovations were made among many of the country’s elite.

The Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I, and a smaller Turkey emerged with a government that adopted many elements of developmental idealism as doctrine and policy. This policy was implemented and enforced over several decades, although with resistance from many quarters. The efforts of Turkey to enter the European Union have provided additional impetus for the adoption of European ways. These programs have been instrumental in the banning of veils from public institutions, increases in gender equality, the decline of parental control over young people, the rise of self-choice marriages, increases in age at marriage, and the decline of fertility to replacement level (Kavas 2010).

Other Countries

Similar stories can be told for many additional countries. I can mention only a few. Within a relatively short time after the European discovery of America, many native Americans were speaking European languages and were at least nominally Christian, with many family attributes such as young marriage and polygamy restricted. Similarly, the colonization of Africa by Europeans led to many Africans becoming Christian and being influenced by European ideals and norms. Japan also launched its own campaign of modernization. In Nepal, the endorsement of development is widespread, along with the desirability of family change to bring development.

Women and Veils

The battle to eliminate women’s veils has occurred in many places other than Turkey. It was an active – and in many ways successful – program in Central Asia under the Russian Empire and Soviet Union (Northrop 2004). It was also an active program of the Shah’s regime in Iran before the 1979 revolution. Elimination of veils and gender segregation was added to the fight against terrorism in the 21st century as a justification for the Western military presence in Afghanistan. Interestingly, the migration of Muslims to Europe has led several European countries that usually take great pride in their emphasis on freedom to take steps to abolish the veil in public places (“Running for cover” 2010; Erlanger 2010). This has been justified both as a security measure and as a way to eliminate backwardness and the repression of women.
Efforts to eliminate veils have met great resistance in many places and are losing traction in some places. The veil became a symbol of resistance against the Shah in Iran, and after the 1979 revolution it became compulsory. Counter reformers in Turkey have argued that the principle of freedom should allow women to wear the veil in public places. Similarly, there have been increases in wearing veils in other predominantly Muslim countries.

**Family Planning**

A powerful component of world culture is the international family planning movement. For centuries, high fertility and large populations were seen as positive, but during the late 1700s, Western writers began to suggest high ages at marriage and low fertility as explanations for Western socioeconomic accomplishments (Malthus 1986/1798). Although such arguments initially gained little traction, an international family planning program was initiated after WW II to increase age at marriage and the use of birth control and to reduce birth rates (Barrett and Frank 1999; Donaldson 1990; Greenhalgh 1996). Several factors motivated these programs, but a central justification was the belief that they would foster socioeconomic development (Barrett, Kurzman, and Shanahan 2010).

Family planning programs were not accepted and implemented immediately, but in many instances met extensive resistance. Some countries, including China, initially rejected the call for population control. Another example of national rejection was Malawi where family planning was legally banned in the 1960s (Chimbwete, Watkins, and Zulu 2005). The government of Kenya publicly endorsed family planning in the 1960s, but resisted implementing it (Chimbwete et al. 2005). Later, each of these countries – China, Malawi, and Kenya – implemented more vigorous family planning programs.

Despite the initial resistance, almost all so-called “developing countries” adopted such programs by the 1980s, although with varying degrees of enthusiasm and effectiveness (Johnson 1994). In some programs, for example at times in China, India, and Indonesia, the government tried to take control of reproduction from individual couples (Thornton 2005). Government control mechanisms in these places included monitoring women’s reproductive cycles, requiring government permission to have a baby, and forcing abortion and sterilization.

In 1994, the agenda shifted from prioritizing population control to prioritizing gender equity and reproductive health for everyone, including adolescents (Luke and Watkins 2002). Although the full story is more complex, from the viewpoint of this paper, this shift was a change in priorities from one element of developmental idealism, low fertility, to other elements of developmental
idealism, equality and freedom. Endorsement of this new emphasis in Ghana, Bangladesh, Malawi, Senegal, and Jordan was mixed, with some elements being rejected, at least initially in some places (Luke and Watkins 2002). International financial resources were also important in motivating acceptance of certain programs, although such incentives were not always successful, at least in the short run. Interestingly, by the late 1990s, there was widespread endorsement of the family planning element of the international population agenda in these countries (Luke and Watkins 2002).

The changes in marriage, contraception, and childbearing have been phenomenal. In many countries where women previously married as teenagers or earlier, average ages at marriage have extended into the twenties, even the late twenties. Contraception has become common, and abortion has been legalized in many countries. There have been important fertility declines in most of the world’s populations. Many countries have fertility levels at approximately replacement levels of just over two children per woman. In some countries, especially in East Asia and Europe, fertility levels have fallen, at least temporarily, to 1.5 children or below. Overall fertility levels in the US are at or near replacement, but are below replacement in some groups.

Several elements of developmental idealism are important for understanding fertility declines, including high consumption aspirations, the expansion of female employment, and desires for few children. In parts of Europe many people have not only assimilated the belief that two children are better than three, but that zero or one is acceptable and may be preferable to two (Sobotka 2009). Recent surveys in Argentina, China, Egypt, Iran, Nepal, and the US document that low fertility is seen by great majorities to be correlated with development, a product of development, and a factor producing development (Thornton et al. in press).

Fertility at 1.5 children or below will have substantial effects if sustained over long periods. It would reduce populations by one-quarter or more each generation, with large reductions in working age populations. Sustaining population levels would require substantial international migration that would change the ethnic composition of populations. Such low fertility, accompanied by low mortality at older ages, is also producing older populations.

Reproductive freedom has been an important theme across recent decades. Among its earliest successes was the 19th and early 20th century fight to eliminate restrictions against contraceptive devices. Increases in the effectiveness, number, and availability of contraceptive supplies have been a major story of the 20th century, with governments shifting from being active opponents to active proponents. In recent decades abortion shifted from being a violation of norms and laws to being accepted and legal in many places. The legalization of abortion in the US was made possible by the expansion of freedom and the discovery of a new right to privacy. As noted earlier, however, in some places
reproductive freedom was deemed less important than fertility reduction, as the use of contraception and abortion was forced.

*Marital Timing and Processes*

Efforts to increase age at marriage have extended beyond the international population control movement. For centuries child marriage and arranged marriage have been common in many parts of the world. In South Asia it was considered morally necessary by many for a girl to be married before her first menstruation, and many were so married. Some brides were even chosen before they were born. Such practices have been explicitly targeted for elimination, with mature marriage and self-choice marriage declared to be the rights of children, with vigorous programs to implement them (Boyle et al. 2007). There have been dramatic declines in both child marriage and arranged marriage in many places.

The fight against child and arranged marriage has largely been absent from northwest Europe because initial conditions were different (Brundage 1987; Hajnal 1965; Macfarlane 1986). For many centuries, most marriages in the West were contracted at mature ages by the bride and groom themselves – often with input by the couple’s parents – a pattern that was supported by the Catholic Church. Common law marriages could be contracted merely by a couple living together and presenting themselves to the world as wife and husband. In fact, marriage was historically under such control of the couple – requiring only the consent of the bride and groom – that legitimate marriages could occur in secret without rituals, licenses, witnesses, certificates, clergy, or government officials. With only the couple’s consent required, many disputes of the he said/she said variety arose concerning whether both members of the couple had agreed to the marriage.

This free marriage system was severely criticized during the Protestant Reformation, and a 500-year campaign supported by both Protestants and Catholics was launched to tighten control over marriage (Brundage 1987; Witte 1997). Reforms included requiring licenses, certificates, witnesses, and church or government officials for a marriage to occur. Reforms to prohibit common law marriages were also implemented in many places. These reforms were so effective in some places that many elements of them came to be seen as essential for marriage.

This 500-year effort to control marriage fell apart under the wave of freedom in the West during the 20th century, particularly after World War II, when the old norms requiring marriage to legitimize sexual relations, cohabitation, and childbearing were eroded (Thornton, Axinn, and Xie 2007). At first, love remained a requirement for sex, but later, for many, consent became the only
requirement for sex. Marriage also was no longer a marker for adulthood or a necessity for independent living. It became just a piece of paper for many, and a valued but unnecessary state that could be achieved at some indefinite future time when the perfect partner, two dream jobs, generous incomes, and a very nice house were achieved (Cherlin 2004). Also, childbearing was no longer required of the married.

Throughout the Western world, this new-found freedom and decreasing centrality of marriage have contributed to substantial postponement of marriage and childbearing within marriage (Thornton et al. 2007). It has also greatly increased sex, cohabitation, and childbearing outside of marriage. Although these trends began in northwest Europe and its overseas populations, they have recently spread to Southern and Eastern Europe and to parts of East Asia and Latin America (Lesthaeghe 2010; Cerruti and Binstock 2009; Thornton and Philipov 2009).

Divorce

The trend towards easier and more frequent divorce extends back to the Protestant Reformation when the prohibition against it was refuted by the reformers, although they stressed that it should be difficult and infrequent (Phillips 1988). The Enlightenment gave the trend towards easier divorce added impetus, as it emphasized that consent was not only required for the contraction of marriage, but that it could later be withdrawn and the marriage dissolved (Thornton 2005).

Freedom was particularly emphasized during the French Revolution, with its slogan of freedom, equality, and fraternity. Late in the 18th century revolutionary France passed an essentially no-fault divorce law, which was revoked in later years (Phillips 1988; Traer 1980). The French Revolution also produced a longer lasting reform requiring equal inheritance (Traer 1980). Following the American Revolution – with its emphasis on freedom and equality – there was a less dramatic but more permanent easing of divorce laws (Cott 2000). Divorce laws in the West became very easy following World War II, and public attitudes toward divorce have become more permissive (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; van de Kaa 1987).

These trends have been accompanied by dramatic increases in the divorce rate and the number of single-parent families. With many divorced people remarrying, there has also been an important rise in the number of blended or reconstituted families. These trends have occurred both in the West and elsewhere.
Same-Sex Relations

Particularly important in the past two decades has been the expansion of the rights of people with same-sex orientation, an expansion in the United States associated with the new right of privacy. With the backing of the principles of freedom and equality, sexual acts between two people of the same sex were decriminalized and legitimated in a few decades. Gays and lesbians became more open about their sexual orientations and became more accepted in many places.

Decriminalization of gay and lesbian sexual relations has occurred in other countries as well. One recent example is India where the country’s highest court over-turned the prohibitions against sex-sex relations on the grounds that they violated the principles of equality and liberty (Timmons 2009).

So great has been this movement that several European countries, Canada, and several states in the United States have recognized same-sex marriages. Also, a US federal court ruled in 2010 that California’s ban against same-sex marriage violated the US constitution’s guarantee of equal protection and due process (Dolan and Williams 2010). This decision will likely be appealed and reach the Supreme Court.

Grassroots Penetration

Many changes in ideas and behaviour have permeated to the grassroots in many places. An educator in Nepal in 2008 informed me that he taught the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Rights of Children to students in his classes. The children in his classes were learning new beliefs and values, being empowered by international norms, and gaining tools to challenge the authority of their parents. Many other elements of family and marriage change have penetrated the grassroots, including marriage timing and processes, family planning, veils, and polygamy.

Recent research provides considerable evidence that a large proportion of ordinary people around the world understand the ideas of development and developmental hierarchies, believe that many family attributes such as gender equality, low fertility, high ages at marriage, and intergenerational independence are correlated internationally with development levels, believe that development causes family change, and believe that modern families help bring development. Thus, endorsement of developmental idealism is not just an elite phenomenon, but is evident in the beliefs and values of ordinary people (Binstock and Thornton 2007; Mitchell 2009; Thornton, Binstock, and Ghimire 2008; Thornton et al. in press, 2010a; Yount et al. 2010).
Changes can be Slow but Extensive

It can take decades, even centuries, for the principles of developmental idealism to be adopted because they are often in competition with well-entrenched beliefs, values, and social and economic arrangements. Many of the examples mentioned above illustrate this fact, and here I mention the efforts for racial and gender equality in Western societies.

Chattel slavery of African Americans was both legal and widespread in colonial British North America in the 1770s. However, Thomas Jefferson, a slave owner invigorated by the Enlightenment, wrote in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights” that include “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/freedom/doi/text.html). Jefferson later served as the third president of the new United States where slavery was enshrined in a constitution that also provided an aggressive Bill of Rights.

Slavery was still widespread more than eighty years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. In a Senate campaign debate in 1858, Abraham Lincoln argued that the Declaration of Independence applied to African Americans and that slavery was “a moral, social and political wrong” (cited in Goodwin 2005, page 203). His opponent, Stephen Douglas, declared that the “signers of the Declaration of Independence had no reference to negroes at all when they declared all men to be created equal. They did not mean negro, nor the savage Indians, nor the Fejee Islanders, nor any other barbarous race. They were speaking of white men” (cited in Goodwin 2005, page 204). Two years later Lincoln was elected president, the American Civil War commenced, slavery was abolished, and amendments to the US Constitution provided additional rights.

A century later, African Americans were still far from equal or free. Yet, the same principles of freedom and equality that energized Jefferson and Lincoln energized a new civil rights movement. Martin Luther King Junior dreamed that people would be judged by their character and not by the color of their skin. King was assassinated, but over subsequent decades, additional legislation was passed to protect African American rights, prejudice against Blacks declined, restrictions against interracial marriages were declared unconstitutional, affirmative action programs were adopted, and an African American was elected president in 2008. This does not mean that total racial freedom and equality existed in America in 2008, but the contrast with America in 1776 is sharp.

Gender provides another example of the long time frame often associated with change. In 1690 John Locke (1988/1690), a British philosopher, wrote that
women and men came together in marriage as equals, a normative rather than descriptive statement for British society in the 17th century. A few years later Mary Astell (1970/1730, page 107) asked the simple question, “if all Men are born Free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves?”, a challenge that has been heard around the world. Enlightenment writers declared that the status of women was an indicator of development levels in a society, and declarations were passed concerning the rights of women, for example in France in 1791 and the United States in 1848 (Thornton 2005).

It was not until the end of the 19th century that women received the right to vote in certain American jurisdictions, but this did not occur in the whole of the US and in most other Western countries until the early 20th century. The rights and status of women have generally increased over the past decades. Community identity separate from their husbands, substantial participation in the labour force, educational attainments that often equal and sometimes exceed those of men, and the acceptance of legal equality are some of the many changes in Western societies during the past century. In addition, egalitarian attitudes towards the place of women have expanded dramatically, equal rights for women are enshrined in international treaties, and gender equality is being globalised as an element of world culture. Recent studies document worldwide increases in women’s status and egalitarian gender values (Dorius and Firebaugh 2010; Dorius and Alwin 2009). This does not mean that equality has been achieved, but the changes in that direction have been substantial.

Similar points have been made for Egypt (Abu-Lughod 1998; Yount and Rashad 2008). Egyptians have had tremendous contact over the years with the ideas legitimating female education, women’s employment, nuclear families, and companionate marriage. Ideas about what constitutes proper family life have been transformed. Abu-Lughod (1998, page 261) suggests that “access to any sort of real ‘tradition’ has been made impossible by the historical cultural encounter with the West”. Many aspects of developmental idealism are opposed vigorously in Egypt, but this opposition occurs within the context of a changed cultural reality.

CLASHES OF CULTURE

The spread of developmental idealism has led to many clashes of culture because developmental idealism brings new values and beliefs that often contradict other beliefs and values. These clashes of culture occur at many levels: within countries; between countries; and within individuals and families. In addition, because developmental idealism contains several different elements, clashes occur within developmental idealism itself. I now discuss these types of culture clashes, beginning with clashes within countries.
Within Country Culture Clashes

In many ways the cultural clashes in the United States, which Hunter (1991) refers to as “cultural wars”, are a direct outcome of the spread of developmental idealism. As I mentioned earlier, the world’s people have for centuries had their own cultural models and schemas that have defined their sense of right and wrong. Western Europe and the United States are not exceptions, and culture and laws in these regions have historically opposed contraception, abortion, divorce, same-sex relations, premarital sex, and cohabitation and childbearing outside marriage. The increased acceptance and practice of these behaviors have elicited strong opposition and conflict.

Many clashes of culture in the US can be traced to these issues. The importance of abortion, divorce, same-sex relations, and premarital sex, cohabitation, and childbearing for culture clashes and American politics is demonstrated by research showing that voting patterns are strongly related to the geographical distribution of family behaviours. Geographical distributions of votes in recent US presidential elections and in state-wide initiatives followed closely the geographical distribution of various family attributes (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006, 2009). The blue-state red-state distinction in elections is closely related to the extent to which the behaviours supported by developmental idealism are evident in particular jurisdictions.

International Culture Clashes

Clashes of culture extend around the world and are often associated with desires for an alternative modernity that is different from the West – a modernity seen as suitable or moral. Many see certain personal and family patterns in the West as immoral and corrupt, with these viewpoints probably enhanced by the exaggerated displays often produced in the Western media that are available internationally. In the Middle East, for example, many people view modern personal and family attributes as largely compatible with their values, but they see Western personal and family life as largely incompatible with their values and view them, and local people who adopt them, as immoral (Yount et al. 2010).

The views of people in the Middle East about the immorality of American personal and family life are related to their views of American morality in general. In recent surveys in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, respondents were asked to rate several countries on morality, and the US was rated the lowest and France the second lowest. In a youth survey in Egypt, the average rating of American
morality on a scale from one to ten only reached 2.1, whereas the average morality ratings for Egypt and Saudi Arabia were respectively 6.5 and 7.2 (Thornton et al. 2010b).

Such international clashes of culture can become intense when people outside the West perceive that the West is imposing its immoral standards on them. This has taken many forms over the centuries as developmental idealism has conflicted with local cultural models. A recent example occurred in Malawi. Two gay men formed an unofficial marriage and were then arrested and sentenced to hard labour. This provoked considerable international outrage, strong communications from international bodies, a visit from the UN Secretary General, and threats to cut off foreign aid. The Malawi government reluctantly reacted to this international pressure by pardoning the two men (Bearak 2010).

The clashes between developmental idealism and local cultures take another form when the beliefs and values of developmental idealism are arrayed against non-Western norms and behaviours that are defined by developmental idealism as being especially backward. There are several examples of values and behaviour that have been labeled and condemned as barbarous, with strong action taken to eliminate them. Polygamy, or one man having multiple wives at the same time, is one example of strenuous fights against so-called barbarism over many years and places (Thornton 2005, 2011). For millennia, polygamy had been considered a legitimate form of marriage in many countries, sometimes viewed as the preferred form of marriage. Yet, for centuries, monogamous Westerners have passed laws and launched campaigns to eliminate the practice in numerous settings around the world, including several in Africa (Phillips 1953).

In the 19th century the US Congress declared polygamy to be illegal and over several decades passed increasingly harsh laws to eliminate the practice within a small religious group (Thornton 2005). These laws were challenged on the basis that they violated religious freedom, but in several decisions, the Supreme Court declared that the principle of freedom did not extend to two women being married to the same man. The primary rationale for these decisions rested on the declaration that polygamy was a barbaric practice contrary to civilized ideals. Such laws have been reaffirmed by the US Supreme Court in the 20th century.

Other local cultural beliefs and practices are being fought around the world. Sometimes these are identified as “harmful cultural practices”. Efforts to eliminate such harmful practices reach into the lives of individuals worldwide. For example, a newspaper advertisement sponsored by UNICEF in Malawi declares: “Stop Harmful Cultural Practices: Every child has a right to good health” (http://developmentalidealism.org/imagery/malawi.html). This UNICEF newspaper ad did not specify what it meant by harmful cultural practices, but it is
unlikely that it was aimed at Western cultural practices with negative health outcomes, such as smoking, consumption of junk food, the amount and content of television viewing, or the lack of exercise.

One particular cultural practice that UNICEF is desirous to end is female circumcision, also known as female genital cutting. This practice is widespread in some regions of the world and is currently targeted for elimination. Official statements condemning it, laws outlawing it, and campaigns against it have been implemented in several African countries (Boyle 2002; Yount 2004).

The strong cultural differences within and between societies raises the issue of alternative modernities. Cultural models supporting technology, wealth, health, education, airplanes, computers, and cell phones are relatively widespread internationally, but cultural models about personal and family lives can be very conflicting. These strong differences have led some to advocate alternative modernities and alternative pathways of progress. It has also led to variations in the pathways of change that some individuals and countries have taken.

Clashes of Cultures within Individuals and within Families

Clashes of culture can also occur within families and within individuals. Individuals can accept both the values and beliefs of their own local culture and the values and beliefs of developmental idealism, and the respective beliefs and values can clash. In many cases, especially when developmental idealism is first encountered, there is probably an easy rejection of it in favor of the long-standing local values and beliefs. As the ideas of developmental idealism become more familiar and understandable, and perhaps as they are accompanied by external incentives and/or sanctions, they start to compete with local values and beliefs within the minds of individuals. Over time, the within individual clashes can become intense.

There are many ways for within-individual culture clashes to be resolved. There can be outright rejection of developmental idealism or the local culture. Another possibility is a hybridization of values and beliefs, with the acceptance and practice of elements from both the local culture and developmental idealism. This hybridization may occur with the integration of disparate ideas into a coherent package, or the elements may fit together awkwardly. The ability to pick and choose, however, may be restricted by the fact that “modernity” and “traditionality” are sometimes seen as “packages” with an all-or-nothing character, with “modernity” in one dimension implying “modernity” in another. People may also adopt developmental idealism superficially and take different stances concerning it in different contexts.

Within family clashes of culture can be especially contentious. As different members of the same family differentially adopt or reject the elements of de-
developmental idealism, there can be considerable family tension and conflict. Such clashes are often intergenerational, as young people adopt new ideas that are contrary to those of their parents. Such clashes can also occur among siblings, as they differentially accept or reject developmental idealism.

Clashes within Developmental Idealism

The existence of many different values and beliefs within developmental idealism creates numerous opportunities for clashes within developmental idealism itself. There are many ways in which such clashes may occur, but I focus here primarily on clashes between the idea of freedom and the idea that behaviours labeled as backwardness or barbarism should be eliminated. Although freedom may be considered a human right, other values can take precedence. If a particular cultural attribute, usually non-Western, is judged as barbaric from the perspective of developmental idealism, there are often efforts to limit people’s freedom to practice it. In short, in some cases people do not have the freedom to practice things labeled by developmental idealism as barbarism.

One such clash occurs in the case of sexual freedom and the practice of polygamy. In many places in the Western world today, freedom allows individuals to have sex with as many different or same sex consenting partners as they desire. Although adultery, a married person having sex with someone other than her/his spouse, is often considered unacceptable, there are no legal sanctions against it in many places today. However, if two women are simultaneously married to the same man, the threesome can be both socially ostracized and criminally sanctioned in some jurisdictions in both Canada and the United States. In fact, a man who has sexual relationships with two women who each say they are married to him is condemned by a larger percentage of Americans than almost any other behaviour (Thornton 2011). The clash between the acceptance of sexual freedom and the condemnation of polygamy is seldom acknowledged.

The Province of British Columbia in Canada is one jurisdiction that both currently criminalizes polygamy and recognizes a potential conflict between the anti-polygamy laws and the principles of freedom and equality. A British Columbia court is currently (May 2011) seeking to determine whether the perceived evils of polygamy trump freedom and equality, and, whatever the decision, it is expected to be appealed all the way to the Canadian Supreme Court. Polygamists in Canada and the United States have also mobilized to advocate for the decriminalization of their form of marriage, with sexual freedom being an important component of their arguments.

Another clash concerns women’s dress. Many Westerners today permit almost any dress, except if it covers a woman’s face. There is intense political
and legislative debate in several countries in Europe about the freedom for women to wear veils. It will be interesting to see how this clash is resolved in Europe and other settings.

Another clash of cultures within developmental idealism is female circumcision. This practice has been common in certain parts of the world for many centuries, presumably because it was valued in these settings. Powerful international forces have labeled this practice evil and have launched vigorous campaigns to remove freedom to practice it. To my knowledge there is currently no campaign to eliminate male circumcision, which is a form of male genital cutting.

My final example concerns the freedom of parents in rearing their children. Although parents have many such freedoms, their freedom is also limited in many places if they decide their children do not need education or if they decide who their children marry, especially if they make those decisions for very young children.

Of course, clashes between the principles of freedom and protecting what is seen as the public good do not occur only within developmental idealism but occur in many other areas of life. For example, the freedom to shout “fire” in a crowded movie theatre when there is no fire, the freedom to drive while under the influence of alcohol, and the freedom to print counterfeit money are all severely restricted. There are many considerations that enter into such decisions that do not directly involve developmental idealism. It is also not clear how such clashes are ameliorated. My purpose is not to make a judgment in any of these cases, but to illustrate the clashes that can occur among the elements of developmental idealism.

FUTURE EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENTAL IDEALISM

As we shift focus from the past to the future, we leave the advantages of hindsight and accept the difficulties of looking forward. I examine the future of family change and conflict within the lens of the developmental idealism perspective. The question is: How does the understanding of developmental idealism and its past influence provide insights into the future?

*Continuing Influence and Tension*

My firmest prediction is that developmental idealism will be a powerful future force in (nearly) every part of the world. Developmental idealism has been an extremely strong force in the past and there are no signs that it is weakening.
In fact, with the increasing globalization of the world, the power of developmental idealism may be increasing.

This suggests that many elements of developmental idealism will play out in the future in many ways that are similar to how they occurred in the past. Many practices defined by many in the West as harmful, backward, and barbaric – for example, female genital cutting, polygamy, and women wearing veils – are still evident in many places and will likely continue to be the targets of campaigns to eliminate them. In many places, fertility is still above replacement levels, people marry at young ages, parents arrange the marriages of their children, same sex orientation is repressed, same-sex marriage is not legally recognized, contraceptives fail, gender inequality is widespread, and there is opposition to abortion. Developmental idealism will be used to oppose each of these attributes well into the future.

It is likely that these trends will continue to generate considerable cultural clashes. As noted above, developmental idealism is being advocated among people who have long had their own beliefs and values. Many of these local cultural models continue to clash with developmental idealism, and these clashes are not likely to disappear soon. It is easy to predict long-term continuation of these cultural clashes within countries, between countries, within individuals and families, and within developmental idealism itself.

Pathways of Future Change

The part of the future just discussed seems easy to predict. What are more difficult to ascertain are the particular decisions and pathways of future change and continuity. I will speculate on such directions, but because my crystal ball is cloudy, I will primarily ask questions to consider as we think about the future.

I begin by asking what will happen if same-sex marriage is considered by the US Supreme Court, as it likely will. Will the Court declare that states have the right to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples? If the Court decides that states do not have this right, will there be a constitutional amendment? And, what will the American people support and not support? Similarly, will same-sex relations be decriminalized in Malawi and other parts of the world? And, if so, will same-sex couples in Malawi and elsewhere eventually be able to contract legal marriages? Such questions can be raised on many other issues in numerous places.
Possible Limitations on Developmental Idealism

I mentioned earlier the clashes between various elements of developmental idealism and discussed some ways that certain freedoms are restricted. It may also be useful to contemplate the possibility of other limits on freedom, equality, individualism, and the necessity of consent. One area where this seems relevant today concerns the rearing of children. At what point do children have the right to determine their own educational programs and activities? What are the rights of parents in this? In many Western societies age at marriage is increasing and age at sexual initiation is declining. Are there any minimum legitimate limits on ages for sexual intercourse that parallel the specifications in many places of a minimum age for contracting marriage? Will children of any age have the right to have sexual relations with any other child, as long as the two are willing and able?

I mentioned earlier that in some places fertility rates are substantially below what is needed for population replenishment. Is there any limit on how low fertility can or will go? Will a new equilibrium – or new equilibriums in different places – be found in age at marriage and the number of people ever marrying? Or will age at marriage and the number who never marry continue to increase? Are there any real limitations on the number of marital dissolutions that occur and will society reach some kind of equilibrium in this regard? Are there limitations on the extent to which human beings, social animals for sure, can operate as individuals rather than as members of social units?

Challenges to Western Exports

I earlier raised the issue of the exportation and, in some cases, imposition of Western values and practices in many parts of the world. Such exportation and imposition is often accomplished by the identification of the values and practices originating in the West as universal and modern. This exportation and importation is also benefited by the designation of the West as an advanced role model for societies seen as less developed.

This exportation of Western cultural models as universal and modern is frequently effective, but it is also sometimes recognized and criticized (“Some say they don’t want them” 2010; Clayton and Banda 2010). Such cultural models are sometimes recognized as simply foreign and inappropriate for a given society (Chimbwete et al. 2005). This seems to be true in many places, as people wonder about alternative models of modernity considered to be more suitable. They ask, is Sweden an appropriate model for the US, and are the US and Sweden appropriate models for Hungary, Egypt, and Kenya? Will asking such questions increase in the future, with non-Westerners increasingly asking where
Westerners got the right to be models of the good and to tell them what is moral and immoral in their own societies? If this occurs, how much will it detract from the power of developmental idealism as an international force? Will the exportation and importation of Western cultural models under the labels of universal, modern, and progressive values continue into the indefinite future?

Another dimension of this is the disdain by many of Western cultural patterns. As I discussed earlier, some Western cultural practices are seen as immoral by many people in the Middle East and elsewhere. In addition, Western countries are not always on the side of developmental idealism. They can take opposite positions when they see them to be in their own national interests. Support of repressive governments when they are supportive of Western economic or political interests is one example of this.

CONCLUSION

I close with the observation that there is considerable evidence consistent with the conclusion that developmental idealism and its integration into world culture have been important forces for family and marriage change in the West and elsewhere. Establishing causation is always difficult, especially since cultural models and changes in those models are infrequently measured, but there are many reasons to believe there are causal effects. Developmental idealism is not the only force for change as there are many other ideational and material forces, and its spread has been the locus of much resistance, tension, and conflict. But, over long time frames, its influence has been enormous, although local cultural schemas also guide the change and often persist, although often in modified form. This understanding of developmental idealism and its spread provides a framework for understanding family change, resistance to family change, and many cultural tensions within and between societies.

Developmental idealism also provides a useful framework for thinking about the future. There are many reasons to expect that many aspects of the future will be like the past. The principles of developmental idealism will continue to be advocated, exported, and imported. They will also continue to be resisted. Cultural clashes within and between countries, within individuals and their families, and within developmental idealism itself will continue. There will continue to be contradictions, and there may be limitations on how far developmental idealism can be implemented.

The past has been full of surprises. Any Rip van Winkle who was to awaken from a long sleep would be surprised – and probably shocked – by the many changes. The coming centuries will probably be as full of surprises as the last two centuries. The developmental idealism framework and this paper do not provide much assistance in specifying what pathways are the best for what
people, but they do provide an overview of some of the issues that will enter into the international flow of change and continuity in marriage and family relations. They also provide a framework for understanding the terrain of the journey. The framework also provides impetus for further research concerning the beliefs of policy makers and ordinary people about developmental idealism, the factors producing the associated values and beliefs, the consequences for family and marriage change, and the implications of these issues for international relations.

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ABSTRACT: This study proposes new ways of comparing discourses on population and argues that these discourses concern both management of the reproduction of human bodies on a massive scale, and competition at global and local levels for resources and/or an improved position in global and local hierarchies. This interface between global and local hierarchies actually reveals how we can understand the comparative politics of population management. We aim to establish some of the basic types of such positioning, linking global and local hierarchies in order to start the work of a truly comparative analysis of patterns of population policy, which cannot be sufficiently explained by demographic processes or the specific ideologies of ruling groups.

I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

In this study I propose new ways of comparing discourses on population. I argue that these discourse concern both management of the reproduction of human bodies on a massive scale, and competition at global and local levels for resources and/or an improved position in global and local hierarchies. In this sense I propose that Foucauldian biopolitical concerns need to be reintegrated into global versus local social inequality systems and related class-conflict discourses (Dean 2001; Stoler 1995). My aim is to provide concrete examples of biopolitical and competition (e.g. class conflict) discourses and relate these at a global level so as to enable comparative understanding of population policies.

History shows that world capitalism has been a system of competitive struggle to control management of resources. This fight in the early twentieth

1 The present study utilises some of my previous research on population discourses, but even these results have been recontextualised (Melegh 2002, 2005, 2006). An early version of this paper has been published in Hungarian “Nemzeti és etnikai identitások globális kontextusban. Kísérleti lépések a globális hierarchiák szociológiája felé. In Feischmidt Margit (ed.): Etnicitás. Különbségteremtő társadalom. Bp. Gondolat. MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 126–140. In this work I am especially grateful for the comments of József Böröcz, Arland Thornton, Dirk J. van de Kaa, Susan Zimmermann, Mahua Sarkar, Margit Feischmidt and Éva Kovács.

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century was all the more acute as global hegemonies were challenged (Chase-Dunn et al. 1999; Böröcz 2009, 93–99; Hobsbawm 1994, 6–8 86–89). Europe was fighting to regain some of its dominance in the face of economic weakness, in an era when its colonial system was on the brink of collapse. Intra- and extra-European struggles to dominate led to two world wars, during which France, Germany, Britain and Italy challenged each other to secure more intra- and extra-European influence. The United States was quickly becoming a ‘heavy weight’ nation in terms of per-capita income and economic weight whilst the pre-nineteenth-century great powers – India and China – were still declining in economic terms; Latin-American countries had already had a chance to experience some real independence and higher economic growth during the First World War (Frank 1968). It was a period of hegemonic transition, during which some states saw a chance to advance and secure a better position for themselves in global hierarchies.

This international geopolitical re-arrangement was coupled with another massive form of global social change: the decline and subordination of rural groups and economies, both internationally and internally, in a period characterised by global population growth. Writing about agriculture in world history, Mark Tauger describes this change as follows:

*The world’s agrarian economies and societies went through a series of complex economic, social and political crises during 1900-1940. Governments responded with unprecedented policy initiatives, most of which are still in effect. The crises in Europe and North America had particular significance, because of the dominant role of the U.S. economy and agriculture in the world and because European countries and colonies controlled most of the rest of the world’s farmland (Tauger 2011, 107–108).*

This integration of peasants and farmers into the world market and their subsequent subordination was the basis of an unequal relationship between industrial capitalism and agrarian economies. This was due to a gap between agrarian and industrial prices, an economic relationship that was embedded in larger colonial frameworks and larger and smaller imperialisms (Chayanov 1986; Tauger 2011, 106–138). The key result of this subordination was not only the creation of numerous “poor”, “delinquent” and “labouring” classes throughout the world (from Latin America and Europe to the huge states of Asia,) and the subsequent “social-hygenic” problems as perceived by the local colonial or ruling classes. These problems increased dramatically when the world economic crisis hit most economies of the world in the late 1920s. Peasant economies (privately owned, small-scale, rural-economic entities based on the labour of the family or co-residing household) and even larger estates with

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3 For the rise of inequality see O'Rourke, 1999, 181–83, 185–206.
lower capital intensity faced enormous problems in adapting to markets over
the longer term due to relatively low and often stagnating agrarian prices with
very short periods of improvement in terms of trade for agriculture in relation
Tauger 2011, 106–137). The exploitability of peasant or family economies can
partly be explained by internal factors, most notably the fact that wages could
not be calculated and thus profits as related to the market prices could not be
measured “properly”, thereby leading to “irrational” (i.e. self-exploitative)
behaviour (Chayanov 1986, 70–89; Tóth 2006, 42–43; Frank 1968; Macfarlane
1978, 7–33). This subordination was related to the functioning of massive mi-
gratory systems, in which increasing rural populations fled to areas with de-
mand for industrial work in the home country or abroad, or simply migrated to
colonies (Sassen 1999, 51–88; O’Rourke 1999, 185–06). This floating ex-
agrarian population was seen by the ruling classes as one of the most pressing
social problems to be dealt with (Schneider and Schneider 1996, 271-73; Quine
1999; Stepan 1991, 35–39; Hobsbawm 1987, chapters 2 and 5). These changes
strengthened an already intensified feeling that there was a need to intervene in
social processes in order to manage populations, in effect treating them as re-
sources to be managed locally and globally as part of a struggle to improve
position within global hierarchies.

Thus we can see that local political elites in Europe, in North America, and
also in the formerly independent Latin-American countries and colonies like
British India, started adopting measures that not only aimed to manage some of
the consequences of this crisis, but also sought remedies so as to secure better
positions. Among the remedies, the issue of the size, the “quality”, the health
and varying fertility rates of populations became very important issues, which
no state or social group could completely ignore. This is what Foucault de-
scribes as “biopolitics”, meaning the systematic attempt of governments or
systems of governments to advance the welfare and control certain groups on
the basis of mass statistical analysis, and to intervene when “unfortunate” bal-
ances emerge in the societies concerned. In such situations of “imbalance”,
arguments to exclude or even exterminate certain “unwanted” groups appear in
political discourses (Foucault 1991; Dean 2001). This “shepherd-flock game”
was not only coupled with the problem of who the citizen was in the relevant
political communities, but, as this paper strongly argues, was embedded in
global competition for resources by the relevant and highly unequal political
communities concerned.

This biopolitical positioning game in the interface of local and global hier-
archies can be seen clearly in the reasoning put forward by Prime Minister
Alexander Stamboliyski and his radical reformist Bulgarian Agrarian National
Union when introducing the Bulgarian law of People’s Health in 1923:
It is only the radical reorganization of our healthcare legislation which would yield the desired results expected by the state’s investment – a healthy and strong nation, capable of meeting all the challenges of civilization and preserving its independence amongst the culturally elevated countries of the world (cited by Baloutzova 2011, 47).

So, as we can see above, imagining itself as somewhere on the “middle” level and emerging from a long period of Ottoman rule and the First World War and the territorial debates which followed, the Bulgarian state started to introduce new laws on improving the healthcare of the “people”. This constituted a biopolitical policy aiming to improve the health of the agrarian masses, so as to secure a position among other “culturally elevated” countries.

It is also important to note that the fight over resources and its links to a hierarchical world economy stemmed from an imaginary hierarchy structured by racist ideas and notions of internal and international civilisational hierarchy. A massive amount of literature has been published describing the internal mechanisms of positioning, though mainly from the perspective of the top position (colonisers and westerners) (see amongst others Böröcz 2006; Said 1978; Amin 1989; Stoler 1995).

Here we introduce this sense of hierarchy as perceived in the middling positions. It is exemplified by the “defence” speech of Count Apponyi, who pleaded in his capacity as high state representative of the Kingdom of Hungary to “the civilised” nations of France and Britain during the peace negotiation of Hungary in January, 1920, in an effort to secure Hungarian control over “lost” territories (vast areas of Hungary attached to neighbouring countries like Romania, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, etc.):

Among the Hungarians the percentage of those literate is close to 80%; among the Germans in Hungary 82%; among the Romanians 33%; among the Serbians almost 60%. In case we look at the higher social classes and we take into account those who have finished secondary schools and took the exam called the baccalaureat in France, then we observe that among those having completed such studies or educational levels equivalent to the concerned final exam, the proportion of Hungarians reaches 84%, although their overall proportion in the population is 54.5%; while among those completing such studies the percentage of Romanians is 4%, as opposed to their proportion of 16% in the total population; while in the case of the Serbians this is 1% related to their 2.5% overall population ratio. I repeat my remarks are not hostile towards anybody. The only reason for this situation is that due to the unfortunate events of their histories, our neighbours joined the family of civilised nations later than us. But the fact is undeniable. In my view, the assignment of national hegemony to a lower level of cultural development is not without consequences from the point of view of the greater cultural interests
Just as in the Bulgarian example above, there is a very clear sense of global hierarchy. It is related to internal hierarchies, which become clear when there is actually a break-up of a country and a loss of territory and large segments of ethnically diverse populations. The claim is that Hungarians are of a higher quality, and they should therefore rule and manage the region and improve the standing of “lower” level groups – a fact that should be acknowledged by the “superpowers” of the era, England and France.

This interface between global and local hierarchies actually reveals how we can understand the comparative politics of population management. This study aims to establish some of the basic types of such positioning, linking global and local hierarchies in order to start the work of a truly comparative analysis of patterns of population policy, which cannot be sufficiently explained by demographic processes or the specific ideologies of the relevant ruling groups.

This fascinating – and sometimes literally horrifying – story of the first half of the twentieth century has only been partially analysed in recent European and post-colonial historiography:

- There are historical demographic analyses of population processes and the development of relevant models for these demographic “transitions” (e.g. Coale and Watkins 1986; Livi-Bacci 2001; Saito 1996; Óri and Melegh 2003; van de Kaa 1996; Sassen 1999).
- There are histories of certain aspects of population development and policy, such as the history of contraception, divorce, family in the modern period, etc. (e.g. Bardet-Dupaquier 1997–99; Phillips 1991; McLaren 1990; Kertzer and Barbagli 2001, 2002).
- There are comparative histories of population policies based on their links to major political ideologies (for example Teitelbaum 1988, 1998; Weindling 1989; Quine 1996).
- There are specific histories of population policies and discourses concerning certain periods of modern European societies including extremist periods (e.g. Baloutzova 2011; Bock 2002; Hodgson 1991, 1997; Cole 2000; Greenhlagh 1996; Schneider 1982, 1990; Schneider and Schneider 1996, Turda and Weindling 2007; Turda 2010).
- And there are histories of population policies and practices in the previously colonised world in the era of modernity, based partially on post-colonial comparative insights (e.g. Bashford 2007; McClintock 1995; Caldwell 1998; Stepan 1991; Stoler 1995, 2000; Panandiker 1994; Melegh 2005; Ahluwalia 2008).
Many of the insights and empirical findings of the above histories are relevant to us, but the global linkages and their consequences have not been properly investigated. A more appropriate analysis starts with the notion that biopolitical concerns of high modernity are based on hierarchical conceptions of various social groups within and (very importantly) across “nations”. This hierarchy appears to direct the exclusion of “deviant” groups (racially subordinate groups, working classes, the urban proletariat who are putatively “too fertile”, over-fertile peasants or those who on the contrary practice birth control, the supposed “flood” of immigrants, the assumed sexual deviance of subordinate groups or the ostensibly “too prolific” Third World populations, etc.) (Melegh 2006, chapter 2). These imagined local hierarchies are different in distinct parts of the world – and even within Europe – but they are not arbitrary: they follow a basic underlying logic of positioning in the interface of local and global hierarchies, and for this reason they ought to be linked analytically.

In addition to generating a proper comparative framework, taking into account global hierarchical conceptions, the diverse “national” and local perspectives can also be reflected onto each other. This could serve as the basis for a new kind of “global” history, one that does not eliminate national and local histories, only reconfigures them. In other words, anti-natalist and eugenic concerns in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s are in fact linked – and hence to be analysed jointly – with the pro-natalist hysteria of Italian fascism (and the fascisms of many other European countries), or to eugenic concerns in India and Latin America. This link is based upon on the spread of certain “universal” scientific and social beliefs, closely aligned with the national-imperial geopolitical positioning of the various countries and regions embedded in the global inequality systems created by colonial capitalism.

It is important to note that local and global hierarchies refer to webs of inequalities, which have cognitive and non-cognitive structures in terms of economic and social power, and a web of unequal social relationships. This study combines them in the sense that they are “in the making”, with both factors playing strong roles (Melegh 2011; Melegh, Thornton, Philipov and Young-De Marco 2010). In other words, in this ‘local’ positioning the management of population development, the applied categorisation, the various discursive patterns, policy targets and the demographic processes themselves play equally important roles. It is also important to see that the positioning patterns and the related hierarchies I present below are gendered – revealing how nation building and gender are related in a comparative way.

We can now present a preliminary table based on how targets and controls in these population discourses are formulated in the context of local and global hierarchies. We have selected those discourses which formed parts of national “revitalisation” or development programmes in the first half of the twentieth century or between the two world wars. They represent countries and areas with
widely differing experiences of demographic processes in terms of mortality, fertility and migration. It is important to note that we cannot claim that any of these discourses and patterns were dominant, excluding alternative competing discourses. But we do claim that they represented definite strong currents embedded in global versus local positioning, or in other words the glocal politics of managing population development. The rest of the paper elaborates upon the seven cases in more detail.

<table>
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<td>Anti-colonial, anti-Western nationalism. Locally repressive toward middle and lower classes: ethnic, religious and social rivalry.</td>
<td>Frustrated nationalist, globally challenging, looking for substantial change in local social structure. Involved in local ethnic rivalries.</td>
<td>Anti-colonial, pro-peasant, liberating and socially-radical nationalism. Calming of ethnic and religious rivalries.</td>
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Demo-graphic processes:
- Substantially declining fertility, mortality and substantial immigration.
- Increasing rates of population growth, high fertility, somewhat declining mortality, high infant mortality. Out-migration to other parts of Asia and Africa. De-industrialised agrarian population.
- Declining fertility, improving mortality and infant mortality, high emigration rates in the beginning of the period. Substantial agrarian population.
- Stagnant or declining fertility, somewhat improving mortality and infant mortality, high rates of emigration at the beginning of the period. Substantial agrarian population.
- Increasing rates of population growth, high fertility, somewhat declining mortality, high infant mortality. Out-migration to other parts of Asia and Africa. De-industrialised agrarian population.
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II. ACCEPTING GLOBAL AND LOCAL HIERARCHIES

Below we present two types of positioning which do not question global and local hierarchies with regard to the management of population issues. One is the strong anti-natalist movement in the United States and Britain, two countries that had by that time experienced substantial declines in fertility. The other is internalisation of Western perspectives into local hierarchies in colonial India in the 1920s and 30s, which had just started going through a period of rapid population growth.
II.1. Anti-natalist movements in the United States and Britain, globalising local hierarchies

Neo-Malthusianism as a complex combination of different discourses (anti-immigration, conscious birth control, feminism, eugenics, etc.) moved increasingly towards the idea of controlling the “quality” of a population by the end of the nineteenth century (Quine 1996; Stepan 1996). These coalitions and animosities were not without a certain logic built into the neo-Malthusian ideas themselves – as a justification for selective population control based on social, ethnic and racist exclusion. Malthusian control was to be practiced within a very complex environment, so as to save the privileged positions of propertied “upper and middle classes” in the West, and also the West itself when confronted with a non-Western world in the global order (Stoler 1995, 124–126; Melegh 2006, 55–62).

There was also a science-based belief in Eurocentric progress, a cognitive structure in which scientific control of social and economic processes and human development was a key idea (Hobsbawm 1987, 251–69; Stoler 1995, 55–94; Amin 1989, 79–89). In this respect, the hierarchical categorisation of living species (including mankind), and the idea of evolution based on genetic inheritance and control of related social and demographic behaviour was a brutal and practical mix of science and intervention (Hannaford 1996, 325–368). Neo-Malthusianism was also an appealing (seemingly non-culture-based) set of ideas, which could easily be exported and imported throughout the world, particularly because it came from the top of the hierarchy, the “West”. It was also handy because growing global inequality in the early twentieth century was a suitable basis for its spread.

The world at this time was confronted with several additional issues. First of all, huge demographic changes were taking place: mortality (most importantly infant mortality) was declining or starting a long-term decline, in conjunction with changes in patterns of marriage and fertility. These later developments in patterns of partnership were related to the growing practice of fertility control and changes in culture such as newspapers, leaflets and propaganda materials (McLaren, 1990; Phillips 1991; Livi-Bacci 2001; Coale and Watkins, 1986).

This idea of fertility control was most popular in Britain and the United States. The establishment of population control groups (like the Population Association of America) and their ideological manoeuvrings between eugenic, feminist, xenophobic and anti-immigrant ideas has been widely discussed in the literature (Quine 1996; Caldwell 1998; Hodgson 1991; Szreter 1993; Greenhalgh 1996). The key factor behind this development was the formation of a “strange” coalition of racist eugenicists, doctors, anti-immigration campaigners, some feminists, and population experts between the two world wars, all interested in “improving” the social situation of the “unworthy”, by gaining control
over the fecundity of certain groups of marginalised people (Melegh 2006, 52–56).

This approach focused on local exclusion, but with its racist structure it fit into continued colonial and global patterns of exclusion. It positioned itself positively as something related to the “defence” of the Western middle classes which were, according to activists, the most receptive to the idea of birth control and medical progress. For this reason, they argued that they had to be defended from being overwhelmed by lower classes, such as immigrant groups from southern or eastern Europe (Szreter 1993). This combination of antinatalism in the name of balanced development of resources and population selection, and of imagining Western middle classes as being at the top of social development is made clear in the following text by Notestein, one of the fathers of demographic transition theory. It is tellingly titled Demographic Sources of Power. The talk was given to the US military in 1949, but this can also be seen also as reflecting on the previous period and on global hierarchies in general:

Let’s put that all together, if we can, in terms of power, resources and problems. Western Europe: huge, high skilled, at the end of its growth period but plenty powerful in the trading world, politically organized, no fundamental difficulties here... The United States: roughly the same thing with an awfully favourable balance of people and resources, one, if it solves its political and economic problems which are not very fundamental ones, that adds up to a very effective power in the world... Asia is quite a different thing. We hear a lot of nonsense talked about population growth there as though it means power. It is a source of disturbance (Notestein, F. W. (1949): Demographic sources of power. Lecture: 20 September, Manuscript (Office of Population Research, Library, Princeton p.23)).

We witness here the evolution of a global positioning process that not only sees Western middle classes as being in a top position globally and locally but also as being empowered to introduce these population developments into countries with “disturbed” development (Thornton 2005; see Thornton also in this volume). Notestein also expresses the common view that relationships which work in the West do not work the same way in Asia. This difference is not explained directly, and mainly essentialised cultural and/or racial differences are invoked in a world imagined as inherently hierarchical (Melegh 2006, 63).
II.2. Approving global and local hierarchies in a high-fertility colonial setting: pro-Western family planning in India between the two world wars

The campaign for birth control by the elite and certain civil groups also appeared in colonial India, which underwent rapid population growth in the 1920s and 1930s. During this period the population increased from roughly 300 million to 390 million in 1941, with a growth rate of more than 10 per cent in a decade (Chandarasekhar 1943, 166; see also Livi-Bacci 2001, 128–123). Supported by two prominent family planning advocates in Britain and the United States (Stopes and Sanger) and also the colonial authorities themselves, the idea of controlling fertility in India received enormous external support (Caldwell 1998; Ahluwalia 2008, 2–5 and 50–77). A neo-Malthusian group was established as early as 1916 at Madras Presidency College by the Maharajah of Mysore and Lady Rama Rao (Caldwell, 1998, 688). Acceptance and use of population control (at least by certain political elites) later proved to be important in the development of the international population control movement.

The gendered and hierarchical image of population processes and fertility in India, even as early as the late nineteenth century, was situated within an extremely dubious framework. On the one hand, local women were seen as suitable subjects for exploitation and control, an idea that derived from the aim of saving them from brutal customs and the burden of high fertility (Sarkar 2008, 45). These “liberal contradictions” were further twisted by some local representatives of population control in the local elite, who created a rather complex positioning system in colonial India. This positioning referred not only to the strength of global hierarchies, but also tried to fix certain social groups within local hierarchies. Here we can refer to Sir Vepa Rameson’s presidential address at the 2nd All India Population and 1st Family Hygiene Conference in 1938 in Mumbai (then Bombay): we see the unproblematic acceptance of racist European ideas, which actually opposed the elite represented by the author:

*Bertrand Russel in his “Icarus” discusses the possibility of the white races being outrun in numbers by the backward races. The real solution of such a problem is by international agreement under which all civilized nations practice some degree of Birth Control. Until such an agreement is reached family limitation must be cautiously practiced and modified in degrees so as not to endanger the proper defence of the country. But for us Indians, all this is academic* (The 2nd All-India Population and 1st Family Hygiene Conference. Bodleian Library, Oxford BOD OFFSITE 24762 d.117 (p. 10).

This is combined with a sense of the need to catch up with the West, which had already started a move towards family planning:
The growth of unemployment with all the suffering that it involves, vis underfeeding, disease, maternal mortality, wastage in infant life, has reached appalling magnitude in recent years. In India it has become accentuated for about 20 or 25 years. But in Western Countries it was felt for more than a century and western nations had begun to think about this matter from the 19th century. But even there it is only in recent years that the problem has reached dimensions compelling the urgent adoption of remedies (ibid p. 6).

And this was combined with an extremely rigid Malthusian social view on links between social inequality and fertility:

Thus it is easy to see that equality of human beings is a futile idea, even if we start distributing property equally between all human beings. One man is intelligent and earns more, another man is dull and earns less; one man is prudent and cautious and saves more; another man is improvident and reckless and spends more; one gets eight children and another has got two children (ibid p. 7).

The smooth fit into imagined global hierarchies and its direct translation into local hierarchies is of course not the only positioning accepting “Western” family planning. The ones we analyse later, however, challenge global and/or local hierarchies and therefore belong in the next part of this study on population management ideas challenging global and/or local hierarchies. First we examine some European examples and then we return to India in the same period. As a starting point, we analyse those European or Indian perspectives that challenged or were anxious about “unfavourable” global positions of the populations concerned, and then move to ones that sought internal reforms as well. With this analysis complete, we start analysing various forms of demographic nationalisms, focusing on the “uplift” or “vitalisation” of the nation in the designated period.

III. CHALLENGING GLOBAL HIERARCHIES WITHOUT RESTRUCTURING LOCAL HIERARCHIES

III.1. European pro-natalist colonial powers

France was a unique country in this respect. It was a major colonial power on the first level of the global hierarchy, but due to constant rivalry with the British Empire and other European powers, most importantly Germany, it understood itself as being in constant struggle for dominance. France harboured ideologies of “familism” and stable public support for patriarchal families with
a great number of children. As a result, the idea of limiting number of children in a family was considered a sign of deviation and was even negatively termed the “Malthusian family”. Malthus was therefore clearly seen as irrelevant to the national-colonial imaginary of France (Quine 1996, 52–88; Schneider 1982, 1990).

But this pro-natalism can easily be connected to elements of the neo-Malthusian package other than population control, most notably to positive eugenics. Thus, we can conclude that the link between neo-Malthusianism and strong pro-natalism could be the strong emphasis on combining “quality and quantity”. Schneider wrote about this “strange” mix in the following way:

French eugenicists supported programs which were much more popular in a country like France where fear of depopulation was very strong. Rather than emphasizing the need to limit births among any segment of the population in order to screen for negative traits, French eugenicists could emphasize a positive program that called for improving the general health of the populace as well as treating specific diseases thought most likely to be hereditary. Hence, eugenicists could avoid coming into conflict with the powerful French natalist organizations, which resisted any measures that might inhibit the birthrate. Both groups could support the French eugenics slogan, “quality goes hand in hand with quantity” (Schneider 1982, 279).

It is to be noted that the socially and universally protective French policies morphed into the repressive, conservative, socially and “racially” selective approach of Vichy France in the early 1940s. This government introduced harsh anti-abortion laws, tried to control women and marital behaviour, and in some ways was very close to Italian policies.

In between the two world wars, Italy was understood as a second rank power, even at a European level in the investigated period. Great emphasis was placed on the need to be much more populous and the need for “revitalisation” so as to move to the forefront of development. “Number means force” as Mussolini put it in 1928 in his infamous Ascension Day Speech, and there was a combined policy of reorganising and re-channelling population development via control over fertility, as well as international migration (Quine 1996, 17–51; Wanrooij 2002, 175–195; Smith 2003). This complex discourse is present in the speech of nationalist Alfredo Rocco in 1923, who later became Justice Minister under Mussolini:

Expansion is for us a necessity. Our land is limited and relatively poor while we have a scarcity of capital and an exuberant population... Spontaneously, instinctively, the nation found a solution... it resolved the problem of expansion by means of emigration... Too many in Italy view with pleasure
and approval this solution... The phenomenon of emigration today is grave... The fertility of the Italian population is considerable, but cannot long resist a bleeding of this sort. Remember: our true and greatest wealth is population, because in numbers is the greatest strength of all races. The most numerous peoples are not simply those militarily most important... but economically every man has a value and represents capital. To lose millions of Italians means to lose billions of lire. Up until now our high fertility has allowed us to endure this open wound in the side of the nation. It has even allowed us to enjoy population increase in spite of emigration... And even though the birth rate remains high, the tendency in Italy is one of decline (Boll. CGE, iii (1923): 821–22) (cited in Ipsen 1993, 79. p.).

This discourse on population development, focusing on revitalising the nation and improving global positioning, included the following main interconnected elements, showing the complexity of this pattern re-strengthening local gendered hierarchies for the sake of “strength” in a period of crisis (Quine 1996, 17–51; Wanrooij 2002, 175–195; Ipsen 1993; Smith 2003):

- Peasant families unite capital and labour, and are thus superior to market enterprises.
- Young wives are to be controlled if they look for amusement and do not accept the authority of men. Hedonism and moral decay must be stopped.
- Maternity is a civic duty. Breastfeeding is to be obligatory.
- Reduce female employment in industry and in the service sector.
- Extra-marital sex for men is permitted. Remaining single is criminalised.
- Tax breaks and career opportunities should be provided to fathers.
- The National Foundation for the Protection of Maternity and Infancy (ONMI) is set up. In 1925, children’s “colonies” are set up under fascist control to protect child welfare.
- Military strength and population are closely linked.
- A need for positive eugenics: both quantity and quality is to be improved.
- Rigid defence of “race” is to be maintained, especially in colonies like Libya.
- A need to control migration from rural areas to cities.
- Control and selection of international migrants, particularly those from Asian areas.

This combination of ideas was first of all a reaction to local economic problems due to Italy’s semi-peripheral position in the world, and secondly to some
of the discourses of major powers at the time who looked down on the region (England, United States) – there was therefore an urge to counterbalance them. This counterbalance is also related to attempts to control emigration and promote national revitalisation. There is also the strengthening of control over the lower classes, most important of which, women. These measures were in some ways “rational” reactions to the agrarian crisis evolving in the development of world capitalism. And first and foremost they were strategies to secure a better place among “civilised” nations, by looking for further opportunities to “colonise” further down (Ben-Ghiat and Fuller 2005). Italian fascist discourse might be seen as a clear prototype of inferiorised imperialism in a hierarchical world economy and imaginary. In this way it was not only a local or even just a European product.

III.2 Eastern European conservative demographic nationalism

It is important to note that eastern European ruling elite were following some of the above: globally challenging, locally repressive, conservative or fascist approaches to social and population policy. These discourses were challenged by more radical “populist” movements throughout the region, which represented a different pattern, to be discussed later on in our study.

Conservative eastern European pro-natalism could be characterised as a belated response to the social problems of the peasantry, systematic, step-by-step progress in the institutional and material support of civil servants and industrial workers, and the rather rigid defence of local social hierarchies. Nonetheless, this advancement did not propose an actual break in the current local system of inequalities; in fact quite the contrary: proponents wanted to preserve them as much as possible. But these ideas were coupled with nationalist and ethnic panic concerning changes of population and territories, as exemplified by the above quote from count Apponyi on the territorial changes of Hungary (Kövér and Gyáni 1998, 363–378; Baloutzova 2011, 58–122).

Most eastern European countries either underwent a dramatic redrawing of borders or were formed shortly after the First World War. These changes to the fragile geopolitical status quo led to dramatic ethnic biopolitical struggles amongst each other, so as to achieve a better and more secure position, as exemplified perhaps by the earlier quote on Hungarian territorial claims. These struggles and concerns framed most of the laws and policies relating to population management. Lost or conquered territories were seen as targets of state policies, for “filling” them with population of the “right” social and ethnic composition. In Bulgaria for instance, family allowance was greater for civil servant (later worker) families who chose to settle in the newly acquired Aegean territories in 1942 (Baloutzova 2011, 92–96). The same ethno-political
The Hungarian race is suppressed into a small territory by the Slavic and Olah [pejorative term, meaning Romanian] ring. There are two ways to assure living; one assures the advancement of the individual, but kills the nation, as it means the single child or emigration, the other is struggle and suffering for the individual, but it leads to the resurrection of the nation and this involves the storage of the strengths of the Hungarian race on the Great Plain [central and eastern part of Hungary] (Czettler 1995, 71).

The strength of the nation should be the focus of politics, and it is precisely this concern for global positioning which drives management of population migration and fertility. This pattern seeks an improvement in the level attained by the nation in the regional and neighbouring hierarchy, and does not seek to challenge globally, such as France or Italy. Nonetheless, it aims for the disciplining of the nation without restructuring internal social relations, and in this respect it follows major European pro-natalist countries.

III.3 Anti-colonial eugenic nationalism in India

Proponents of family planning in India included representatives (Ahluwalia and Phadke) in favour of eugenic ideas, but who questioned British colonial domination. Phadke, in particular, was a strong opponent of colonial rule and supported Gandhi in his struggle based on peaceful disobedience (Ahluwalia 2008, 30–41). In this manner they represented another (not dominant or institutionalised pattern) of positioning concerning population, resources and local versus global hierarchies. They therefore attempted to break down the global hierarchies repressing India, and wanted to “revitalise” their own nation by eugenic means, without changing its internal hierarchical structure.

In 1923, Ahluwalia wrote “Indian Population problem: selective Lower Birth rate, a Sure Remedy of Extreme Indian Poverty”. In this he claimed that the “thoughtless irresponsible and extensive breeding, particularly among the middle and poor classes” was the cause of Indian poverty. He also complained that “India resembled a vast garden literally choked with weeds, fine roses being few and far between” and he was therefore in favour of strong selection from amongst the people in order to improve the global position of India (Ahluwalia 2008, 31).
Phadke, another proponent of eugenic nationalism, was militantly against
the rule of the British, and when writing about birth control in India in 1925, he
argued for a non-Western “Aryan” eugenic intervention, as otherwise the In-
dian population would remain a “race of slaves who will too readily fall a /sic/
prey to the designs of the foreign rulers and exploiters” (Ahluwalia 2008, 35).
He was also very clear about the aim of uplifting the country in global hierar-
chies, believing that the “stalwart physiques /sic/ of the people is one of the
greatest assets of a country and an important instrument of its uplift” (Ahlu-
walia 2008, 32). Proposed measures included controlling “unfit” marriages and
therefore achieving “better” breeding.

This simultaneous global challenge and locally repressive notion actually
resembles American or British neo-Malthusian panic concerning lower - and in
this respect - inferior classes and ethnic or religious groups and their fertility.
Thus it was not an accident that upper caste Hindu proponents of neo-
Malthusian intervention turned against the Muslims. Ahluwalia aptly cites Wat-
tal and refers to a 1934 piece on population control. According to him, Muslim
“cerebral development is so much less” (compared to Hindus), “Wattal claimed
that as a consequence their fecundity is so much greater” (Ahluwalia 2008, 38).
Mukharjee, another proponent extended this argument further:

The Muhamaddan, who is less literate than all upper caste Hindus every-
where and in Bihar and Bengal less than even some of the backward castes
such as the Santhals, Mahisyas, and Namsudras, increased by 51 per cent in
Bengal and Punjab during the last 50 years while the Hindu has declined by
6 in the Punjab and increased by about 7 per cent in the United Provinces
and 5 per cent in Bihar and 23 per cent in Bengal… The enormous growth
of the Muslims is no doubt due to widow remarriage, to polygamy, and later
consummation of marriage than among the Hindus and probably also to the
differences of food and economic habits (Ahluwalia 2008, 40).

Altogether, we can see that globally frustrated positioning in the various
forms of repressive demographic nationalisms led to very harsh and in many
ways extremist ideas when local inequalities and hierarchies were ignored, or –
perhaps more properly –, preserved and re-strengthened. In certain circum-
stances such patterns and the relevant “glocal” interplay of hierarchies could
actually lead to political actions aiming to achieve the immediate demographic
or population compositional aims by any possible means. But this was certainly
not a necessity, and this can be clearly shown by looking at those perspectives
in the same areas which approved or even supported internal structural changes
to achieve demographic “national” goals in global competition.
IV. CHALLENGING GLOBAL AND LOCAL HIERARCHIES

As an underlying factor of global-local positioning, we pointed out the key importance of overall agrarian crisis throughout the world, from Mexico to India. This crisis not only created problem groups deserving of population engineering, and nostalgia for more “traditional” periods, but actually led to peasant movements or pro-peasant movements such as that led by Zapata in Mexico, the Russian Narodniki, eastern-European populists and Gandhi himself in colonial India. There is a common thread to all of this: they looked for radical social changes in the fight against landlords, usurpation of taxes and support for peasant holdings or joint peasant farms and co-operatives. They also considered population issues to be very important and represented a more liberating version of demographic nationalism than those analysed above. They were demographic nationalisms, but with an open arm to local labouring classes, who were seen as the ultimate source of social and even ethnic religious revival.

IV.1 Eastern European “populists”

The movement of “populist” sociographers and reformers, among others the Romanian village monograph movement led by Gusti, the Narodniki in Russia, the Russian agrarianist Chayanov, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union led by Stamboliiski (crushed in the early 1920s) and the Hungarian “Népi” (meaning “people’s”) movement reveal characteristic perspectives as regards population discourses and positioning between global and local hierarchies.

The dramatic changes experienced by the eastern European agrarian sector were followed by deep crisis in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Tóth 2006, 126–133; Tauger 2011, 131–134). This was due to great difficulties caused by lack of proper machinery, low agrarian wages and the unmarketable product structure of small-scale units; all of which resulted from world capitalism. Owing to the combined effects of such imbalances and an unfavourable property structure, the sector relied either on big estates exploiting extremely cheap labour or on inward looking, non-market oriented peasant economies. This made the fate of the peasantry a central issue for certain young politicians, radical writers and social scientists, who were appalled by the “underclass” status of the peasantry (Bibó 1991; Melegh 2006). In the eyes of these radical intellectuals, the most relevant symptom of the agrarian crisis was the deplorable mortality, health and psychological status – and sooner or later the falling fertility rate – of the peasants.

This demographic element actually varied between countries according specific demographic patterns. In Hungary, low fertility was a prime motive, while in Romania and Bulgaria it was not because fertility started to decline one or
two decades later (Kiss 2009; Baloutzova 2011, 128–133). This “lack of vitality” and related social and health problems was not only understood as a sign of social crisis, but also as a sign of the “self-destructive” behaviours of the groups concerned. These movements rejected this phenomenon on moral grounds and called for massive reforms in the rural economy, and for new measure to support these groups. All these measures aimed to “uplift” national status as exemplified above in the Bulgarian quote on the health law, or for its complete reorganisation like Gusti (Kiss 2009).

Similar to the conservative biopolitical discourses we’ve seen, strong natalism and a rejection of Malthusianism were seen as something natural from the perspective of frustrated national development. This is clear in the case of Ferenc Erdei, a Hungarian sociologist writing about how birth control and abortion were not natural in eastern Europe due to problems of social structure:

*Villages practising the single-child system are the best demonstration of the distorted development of the peasantry, for the single-child system is not the same phenomenon as fertility control in bourgeois society. Bourgeois fertility control - as all phenomena of this society - is not a structure crystallised into frozen and objectified forms, but an intermediate phenomenon of life channelled by interests, which immediately change and transform if interests change... By contrast the single-child system of the peasantry is not so directly consequential. This control of fertility is the alleviation of an unmanageable situation through the production of social forms (Erdei 1942, 86. translated by A. M.).*

This element of social structure separates these discourses from the ones that only wished to preserve local structures. Nevertheless, it should be noted that they share a characteristic panic over territories and resources, and they clearly localised ethnic rivalries and panics in the themes of demographic discourses. A Hungarian sociographer wrote about the ethnic composition of an unfavourable rural area of Hungary as follows:

*The life and death struggle of the Transdanubian region was first recognised three years ago, when in Hidas [a Hungarian village in southern Hungary] the Hungarian church was officially transferred to the Germans. The Hungarians have been dispersed in the storms of the centuries and they have been replaced by Germans. The statisticians have not ignored the problem and have shown that the Hungarians of Hidas exist: in the cemetery, in neighbouring villages and in America (Kovács 1989, 97 translated by A.M.).*
This maintenance of ethno-territorial panic could have led to the fact that some of the radical populists ended up in the ultra-conservative camp, or even in fascist groups. But it is important to stress that they originally rejected ultra-nationalist strategies because they were seen as serving the interests of the “aristocratic” elite; they were in fact aiming to completely restructure local agrarian society.

IV.2 The movement of Gandhi in British India

Interestingly, many of the points made by eastern European populists were shared by Gandhi: leading mass struggle to liberate and restructure an India devastated by colonial rule⁴. He was firmly and systematically anti-colonial, with original techniques of resistance, and worked very hard on social restructuring, even in the face of opposition from other anti-colonial groups. With eastern European populists, and later communists, he shared in the belief that there was no “overpopulation”, and that it was not necessary to reduce fertility. Instead, he argued there was a need to restructure and defend local industry, reduce taxes, and improve irrigation and plant structures:

This little globe of ours is not a toy of yesterday. It has not suffered from the weight of over-population through its age of countless millions. How can it be that the truth has suddenly dawned upon some people that it is in danger of perishing of shortage of food unless birth rate is checked through the use of contraceptives? (Harijan, 14-9-35, http://www.mkgandhi.org/indiadreams/chap56.htm, accessed 08 November, 2011).

He even shared the idea that use of contraception had been ‘twisted’, as seen above among eastern European populists:

I have no doubt that those learned men and women who are carrying on propaganda men and with missionary zeal in favour of the use of contraceptives, are doing irreparable harm to the use of contraceptives, are doing irreparable harm to the youth of the country under the false belief that they will be saving... the poor women who may be obliged to bear children against their will. Those who need to limit their children will not be easily reached by them. Our poor women have not the knowledge or the training that the women of the west have. Surely the propaganda is not being carried [out] on behalf of the middle class women, for they do not need the knowl-


In essence, he argues that the social burden of high fertility and family planning can only be managed properly if national sovereignty is achieved. In some parts, he even sounds like Phadke, who proposed demographic change as a means of escaping “slave” status:

Is it right for us who know the situation to bring forth children in an atmosphere so debasing as I have described? We only multiply slaves and weaklings, if we continue the process of procreation while we feel and remain helpless, diseased and famine stricken. Not till India has become a free nation, able to withstand avoidable starvation, well able to feed herself in times of famine [and] possessing the knowledge to deal with malaria, cholera, influenza, we have we the right to bring forth progeny. I must not conceal from the reader the sorrow I feel when I hear of births in this land… I must express that for years I have contemplated with satisfaction the prospect of suspending procreation by voluntary self-denial. India is today ill-equipped for taking care even of her present population, not because she is over-populated but because she is forced to foreign domination whose creed is progressive exploitation of her resources (Young India, 13-10-1920, 21: 356-360, cited in M. Gandhi Soul Force: Gandhi’s Writings on Peace. Edited by V Gentha, London, New Delhi, Tara Publishing Ltd., p. 175).

He proposed self-restraint as a method of voluntary fertility control, something that appeared in other Indian population discourses as well. Here, it received additional support as a means of maintaining social cohesion. In constant conflict with Western advocates, Gandhi believed in asymmetrical traditional patterns of behaviour. His key point was social and spiritual “dignity” leading to discipline, as an overall political and social concept (Ahluwalia 2008, 70–80; Guha 1997, 147–148). The following quote sums this up very clearly:

I do not believe that woman is prey to sexual desire to the same extent as man. It is easier for her than for man to exercise self-restraint. I hold that the right education in this country is to teach the woman the art of saying no even to her husband, to teach her that it is not part of her duty to become a mere tool or a doll in her husband’s hands. She has rights as well as duties… To ask India’s women to take contraceptives is, to say at least, putting the cart before the horse. The first thing is to free her from mental slavery,
to teach her dignity of national service and service to humanity (cited in Ahluwalia, 2008, 71).

This idea of dignity and self-discipline served to position India as distant from the “West”, which in turn served the political purpose of moving towards independence from the British and exercising some control over population growth without extra anti-natalist control over lower social groups, and avoiding immediate competitive fights between religious and social groups. But it maintained gendered hierarchies and a “traditionalist” outlook for the sake of national revitalisation. This challenge concerning global hierarchies was transformed into a kind of moral and spiritual force, a means of challenging the terms of competition in global capitalism.\(^5\)

V. ROOTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC EXTREMISM: CONCLUDING REMARKS

Global and local hierarchies have always been extremely powerful factors in shaping social processes. In an era when global competition was extremely harsh and open, it was no accident that the population and population development were elevated to the forefront of political and intellectual interest. Population was seen as a resource for development and national revival, in a constant struggle over global and local hierarchies. Which country could stabilise privileged positions, and which ones would advance in the real and imagined hierarchies of the world?

These questions were real questions: nobody challenged the idea that populations competed with each other, regardless of ideological inclination. Both anti-natalist and pro-natalist groups lived in the same world, and these were not antagonistic notions, but ones fundamentally linked in a global hierarchy. They came from very different perspectives in terms of ideology: among them there were fascists, conservatives, populists and other radical groups with differences between them, but whose differences should not be over-emphasised. Even demographic processes themselves had only a limited role, and we cannot therefore claim that they exclusively guided demographic discourses and debates, as we have seen from our comparative analysis of examples coming from widely different demographic profiles.

It seems that population discourses were to a large extent shaped by the rules of competition, and by the ways that local and global hierarchies were linked. This interface is actually the most interesting perspective, as it shows the dynamics of such discourses. Even today, there are great debates about whether certain “demographic” ideas (for instance anti-immigration agitation,

\(^5\) Concerning morality scales – as opposed to development scales – see Thornton et al. 2010,
interventionist anti-natalism or pro-natalism) can be linked to extreme ideologies, and the exact relationships thereof. In this paper we have tried to show that this is not a simple exercise. While we have to acknowledge that focusing on certain ideas, for instance ethnic compositions of nations in the first half of the twentieth century might be considered a dubious exercise, in an age of extreme radicalism the dynamics of certain discourses were of greater importance than certain direct (for instance eugenic) patterns of population management. The dynamics of population discourses were shaped instead by the ways in which collective or individual actors positioned themselves with regard to global and local hierarchies.

In this sense it turns out that the most problematic positions clearly aimed to change global positions and at the same time freeze local hierarchies or get rid of the “heavy baggage” of certain social groups or certain groups of children (etc.) in a global struggle. Such groups can be any kind – immigrant, Roma, Muslim – just so long as they are seen as internally inferior. This global versus local frustration seems to be the real source of what we may term “demographic extremism”. And now, in an era when the “West” is experiencing major losses on the global markets whilst facing challenges in terms of its position in global hierarchies, this would seem to be a very important issue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


NEW PARTNERSHIP AFTER FIRST DIVORCE – AN EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS

ERZSÉBET FÖLDHÁZI

ABSTRACT: New or altered family forms and their changing roles in the individual lifecycle is one of the most important factors affecting modern demographic behaviour. In Hungary – like other developed countries – the rate of marriage has decreased, the rate of divorce has increased and cohabitation has spread. On the basis of the first wave of the panel survey carried out in 2001 in the HCSO Demographic Research Institute (Turning Points of the Life Course) on a country-wide representative sample (more than 16,000 people, aged 18–75) the author examines the new partnerships of people after marriage break-up. Using event history analysis, she analyses the factors influencing the formation of new partnerships and differences between the two sexes.

The basic difference between the two sexes is that men form a new cohabiting unit earlier and with a higher frequency than women. The break-up of the parental family during childhood increases the chances of forming new partnerships in every case, while cohabitation before marriage increases chances only for women. Over the course of time, the chances of forming a new partnership decreases for both sexes.

For women, one child under the age of 18 in the household is not a serious impediment to forming a new partnership. At the same time, the burden of having two or more children under the age of 18 is not a sufficiently strong enough incentive for remarrying or starting to cohabit. Having several children in the household decreases chances of remarrying if at least one of the children is younger than 7. For men, these decreased chances refer only to cases where the youngest of the children living with the man is older than 6. Being more highly educated increases men’s chances of finding a new partner, while it does the opposite for women.

Changing partnership forms and the changing roles they play in the life of individuals are important factors in modern demographic behaviour. In developed countries, propensity to marriage has decreased, divorce rates have increased and cohabitation has spread. The majority of marriages are preceded by cohabitation, but – contrary to expectations – instead of enhancing the stability of subsequent marriages it increases chances of marriage break-up.

1 This study was supported by the research project “Change in forms of partnerships – transitions and/or stability”, funded by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (T049066).
2 Senior researcher, Demographic Research Institute, Budapest, email: foldhazi@demografia.hu
3 Henceforth, partnership means either marriage or cohabitation. In other words, any type of relationship where the partners live together in the same household.

These tendencies apply to Hungary too: over the last few decades the number of marriages has decreased, whereas divorce rates have increased. Therefore, the total divorce rate – the ratio of marriages made in a particular year that are likely to break-up under the divorce conditions of that year – is 25% for couples married in 1970 and 38% for couples married in 2000.

Remarriage by divorced people has also decreased dramatically: in 1970, 168 per 1,000 divorced men and 84 per 1,000 divorced women remarried. By 2000 these figures had reduced to 29 and 20 respectively. Over the same period of time the percentage of cohabitations barely reached 3% of all couples in 1970, yet by the end of the last century exceeded 10% (Demographic Yearbook 2000; Census 2001).

As a result of these changes, the dominant model of lifelong marriage has been replaced by a series of (often) less stable partnerships. What factors affect the formation of new partnerships? Who remains alone and who finds a new partner? Based on the first wave of a survey carried out by HCSO Demographic Research Institute in 2001, we examine how partnerships develop after divorce. The method of event history analysis is applied, to enable analysis of the factors affecting the formation of partnerships and gender differences.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Theories on Partnership Formation

A person generally tries to satisfy certain needs, and has certain expectations and preferences when seeking out his/her partner. Decisions are made in the marriage market, where partner seekers, on the one hand, present their resources and, on the other hand, estimate different characteristics of potential partners. These characteristics may be of various types. In this study we focus primarily on economic, cultural and demographic factors. As regards divorced partner seekers, we take into consideration their relatively higher age and the possibility that they already have children.

The factors affecting partner selection change over time in society, and also through the life course of an individual. When the economic basis of a partnership is based on a traditional division of labour within the family, according to which the task of men is to provide sufficient income and the task of women is to take care of household chores, the best selection strategy is to match men’s

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4 This section is based on two studies carried out by Kalmijn and Graaf, and on the theoretical overview by Bukodi (Kalmijn and Graaf 2000; Graaf and Kalmijn 2003; Bukodi 2004).
labour market status with women’s knowledge about how to manage a household. We may suppose that this model has fundamentally changed over the last few decades as a result of women’s increased labour market participation.

As a result of these changes, women’s economic resources play an important role in the process of partner selection. In the early phase of the individual life course, parental background is one of the most important factors because no other reference points are yet available. After leaving school, the significance of formal education decreases in importance, and occupation, income and prestige increase in importance. We may assume that these latter factors have a stronger effect in the case of the divorced.

When considering the requirements and needs of partner seekers, we may also assume that people enter into new partnerships because it increases their financial, emotional and social welfare. The more one lacks these resources, the more likely one will be to form a new partnership. For instance, the majority of women find themselves in an adverse financial situation after the break-up of a partnership, especially when they are raising children. A possible egress is a new relationship. When a new earner joins a single parent family the financial welfare of that family increases. The new partner brings change not only in an economic sense: he or she also provides emotional support, companionship and expands the personal network of the individual.

The chances of founding a new partnership are higher when one is more attractive to the other sex, in other terms, “more marketable” in the second marriage market. Attractiveness is influenced by numerous factors, such as appearance, education, social status, and so on. Attractiveness diminishes as time passes and therefore the probability of a partnership also decreases. However, occupation may have both positive and negative effects. Women of higher status may be more attractive in the marriage market, yet at the same time have less need of economic support (Sweeney 1995).

In the case of a second partnership, new factors may come into play, such as children from an earlier union. It is usually more difficult for individuals with children to find a new partner than those without children. Since such ‘less attractive’ individuals are acceptable to each other, they still may be able to form a new relationship. However, the more attractive have a wider circle to choose from, whereas the less attractive have fewer choices and finding a suitable partner therefore requires a longer period of time for them and their chances are reduced. The characteristics that increase the value of the potential partner may vary with age. As a result, they may play a different role among the divorced than in the total population. Education, income and labour market

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5 Of course, we refer here not only to marriages but also to cohabitations. However, since this term is widely used in the literature, we will stick with it.
skills may gain in importance, while the importance of physical attractiveness and adaptability may be decreased for them. Education may become less important too, while occupational position and financial status may matter more.

However, partnership patterns are defined not only by the needs and characteristics of partner seekers but also by the characteristics of the marriage market. Possibilities offered by the marriage market depend on macro-structural factors, such as the demographic and social composition of the entire population and on the characteristics of local marriage markets (settlements, smaller regions, neighbourhoods, religious groups, schools, workplaces, etc.).

Age and place of residence naturally factor into decision-making about new partners. For older individuals, the pool of potential partners is usually low, which restricts chances of the divorced from finding a partner. The three most important local marriage markets are neighbourhood, workplace and school, and each of these play different roles in the selection of a partner. The latter two are related more to performance, while the first one may play a role in homogamy. Two other important local marriage markets include the parental family's network of relationships and various voluntary organisations, communities and clubs. These markets are significantly narrowed down for the divorced: school and parental family may play a restricted role, or they may be totally irrelevant.

The cultural characteristics and value orientations of partner seekers may also influence partnership formation. Generally, cultural similarity is a prerequisite for two people to meet and get to know each other. It facilitates understanding of each other's behaviours and makes finding common activities more likely in the later stages of a partnership. It also increases the likelihood that partner seekers share values and have similar opinions on issues of importance.

Attitudes towards partnership and marriage also play a major role. It is hard to decide if a failed marriage motivates towards a new marriage or discourages it. For instance, divorced people may try to avoid marriage failure and the process of getting divorced by avoiding marriage altogether and opting to cohabit instead. It is generally recognised, however, that more emancipated, more individualistic and less religious people are less likely to marry or remarry. In this respect we have less information on cohabitation but we may suppose a reversed effect. In general, people with more modern values are less committed to partnerships; the more commitment is required, the more likely it is that they try to avoid a partnership. We may therefore suppose that they prefer cohabitation to marriage. In the case of religious people, the Church controls the life of its members through norms that limit individualism and sanctions the transgression of norms.

The likelihood of forming a new partnership also depends on the relationship density of the individual. The more frequently and the more people some-
one meets, the more likely he/she will find an adequate partner. In the case of re-partnering, this factor plays an even more significant role, as the marriage market is smaller and there are fewer places to meet for divorced people.

Previous Results

According to the results of previous research, basic demographic variables are very important during the formation of new partnerships. The pattern is gender specific: men enter new partnerships more frequently and within a shorter period of time after the ending of a previous relationship than women. Generally, children remain with their mother after divorce. Parallel with ageing, the likelihood of forming a new partnership decreases, especially for women. The marriage or partnership market shrinks with age. This is particularly relevant for women since they generally seek older partners. Opportunities for women become even worse when they reach the end of their fertile period (Graaf and Kalmijn 2003; Wu and Balakrishnan 1994; Haskey 1999; Parker 1999; Hughes 2000).

The situation in Hungary is similar. Based on data from the first wave of the above-mentioned panel survey, 33% of men and 23% of women partner (either cohabitation or marriage) within 2 years after the termination of first marriage. Four years after divorce, half of the men cohabit, whereas women need eight years to do so. Eleven per cent of men and 32% of women do not re-partner and stay alone.
NEW PARTNERSHIP AFTER FIRST DIVORCE

Figure 1

New partnerships among the divorced as a function of the length of time elapsed after the divorce, by sex (%)

The effect of parental family on partner selection is unambiguously strong regarding the first marriage. This effect is reduced after getting divorced because the performance of the individuals involved becomes more important than family background (e.g. the financial and economic resources of the parents, the local marriage market). However, patterns, values and roles that people carry with them from the parental family still have a significant impact on expectations in regard to marriage and partnerships.

We know that parental divorce increases the likelihood that the future partnerships of children will break-up (Amato 1996). However, it is not known whether a similar effect can be found in the case of re-partnering. Children of divorced parents may have negative attitudes towards marriage, and children of single parents may also have less commitment to marry as they lack successful patterns to draw upon. Nevertheless, they may have a different attitude towards cohabitation. Sweeny (1995) found no significant link between remarrying and being raised in an intact parental family, and Bernhardt (2000) came to a similar conclusion when examining marriages and cohabitations.

The number of siblings may also influence the formation of new partnerships, as those raised together with more brothers and sisters may want to live...
in a larger family. According to Bernhardt’s results (2000), the likelihood of re-partnering is high even among lone children. A possible explanation for this is that the partner expands the existing family network in such cases.

It is generally accepted that people with children have lower chances of starting a new partnership, and the more children they have the stronger this effect is. The causes are manifold: children require time and commitment, and parents may consider their parental role as more important than the new partnership. For the new partner, a child/children mean(s) higher costs, and the complexity of the new stepfamily may be perceived as a potential source of conflict.

However, there is a strong economic incentive towards the formation of a new partnership for divorced women with more than one child, and this may increase their initiative (Bumpass et al. 1990). Moreover, the desire to have children may be a motivation for divorced and childless people to start a new relationship. Therefore, the child(ren) of the potential partner may actually be an attractive factor (Lampard and Peggs, 1999). Most research demonstrates the negative effect that children have on women’s chances of starting a new partnership. However, Sweeny (1995) found no significant links between the number of children and likelihood of remarriage. There are contradictory results regarding men: according to some surveys it reduces the chances of new partnerships (Bernhardt 2000; Keij and Harmsen 2001; Ermisch 2002), whereas others claim that it has the opposite effect (Wu and Balakrishnan 1994 – the effect, however, was not significant); other researchers found no effect (Parker 1999; Hughes 2000; Stewart et al. 2003).

Marriage duration may influence the formation of new partnerships in several ways. Those who have lived in a relatively long marriage may tend to be more “marriage oriented”, and may therefore decide to marry again sooner. However, it is also possible that those who have lived most of their adult life in a marriage predispose against being single. These people accumulate a particular “transferable marriage-specific human capital.” Nevertheless, we may also suppose that such individuals find new partners later, as they have lost contact with the marriage market and are less likely have the skills necessary for finding a new partner (Bumpass et al. 1990; Bernhardt 2000).

While demographic effects are generally strong and consistent, the effects of socio-economic factors are less clear-cut (Graaf and Kalmijn 2003). Higher socio-economic status is usually accompanied by higher remarriage rates for men and lower rates for women. The latter effect is explained by the fact that women of lower social status are more dependent on their partner’s support whereas women of higher status are less likely to need such help. Furthermore, highly qualified women can choose from fewer similarly highly qualified potential partners in the marriage market. At the same time, we may also suppose
that educational qualifications raise women’s attractiveness. This may be due to a higher income that facilitates financial stability of the family, or because it has a stimulating effect on the partner with lower status (Bumpass et al. 1990).

Religiousness may run two contradictory mechanisms in the case of the divorced. On the one hand, we may suppose that religious people are more likely to remarry instead of remaining alone, since for them marriage is the most suitable form of an intimate new relationship. However, the Catholic Church discourages remarriage (even though this may have less effect nowadays). At the same time, religious people may reject cohabitation and they may be less likely to choose this type of partnership. Therefore, religious practices have a positive effect on remarriage and a negative effect on cohabitation (Graaf and Kalmijn 2003).

DATA AND METHODS

Data

This paper is based on data from the first wave of the “Turning point of the life course” panel survey (for a detailed description of the survey see Spéder 2002; Kapitány and Spéder 2004). Interviews took place at the end of 2001 and at the beginning of 2002 on a sample representing the entire Hungarian population aged 18–75. The sample size was 16,363.

We only examine new partnerships after the break-up of the first marriage and do not distinguish between its forms – whether they are marriages or cohabitations – during the event history analysis. Based on research on Swedish and Norwegian data, we assume that the majority of women prefer cohabitation as a second partnership. The spread of non-marital cohabitation seems to have contributed to the decrease or postponement of remarriage: in the case of women, one hardly finds any second marriage without prior cohabitation (Blanc 1987). Cohabitation after divorce is a quite general phenomenon (Graaf and Kalmijn 2003).

This paper examines 1,931 cases where first marriages were terminated by court resolution. We disregard new partnerships after widowhood and those cases where the person is still legally married but lives separately from the spouse, or where the respondent is single or in another partnership. (Excluded cases and the causes of exclusion are summarised in Table 1 of the Appendix).

A new partnership was formed in about 62% of the examined cases, whereas no such partnership was established for 29% of men and 43% of women.
The incidence and type of a new partnership varies according to the date of divorce. Some rough categories of the divorce dates demonstrate the decrease of remarriage and the gender differences (Table 1).

Table 1
New partnerships of divorced men and women by the period of the divorce

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohabitation</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No new partnership</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cohabitation</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No new partnership</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (100%)</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When examining those divorced in 1969 or earlier, it seems that the majority of both sexes remarried. Hardly any cohabitation was established and a relatively small number of divorced people – mainly women – remained single.

Among those divorced in the seventies and the eighties for the first time, we observe a tendency towards decreasing remarriage and increasing cohabitation.

It is difficult to arrive at a conclusion regarding those divorced between 1990 and 2002 because of the relatively short period of time that has elapsed since the dissolution of the marriage. However, the data suggests that more people choose cohabitation than marriage. The ratio of re-partnering women is lower in all groups than for men.

Of course, a more accurate picture emerges if we take into consideration the duration of the first marriage and the time elapsed between divorce and the new partnership. These aspects were included in the subsequent event history analysis.

Variables

Besides sex and age, other factors examined during the analysis were the number of siblings and whether one had been raised in an “intact” family dur-
ing one’s childhood (in a traditional family with two parents and children). In
regard to the terminated partnership, its type, duration and the year of divorce
were taken into consideration. Religiousness was also included in the analysis.

Event history analysis allows construction of so-called time-varying vari-
ables. This means that we are able to tell the actual value of a variable at any
given point of time – months in our case – within the observed time period.
Age, education, the number of biological children under the age of 18 living
with the respondent, the age of the youngest of these children, and the number
of biological children under the age of 18 not living with the respondent belong
to our time-varying variables (Table 2).
Table 2
Variables used in the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of variable</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intact family before age 16</td>
<td>1 = yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many brothers and sister was he/she raised with</td>
<td>0 = no siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as a child</td>
<td>1+ = one or more siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitation before marriage</td>
<td>1 = no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of marriage (years)</td>
<td>1 = 0–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = 6–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = 11–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = 16+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of divorce</td>
<td>1 = 1948–1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = 1970–1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = 1990–2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious?</td>
<td>1 = yes, follow the teachings of the Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = yes, in his/her own way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>1 = –29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = 30–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = 40–49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = 50–75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 living with the</td>
<td>0 = none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respondent</td>
<td>1 = one child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = two children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3+ = three or more children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 not living with</td>
<td>0 = none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the respondent</td>
<td>1 = one child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2+ = two or more children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of youngest biological child under 18 living with the</td>
<td>1 = 0–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respondent</td>
<td>2 = 7–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = 13–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = no children under 18 in the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education(^6)</td>
<td>1 = primary or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = vocational training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = tertiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed since divorce (years)</td>
<td>1 = 0–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = 3–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = 6–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = 11–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 = 16+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) Construction of a time-varying education variable rests on certain assumptions. The characteristics of the Hungarian educational system provided our starting point. We assume that respondents completed primary education at age 14, vocational school at age 17, grammar school at age 18, and there were no breaks in studies. Study discontinuities occur more frequently before starting tertiary education, therefore, we consider a five year period before obtaining a degree as the time spent in tertiary education.
Event history analysis was used for examining the social, economic and cultural determinants of establishing a new partnership. We tracked the process from the termination of the first marriage (the official annulation of divorce) until the establishment of a new partnership. The examined event is the formation of the second partnership. Results are relative risks, namely, we define the relative probability of a person with particular characteristics of starting a second partnership compared to the same probability of individuals who belong to the reference categories (the probability for the latter respondents equals 1). Models were estimated for men and women separately.

In Table 3 the occurrence of the event and exposure time (in percentage of the total exposure time) of entering a second partnership are summarised for both sexes separately.
Table 3
Exposure time and the occurrence of the event (a new partnership)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Exposed time</th>
<th>New partnership</th>
<th>Exposed time*</th>
<th>New partnership*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intact family in childhood</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With how many siblings were raised together?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitation before marriage?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of marriage (years)</td>
<td>0–5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16+</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious?</td>
<td>yes, following the teachings of the Church</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes, in his/her own way</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>&lt;29</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50–75</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of divorce</td>
<td>1970–1989</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990–2002</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 living with the respondent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 not living with the respondent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of the youngest child under 18 living with the respondent (years)</td>
<td>0–6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7–12</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13–17</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no children under 18 in the household</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of own underage children living with the respondent, age of youngest (years)</td>
<td>0–6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2+, 0–6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2+, &gt;6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>primary or less</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vocational school</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tertiary</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total exposure time and total no. of new partnerships</td>
<td>50671</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>120914</td>
<td>668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In percentage of total exposure time.
RESULTS

Three models were tested during the analysis, on men and women separately. The first one included age and family background characteristics (whether the respondent lived in an intact family as a child and the number of siblings he/she was raised together with). In the second model, the characteristics of the terminated marriage were also entered: whether they cohabited prior to marriage, the duration of the marriage, the date of divorce and the characteristics of common children under the age of 18 (the number of biological children under the age of 18 who lived with the respondents and the age of the youngest of them, and the number of biological children under the age of 18 who did not live with the respondent).

In this model, entering an interaction term between the number of underage children living with the respondent and the age of youngest child raised the explanatory power the most, hence this model was retained. The number of common children and children living apart were grouped differently in the case of men and women. Bearing in mind child custody practices, we employed a more detailed categorisation of children living with women and children living apart from men. Finally, the third model incorporated religiousness and education.

Single variable effects are presented in Table 2 of the Appendix and the characteristics of particular models are summarised in Tables 4–5 for men and women respectively.

Men

Regarding men, the inclusion of particular variable groups improved the fit of the subsequent models significantly, while the relative risks of particular variables remained practically unchanged. Therefore, we present the results of only the third, the most extended model.

There is a significant relationship between age and re-partnering after first divorce: the older the respondent is, the more difficult it is to find a new partner. The chances of forming a new partnership are less than half for those in the 40–49 age group than for respondents under the age of 30, and it is reduced by a third in the case of the oldest age group. This phenomenon may be explained by decreased attractiveness.

Family break-up experienced during childhood increases chances of starting a new partnership by 40% compared to those raised in intact families. Those raised with siblings are also more likely to find new partners than lone children.

Cohabitation before marriage and the duration of the marriage have no influence on partnership chances.
It is difficult to explain the result that the chances of finding a new partner decrease if divorce took place at a later period. For instance, those divorced between 1970 and 1989 have a 20% lower probability of finding a new partner compared to the reference category. We know that the remarriage rate among the divorced dropped considerably from the 1970s (mainly due to a significant decrease in the remarriage rate of men) (Szűcs 1996). However, cohabitation spread relatively rapidly in Hungary: while 2.1% of all families were cohabiting ones in 1970, this figure had increased to 4.3% in 1990 and to 9.5% by 2001 (Demographic Yearbook 2000). Due to the fact that both marriages and cohabitations were taken into consideration as second partnerships, this tendency can be explained by the fact that the increasing prevalence of cohabitation does not compensate for the decrease of remarrying. This is a realistic assumption, as the spread of cohabitation has accelerated over the last 10–15 years.

In the case of divorces between 1990 and 2002, we assume that intensified individualism – which could also have played a significant role in earlier periods – may have impeded decisions to commit to an intimate relationship. The spread of unmarried unions during this period also underscores this explanation. We also take into consideration the fact that many people live in so-called “living apart together” relationships.

If a divorced man lives with his own child who is older than 6, his chances of forming a new relationship are 40% lower than compared to a divorced man living alone or living with a small child. Whether one has underage children living separately has no influence.

Men who consider themselves religious but don’t attend church and those who do not consider themselves religious have a 30% higher probability of starting a new partnership than those who attend church.

More educated men have significantly higher chances of re-partnering after divorce: the probability of men with tertiary education is two times higher than that of men with primary or lower education.

Time elapsed since divorce has a clear and significant effect: the more time elapses, the lower the chances of finding another partner. However, this decrease is not linear. For instance, chances are decreased by 13% 3–5 years after divorce compared to the first 2 years, and this ratio halves in the subsequent period. After 15 years, which seems to be a watershed, chances are reduced to a third compared to the immediate period after the divorce.

Women

As for men, the effect of age is strong and significant. It is also more intense: chances of partnership of women aged 40–49 are less than a third of those belonging to the youngest age group, and for women older than 50 they
are minimal, only a tenth of those who fall into the youngest age category. In this case, we are faced with the widely acknowledged fact that appearance is more important in the case of women than men. However, this phenomenon may also be related to the fact that women reach the end of their fertile period in their forties.

Family break-up during childhood increases women’s chances of developing a new partnership, though to less of an extent than for men.

Unlike men, women who cohabited with their future husbands before marrying them have a higher probability of entering a new partnership. We know that cohabitation before marriage increases chances of future divorce. A possible explanation could be that people who choose cohabitation prior to marriage have liberal attitudes about partnership and they therefore form partnerships later and more easily, but in a form requiring less commitment.

Marriage duration is related to the chances of finding a new partner: the risk is 25% lower for women divorcing after 6–10 years of marriage than for members of the reference group.

Like men, chances of starting a new partnership decrease with time from the earliest examined period to the present. However, this effect is weaker for women than for men: the probability of finding a new partner among people divorced between 1990 and 2002 is 25% lower for women and 50% lower for men. This relationship is in-line with the fact that remarriage became less frequent mainly among men.

The number of children has less impact on new partnerships than we expected. Only one family type has an impeding effect: single parent families living with many underage children (at least one of whom is aged 6 or younger). In other cases – such as mother with one underage child or with school aged children, – the probability of starting a new partnership is not decreased. Interestingly, children under the age of 18 living in a separate household significantly increase the probability – indeed, almost double it – compared to those not having any children under age 18 or having child(ren) under age 18 but not living together with them. This result can be explained only partly by the fact that there are no or only a few underage children in the household, since this factor was not significant by itself. In any case, this is a small and particular group.

Religiousness plays no role for women and the impact of education is in contrast to what we observe among men. Chances of women starting a new relationship with vocational or secondary education decreased by 14–16% compared to those with primary education – the same variables have a positive effect on men. There is no significant impact on women with tertiary qualifications.
The effect of time elapsed since divorce is also clear: the more time elapses, the less chances women have of finding a new partner. In accordance with the fact that women form fewer partnerships after divorce, probabilities also decrease and they reach their lowest levels sooner than men.

Table 4
Relative risk of entering a new partnership after break-up of the first marriage, men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age and family background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intact family in childhood (yes)</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1.36*</td>
<td>1.38*</td>
<td>1.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of siblings raised together (0)</td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.24^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, years (–29)</td>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>0.80*</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.81^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>0.45***</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>0.53**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50–75</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.41**</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics of the broken up marriage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitation before marriage (no)</td>
<td>cohabitation</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of marriage, years (0–5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16+</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of divorce (1948–1969)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970–1989</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.78*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990–2002</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.51***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 living with the respondent x age of youngest†† (years) (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+, 0–6</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+, &gt;6</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 not living with the respondent (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiousness (yes, following the teachings of the Church)</td>
<td>yes, in his/her own way</td>
<td>1.36*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1.33^</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (primary or less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vocational school</td>
<td>1.43**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>1.57**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tertiary</td>
<td>2.03***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time since divorce, years (0–2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3–5</td>
<td>0.85***</td>
<td>0.84***</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16+</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2881.04</td>
<td>-2868.28</td>
<td>-2854.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of linearly independent factors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{\text{**}}\) p<0.15, ^{\text{*}} p<0.1, ^{\text{**}} p<0.05, ^{\text{***}} p<0.01, ^{\text{****}} p<0.001

\(^{\dagger}\) Reference categories are in parentheses. \(^{\ddagger}\) Interaction of two variables.
### Table 5

**Relative risk of entering a new partnership after break-up of the first marriage, women**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Categories</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>Intact family in childhood (yes) †</td>
<td>no</td>
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<td>1.27*</td>
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<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>40–49</td>
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<td>0.30***</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
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<td>50–75</td>
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<td><strong>Characteristics of the broken up marriage</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1.28^</td>
<td>1.29^</td>
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<td>Duration of marriage, years (0–5)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>0.76*</td>
<td>0.75*</td>
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<td>11–15</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.09</td>
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<td>Date of divorce (1948–1969)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1989</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–2002</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.73*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 living with the respondent, * age of youngest ‡‡ (years) (0)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1, 0–6</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+, 0–6</td>
<td>0.77^</td>
<td>0.76^</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, &gt;6</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+, &gt;6</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>1+</td>
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<td>2.0**</td>
<td>1.93**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>vocational school</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.84^</td>
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<td>0.86^</td>
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<td>tertiary</td>
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<td>Time since divorce, years (0–2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3–5</td>
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<td>0.81***</td>
<td>0.81***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.70***</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16+</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.38***</td>
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<td>-3881.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of linearly independent factors</td>
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<td>22</td>
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</table>

^p<0.15  ^ p<0.1  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001
† Reference categories are in parentheses.
‡‡ Interaction of two variables.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As the proportion of different partnership types radically changes, it becomes increasingly important to examine their development and termination, and the factors that play a role in these processes – paying special attention to children and gender differences.

The investigation of new partnerships after the break-up of first marriage was carried out separately for men and women. However, the form of the new partnership (whether marriage or cohabitation) was not taken into consideration in the event history analysis.

The effect of demographic factors is generally strong and consistent. The consequences of economic and educational characteristics, however, are less clear-cut. Break-up of parental marriage in childhood increases the likelihood of new partnerships in all cases, while cohabitation before marriage has a significant effect only for women. The impact of respondents’ children differs by sex: the probability of finding a new partner is reduced when a woman has children under the age of 18 and at least one of whom is aged 0–6, while the same risk is decreased where men have one or more children above the age of 6 living with them. Children living in a separate household have an effect for women only: it almost doubles their chances of finding a new partner. As regards the effect of the time elapsed since divorce, we can conclude that the likelihood of re-partnering decreases for both sexes as time elapses. Education has a significant effect on men but not on highly educated women; it increases the risk for men, whilst it decreases it for women. Religiousness plays a role only in the case of men: religious men who live in accordance with the regulations of the Church are less likely find a new partner.

Our results are mostly in accordance with earlier studies. However, in certain cases, especially for women, the outcomes are surprising.

The increased chances of more educated men re-partnering are consonant with resource theories, whereas we have found contradictory results in the case of women. Success in the marriage market justifies the fact that decreasing attractiveness as a result of ageing reduces the probability of both sexes finding a new partner. The effect of the number of children is not straightforward in the case of women. We arrived at two unexpected conclusions: firstly, one child under 18 does not seriously hamper finding a new partner, and secondly, the burden of having to support two or more children is not a sufficiently strong reason for forming a new partnership or remarrying. It was similarly surprising that a woman has better chances of re-partnering if she has child(ren) under the age of 18 who live in a separate household. One possible explanation is that the new partnership may have been established before divorce, and the respondent left her child more easily in order to stabilise the new relationship. Previous
research does not help explain the effect of marriage duration, namely that only marriages lasting 6–10 years reduce the probability of a new partnership, and we can only speculate on this. We suppose that children are born during this time period, therefore women who divorce 6–10 years after getting married are more likely to have children under the age of 6.

Evidently, our results need to be treated with caution. The analysis is restricted to divorced respondents whose first partnership was marriage or cohabitation, which later transformed into marriage. Taking into consideration this fact and the proliferation of cohabitations over the last two decades, we may suppose that our subsample includes respondents who are ‘more conservative’ than average.

One should also note that the date of marriage break-up is defined as the date at which this was ruled and agreed upon by a court of law. However, we know from other studies that the majority of divorcing people separate before the judicial process is completed. Divorce is an extended process, and private and legal events hardly ever correspond (Becker 1993). It would have been more reasonable to treat separation as the termination of the marriage, but we have no data on the dates when married couples ceased to live in the same households. As a result of our procedure, we had to exclude those cases where a respondent already lived in a new partnership but the marriage had not been legally terminated. Therefore, we may underestimate the frequency of new partnerships – especially unmarried unions – established after separation but before legal divorce, in particular if the divorce took place after 1990. Finally, one should also note that even though only biological children under the age of 18 are considered, there are lots of missing data, especially regarding children who had been living separately from the respondent for a long time.

Retrospective data from the first wave of a panel survey were applied in the analysis, but we lack important information that might have facilitated better understanding of the phenomenon (for instance, we are not able to follow month by month changes in labour market status). The second wave of this panel survey will provide a rich database, and the inclusion of new variables into the models may fine-tune the conclusions of this paper. For example, it seems promising that we will be able to follow the partnership and family changes step by step among divorced people during the last 3 years. Examining homogamy in the case of terminated and new partnerships could be an interesting aspect, and the new data set will make this possible in the near future. Moreover, we will be able to analyse the role of children in partnership formation not only from the perspective of the respondents but also from the viewpoint of the children of potential partners (Goldscheider and Sassler 2006).
REFERENCES


Table 1
Cases excluded from the analysis and reasons for exclusion.
Partnerships after break-up of the first marriage in Hungary among women and men born between 1926 and 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of records (respondents)</th>
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<td><strong>Exclusions</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has never lived in cohabitation or marriage</td>
<td>3 005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in first partnership</td>
<td>8 612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In first marriage and separated</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second partnership starts before the first ends</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated or widowed</td>
<td>1 912</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>578</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of exclusions</strong></td>
<td>14 432</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of used cases</strong></td>
<td>1 931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of second partnerships</strong></td>
<td>1 204</td>
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Table 2

Relative risk of forming a new partnership after break-up of the first marriage, univariate effects

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<th>Women</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>risk</td>
<td>signifi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intact family in childhood</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1+</td>
<td>1.08</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabitation before marriage</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of marriage (years)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>***</td>
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<td>1.24</td>
<td>^^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes, in his/her own way</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
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<td>40–49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50–75</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of divorce</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970–1989</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990–2002</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of biological children under 18 living with the respondent</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>Number of biological children under 18 not living with the respondent</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1.08</td>
<td>2.21</td>
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<td>2+</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.69</td>
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<td>Age of the youngest child under 18 living with the respondent (years)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7–12</td>
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<td>vocational school</td>
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<tr>
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<td>secondary</td>
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<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tertiary</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>***</td>
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^^ p<0.15  ^ p<0.1  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001

The significance of the variable is indicated next to the reference category.
DIVORCE AND FAMILY CHANGE REVISITED: PROFESSIONAL WOMEN’S DIVORCE EXPERIENCE IN TURKEY

SERAP KAVAS² AND AYŞE GÜNDÜZ-HOŞGÖR³

ABSTRACT: In this study we try to shed light on changed family structure through the act of divorce. Divorce reveals much about the nature of family life, particularly the challenges and stresses families face. The increased rate of divorce seen over the last decade is a sign of the stress families are experiencing. Liberalisation of divorce laws (i.e. enactment of no-fault divorce in 1988) and New Civil Code reforms are analysed as the mechanisms behind the increased divorce rate. At the same time, we scrutinise altered grounds for divorce, thereby revealing the role played by changes in individual perceptions of divorce. Moreover, as is evinced by this study, another challenge for existing family structures manifests itself in the wake of divorce. Following divorce, alternative family forms such as single-parent families – often headed by women – and patterns of remarriage pose challenges to the monolithic family structure in Turkey. Therefore, understanding these diverse patterns is crucial to understanding changes in family structure in Turkish setting. The current study aims to increase knowledge of the current condition of the family in Turkey. Through a qualitative study of one landmark society we hope to shed some new light on the current condition and future of families in developing countries.

INTRODUCTION

The institution of the family in Turkey is facing challenges and, as the domino effect has it, a change in one realm sets off a train of similar changes in other realms. The phenomenon can be illustrated nowhere better than by divorce, given its far-reaching implications for each member of the family. Divorce is not just the act of

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two individuals’ uncoupling, it also reflects family stress and social and cultural normative changes – it is “a barometer registering changes in the social conditions” (Levine 1982). In this respect, increased divorce rates allow us to comprehend social change, which, as this study shows, can simultaneously be considered cause and effect of the redefinition of gender roles and division of labour in the family. At this juncture, to gain a better sense of family change through the ‘lense’ of our sample of 31 divorced women, we concentrate on the grounds for divorce and on the overall experiences these women faced in the aftermath of divorce. Before examining the trajectory of change in the family, we review the family system and the characteristics of divorce in Turkey.

CHANGES IN THE FAMILY SYSTEM

It is difficult to talk about a uniform family system in Turkey, since traditional influences, Republican ideology and massive migration from rural to urban areas have impacted on family life, creating diverse family systems and cultural heterogeneity in society (Nauck and Klaus 2008; Aytac 1998). When the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the modernising drive of the Turkish state manifested itself first and foremost in the domestic sphere. In an effort to instill ‘modern life’, the founder of the nation, Mustafa Kemal (and his associates), imposed a series of legal and social reforms which directly affected the family. The most important reform was adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, which brought important new regulations to Turkey including a ban on polygamy, establishment of minimum ages for marriage (15 for girls and 17 for boys), gender equality in inheritance laws and encouragement of the nuclear family to the detriment of the (“traditional”) extended family structure (Sirman 2007). Adoption of the Swiss Civil Code also led to equal legal rights to divorce, custody of children and the granting of property ownership rights to both sexes.

However, these new legal regulations did not spread evenly throughout the country, being effective only in urban areas. Moreover, there was resistance to the changes from various groups, who rejected Western lifestyles and espoused indigenous values and norms; as a result, a society was brought about characterised by both Western lifestyles and traditional values (Aykan and Wolf 2000; Aytaç 1998; Çindoğlu et al. 2008). While the regulations changed family behaviours, resistance manifested itself through such practices as religious wedlock, the customary practice of bride money paid to the bride’s family before marriage, and highly differentiated roles in the family for the husband and the wife.

Moreover, as Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smith (2008) argue, the reforms did not reach out to the women in rural areas, specifically the eastern side of Turkey. As a result, women in eastern and south-eastern regions benefited less from legal regulations, and have had less favourable living conditions compared to urban women. For instance, while marriage through religious ceremony is quite rare in western and northern Turkey, almost one-third of women are married through religious ceremony in
eastern and south-eastern Turkey, depriving them of the legal rights and regulations provided by civil wedlock (Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smith 2008). The same is true as regards their access to basic education.

Massive migration from rural to urban areas resulting from the industrialisation and urbanisation of 1950s complicated family systems even more. While migrants were trying to adapt to city life, they simultaneously embedded many traditional elements of family life and practices in the new urban setting, resulting in a combination of both modern and traditional family behaviours. As a result of these developments, Turkey became a country where different family ideologies and behaviours coexist (Nauck and Klaus 2008). It is important to note that family systems in Turkey are still under the influence of these three factors, leading to hybrid forms where traditional and modern family forms integrate together. We can now turn to a discussion of the general characteristics of family life in Turkey.

The Ottoman Empire historically had both nuclear families and different forms of extended families. It was quite common for generations of the same family to live either in separate houses in the same yard or under the same roof (see Ortaylı 1994; Kağıtçıbaşı 1982; Duben 1990; Kongar 1976). This household system changed substantially with the advent of urbanisation and migration. Survey data today reveals that the nuclear family structure is dominant in Turkey (87% of all families) (Family Structure Survey 2006). However, even though they live separately, family members are expected to give material and emotional support to each other, especially when a member of family is in an economically difficult situation (Cindioğlu et al. 2008).

Indeed, this familial support mechanism is one of the means of coping with difficulties emanating from migration, adaptation to city life and social change more generally in Turkey (Vergin 1985; Cindioğlu et al. 2008).

Respect for age and authority in the family has long been an important norm, and young people are expected to show respect for their parents throughout the life course (Nauck and Klaus 2008). However, this pattern has changed somewhat over the past few decades and young people have increasingly become more autonomous (Kağıtçıbaşı and Ataca 2005). Parental control stands out as an enduring attribute of Turkish families in both urban and rural contexts. They tend to interfere continuously in their children’s lives, particularly on important issues such as education, career and marital decisions. In fact, parental involvement continues throughout their children’s lives, even after children get married. Parents feel they are responsible for being involved in their children’s lives by giving them help and advising them when the married couple face difficulties. This involvement can get even more complicated because the traditional mother-in-law and bride relationship still persists as an important dimension of family ties in Turkey. Whatever her socio-economic status, a woman is expected to respect her mother-in-law, to visit her frequently and to help with household chores during each visit. This can be complicated when talking about educated and professional women, because this traditional relationship might conflict with professional women’s work schedules and norms of independence. Turkish
parents also play a role in moments of family crisis – such as divorce – and try to help by playing mediatory roles. Although parental involvement may be helpful for couples, it might also complicate conflict-ridden marriages. According to a recent survey, parental interference was reported by 48% to be an important factor leading to marital conflict (Yurtkuran-Demirkan et al. 2009).

Getting married is a norm in Turkey, and as the following figures from 2008 indicate, almost universal. According to the Turkish Demographic Health Survey (TDHS), the majority of women (65%) at childbearing age are currently married. Arranged marriages were quite predominant in the past, but couple-initiated marriages have increased in recent years. The average age at first marriage is 22.9 for women and 26.2 for men (Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkstat, 2008). A general observation is that marital expectations have undergone change, as intimacy and companionship have become more important elements of marital unions, particularly in urban settings.

The total fertility rate in Turkey has decreased gradually: while in 1978 it stood at 4.3 per woman; it had decreased to 3 births per woman by the late 1980s, to 2.6 births per woman by the 1990s, and finally to 2.16 per woman in 2008, almost exactly hitting replacement level (TDHS 2008). To control population growth, after 1965 the Turkish government initiated family-planning programmes across the country. With socio-economic changes as well as changes in the family structure of the past few decades, fertility has declined. What Kagıtcıbası and Ataca (2005) term “the two-child norm” is now common.

PROFESSIONAL WOMEN IN TURKEY

Participation by women in the active labour force currently stands at 24.9% (Turkstat Family Structure Survey 2006). Hence, in Turkey only one in four working-age women participates in the labour force, with half of those women working in agriculture, the rest holding positions in the formal economy. More highly educated women have higher labour force participation rates. According to the Household Labour Force Survey conducted by Turkstat in September 2009, 17% of illiterate women participate in labour force whereas 71% of female university graduates participate. These figures emphasise the significance of education in increasing women’s labour force participation rate. In Turkey, women’s access to higher education is vital for entering the labour force and holding high status positions at work.

Although there is a relatively small number of highly educated women in the labour force, women’s participation in high-status scientific and professional occupations is relatively high in Turkey (Ecevit et al. 2003). The rate of women occupying professional jobs within the formal economy is 29% (WWHR 2009). The percentage of female doctors and lawyers in Turkey is 15% and 18.7% respectively (Narlı 2000). The percentage of women at universities is particularly high, constituting 34% of all academic staff, 23% of them professors.
These contradictory facts are the outcome of the above-mentioned modernity project undertaken by the Turkish Republic. Ozbilgin & Healy (2004) in their study of gender and career development at Turkish universities relate these relatively high percentages to the legacy of representation of women in the public sphere left over from Republican ideology. Republican ideology promoted women’s entry to professional jobs and increased their relative independence in society, particularly those of middle- or upper-class family backgrounds (Öncü 1982; Bora 2002). As stated by Öncü (1982), the large number of women who access education and professional jobs – almost equal to highly industrialised countries in 1970s – can be explained by class inequalities and state recruitment within the framework of the modernity project.

When it comes to decision-making positions, however, the percentages decrease significantly. For example, while 44% of teachers are women, only 8% are school principles, which, according to Kabasakal et al. (2004) is proof of the existence of the glass-ceiling phenomenon in the Turkish context. The same discrepancy is true of women entrepreneurs in Turkey. In 1990 “only 0.2 per cent of economically active women were in the position of employer and 7.3 per cent were self employed” (ibid, 285).

Although Kemalist reforms were part and parcel of the modernity project, paving the way for women’s access to education, employment and politics, it would be an overstatement to say that it transformed women’s social status and familial roles at the same time: male domination remained intact and the reforms did not challenge the prevalent family ideology, which assigned a domestic role to women and breadwinner role to men (Ozbilgin and Healy 2004, 366). The mindset still persists except for in small number of urban elite who consider their caring role their primary role. As stated by Kabasakal, et al.:

Despite significant attempts at the modernization of women, some conflicting and traditional roles are simultaneously present in Turkish society, even among middle and upper classes as part of Middle Eastern culture. These traditional roles promote segregation of gender roles, the role of women as mothers and wives and traits that are considered to be feminine (2004, 274).

As a sizeable literature suggests, female employment does not fundamentally change the patriarchal system (Kağıtçibaşı 1982; Kuyaş 1982; Gunduz-Hosgor and Smits 2008). Due to the entrenched intra-family division of labour, even if women are employed professionally, they are still expected to prioritise their domestic role. Therefore, women may see marriage as a barrier to career advancement. Kabasakal and Bodur (2002), comparing cultural practices and norms in Middle-Eastern contexts, report that 50% of women consider marriage a hindrance to their career, whereas no single men stated the same. Another study (Ecevit et al. 2003), on professional women’s work experience in computer programming occupations in Turkey, finds that in order to pursue their careers successfully women attempt various
strategies such as “working hard, postponing marriage or not marrying at all, and managing marriage without a radical redefinition of their marital roles”; 50% of women in this study never married. What is more, the percentage of divorced, separated or widowed women in their sample is 14.5%, indicating the level of conflict these women face in reconciling marital role and career.

The women who participated in our study shared similar characteristics with most of the professional women mentioned above. As indicated in numerous studies and surveys, professional women in Turkey are still expected to follow traditional gender roles, and the sample in our study is no different. As we show in subsequent sections, the division of labour and men’s responses to transformations in women’s lives has become a source of conflict for the women interviewed.

DIVORCE IN TURKEY

Divorce has always existed in Turkey. Before the foundation of the Republic in 1923 it was practised in the Ottoman Empire within the framework of Sharia law by Muslim judges (kadi). With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the practice of divorce within Islamic Law was replaced by The Civil Code, instituted in 1926. In 1988 no-fault divorce law, which facilitated divorce legally by allowing divorce by mutual consent, was introduced. This significantly increased divorce rates, as can be seen in the following figure.

Source: The raw data were taken from Turkish Statistical Institute demographic database.

Figure I

Increase in Crude Divorce Rate as of 1988
It would be an overstatement to say that divorce rates are increasing at a notable rate in Turkey. However, a marked rise over the last decade can be observed. During the 1990s the crude divorce rate (number of divorces per 1,000 people in the population, children and singles included) fluctuated between 0.46 and 0.52. The rate jumped to 1.35 in 2001 (with an additional smaller increase to 1.40 in 2008) – a 180% increase over the 1990s. This sudden change is unexpected. One explanation might be the method used for collecting divorce data. Before 2002, divorce data collected by Turkstat was gathered from public prosecutors every six months. Data thus produced was collected in an untimely manner, due to the overburdening of public prosecutors. From 2003, however, divorce data are taken from the Central Population Administrative System (MERNIS) database. Population statistics including divorce and marriage produced by the MERNIS are collected in a more timely manner, are more accurate, and are fully compliant with international standards. We speculate that the huge increase in the rate of divorce from 2001 on might have been caused by this organisational shift in data collection.

If this shift is not related to the change in method of data collection, we argue that the motives behind such a dramatic increase in the divorce rate over the 1990s are twofold. The first concerns the socio-economic condition of the country during the early 2000s. Within the framework of Turkey’s bid for European Union membership, some regulations were changed in the Turkish civil code in 2002. The most significant change was in the property regime, giving each spouse an equal right to property acquired during marriage. This change might have encouraged spouses to end conflict-stricken marriages since the new property regime guarantees each spouse’s property rights after divorce and divorce no longer entails one-sided economic loss. The second dimension of this socio-economic juncture concerns the economic recession of 2001; its later implications are reported to have upset family relationships considerably. In 2001 alone, we observe a 20% increase compared to the previous year (Divorce Statistics Report, Prime Ministry General Directorate of Family and Social Research, 08.09.2007).

Divorce rates in Turkey differ substantially according to region: the Aegean region on the western side of Turkey has the highest divorce rate at 2.05, while central-eastern Anatolia has the lowest rate at 0.49 (Turkstat 2008).

It is generally women who file for divorce in Turkey. According to a report published by the Bilka Research Centre, in 150 of 240 court cases, women filed for divorce (Bilka 1998). After divorce, women generally assumed primary custody of children. In addition, most divorces occurred in the first five years of marriage. Rural areas saw the opposite: men were more likely to file for divorce. This discrepancy can be considered as resulting from women’s lack of education and financial security, as well as repressive social control of women. There is a large rural-urban gap in Turkey as regards divorce. In rural areas, where family is an economic unit and the traditional
family structure is the norm, divorce is a decision made by the whole family, rather than just the husband and the wife (Demircioglu 2000, 36).

METHODOLOGY

Participants

The present study is part of a larger project in which 31 highly-educated and professional women were interviewed over a two-year period, between June 2007 and September 2009. We interviewed professional divorced women because in our experience professional women (more so than lower class women) are subject to ideational influences deriving from Western beliefs and values thanks to their easy access to communication technologies, contact with international companies and organisations, and frequent travel to other countries, which have tremendous implications for their perception of existing norms and values (see Thornton 2001, 2005).

During the initial phase potential participants were sought by using the snowball sampling technique. We focused on middle-class, highly-educated and professional divorced women. Those who did not fit this profile were excluded, as were friends and family members. Participants were all from urban areas and had full-time professional jobs at the time of interview. All lived in Istanbul, except for three who lived in small cities in eastern and central parts of Turkey. The average age of the women was around 38 years (with a range between 29 to 58). All of the women had been divorced for at least one year at the time of the study and they had got divorced only once – apart from one participant who had been divorced twice and married three times (she was married to her third husband at the time of the interview). Twenty-four participants in the sample had at least one child, with the average number of children per woman standing at 1.5 (range = 1 to 3).

Data Collection and Analyses

We used an in-depth interview approach to gather the qualitative data used in this study. One researcher conducted the interview while another researcher transcribed and analysed the data. The 31 face-to-face interviews were carried out in between one and three sessions, at participants’ houses or work places. The duration of interviews ranged from three to eight hours. The opening inquiries consisted of general questions about the participant’s family, her place of birth, educational history, the stage at which she made the decision to marry, etc. Participants were then asked questions about their experiences of divorce and its aftermath. Through its unstructured nature, the in-depth interview method allowed us to capture subtleties, contradictions, and
meanings that surfaced during the interviews (see Reinharz 1983; Riessman 1993; Anderson and Jack 1991) and was entirely suitable for this kind of exploratory research. In addition, the in-depth interview was useful because it revealed a lot about the social life of the interviewees – “culture speaks itself through an individual’s story” (Riessman 1993). We used the grounded theory approach as an inductive means of data analysis, deriving analytic categories from the interview data as we coded it (Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2006).

In the next section we present the findings that emerged from the data analyses in two broad categories: (a) women’s experiences before divorce, and (b) the aftermath of divorce. In the first part of the analysis we examine participants’ grounds for divorce and expectations of marriage. This section allows us to tap into changes in patriarchy. The next section examines the aftermath of divorce in three areas: single parenting, experience of remarriage and societal attitudes to divorce.

FINDINGS

Experiences Leading to Divorce

Emasculaton of men: A challenge to patriarchy

To get a better sense of family stress, it is important to examine the motives behind marital dissolution in Turkey, where for the most part grounds for divorce are framed in terms of incompatibility. According to court records, this is applicable to 95% of all divorces. Data on reasons for divorce are in short supply; therefore, we draw on individual pieces of research to fill in the gaps. A recent study carried out in urban settings helps us to get a better sense of the grounds that lead parties to terminate their marital unions. It reveals three major reasons: (1) lack of communication between couples (69%), (2) financial problems (i.e., credit card debts, financial mismanagement, lack of care in financial duties, bankruptcy, etc.) (34%), and, (3) child-related problems (29.8%). Another study (Demircioglu 2000) found irreconcilable differences of personality and mismatch between expectations and fulfillments as the major grounds for marital breakup; alcoholism coupled with domestic violence or gambling ranked second.

Participants related similar reasons for their divorces in our study. Overall, among all the reasons that drove these women to divorce, husbands’ reluctance to be involved in household financial expenses turned out to be the leading one. Of all the women we interviewed, 13 participants recounted how they were distressed by their husbands’ reluctance – or rather their refusal – to share in the family’s financial expenses. Domestic violence was the second most important reason that came into the picture during our interviews: eight participants recounted violence in physical or emotional form. Six participants related infidelity as their prime reason for filing for
divorce. Five women told of emotional estrangement from their spouses and two other women stressed that irreconcilable differences of character with resultant marital dissatisfaction put great strain on their marriages, becoming the major reason for divorce.

Women’s grounds for divorce allow us to see how patriarchy, which has a strong hold on gender roles in the family, is facing challenges and undergoing modification. Thirteen women stated that they were the sole breadwinners due to their husband’s avoidance of household expenses and lack of interest in household responsibilities. Since Turkey is characterised as belonging to “classic patriarchy” (Kandiyoti 1988), where male dominance is the norm, men withdrawing from their primary financial role can be considered a breach of the boundary of gendered division of labour in the family. This emergent trend runs counter to cultural gender ideology, which was even undergirded by a law in the civil code stating that men were head of the family; a law that was repealed in 2001. So these findings lend substance to the fact often raised in the literature that the familial norms stipulating that men be the major provider has been challenged by economic reality. This phenomenon is summed up adroitly by Bolak:

The traditional urban ideal of married women remaining at home and occupying themselves exclusively with family work has been increasingly challenged by the economic pressures of urban living, making women’s employment crucial for the maintenance of [the] economic status quo (1994, 412).

The significant contribution of these women to the household budget allows us to tap the interplay between cultural expectations and family work dynamics and, in this case, the ensuing conflict which led to marital breakup. The following excerpt and quotation from our interviews evince this situation clearly:

— Interviewer: Did you have any economic strain after divorce?
— Participant: Nothing changed. I was already managing myself; with divorce I got rid of one economic burden [referring to her ex-husband]. (Yasemin, Accounting Manager)

—I am OK, because I no longer have to support someone financially! [laughs] It is even better, because I am receiving alimony of 150 lira, and for the first time I am spending his money. (Emine, Quality Manager)

At this point it is important to note that in our study husbands’ reluctance to be involved in household expenses does not necessarily emanate from an inability to bring in a family wage; except in one case, all husbands had stable jobs that would have enabled them to be a major economic provider. The following quotations reveal this situation:
When we moved to Istanbul he did not find a job. I mean, he is a medical doctor and assistant professor but somehow he failed to find himself a job! Unbelievable! He just sat at home, strolled around outside, did not even care for our children…

our flat at that time was still under construction and with my salary, which was not enough even for our children’s basic expenses. I was also paying for construction of the kitchen, bathroom and floors every month. (Ayse, Project Manager)

He was unemployed through to the end of our marriage. But the thing is that he wasn’t taking care of the house while he was working either, it was always me who was in charge. You know what? I was even paying for the flowers he used to buy for me. (Filiz, Sales Executive)

It is perhaps surprising, but it is the husbands in these marriages who were challenging patriarchy: it is the women who appear to call for a traditional allocation of roles. This can be illustrated by the following participant:

Our main problem was his leaning on me, I mean financially… he kept complaining about work, being tired and stuff, but a man works and provides for his family, this is how it should be, isn’t it? Can you think otherwise? (Emine, Quality Manager)

To elaborate on the situation: women were demanding that men be the major providers in the family – a reinstatement of men’s traditional role. Note that this requirement may derive from women’s emphasis on equality of sharing household expenses rather than their demand for a tradition to be preserved. Either way, the traditional male breadwinner role is being emphasised by the most non-traditional segment of society – highly educated and professional women. Husbands unexpectedly resist this traditional demand and the ensuing conflict is remedied through non-traditional means: divorce. There is a strong interplay between gender role confusion and ensuing conflict. Cultural ideology prompts men and women to live up to certain gender roles, such as men being financially independent and women being obedient and dependent. Social change, however, complicates and blurs boundaries, leaving people feeling confused and potentially setting the stage for conflict. As stated by Levine:

In such a transition period, conservative ideals stand side-by-side with new egalitarian ideals. Many people are quite confused in their behavior, acting one moment as an egalitarian, liberal and the next like a chauvinistic conservative. Such confusion forms the basis of many conflicts in marriage and becomes the genesis of later divorce (1982, 328).
How this emerging trend will affect a renegotiation of ingrained gender role dynamics, as well as the economic characteristics of marriage, is an issue that deserves more research attention and in-depth analysis. However, since it is beyond our scope right now, it will suffice to note how the situation leads to conflict within a family and constitutes grounds for divorce in its own right. That said, we can speculate that changes in gender roles lead towards structural changes in the family, blurring the boundaries between the main provider and homemaker, lending itself to conflicts and resistance and thereby straining marital unions:

When [the] effects of urbanisation, female employment, and men’s reduced economic power provide an occasion for a shift in the boundaries between the sexes, how rights and responsibilities are negotiated depends on the context of situational constraints and opportunities as well as cultural meanings (Bolak 1997, 429).

Fulfillment: Redefinition of Marriage

Another challenge revealed in the reasons given for divorce is changes in the participants’ expectations and perceptions of marriage. The women interviewed made it clear that marriage for them did not mean financial stability or privileged status or protection, as inculcated in previously held norms and attitudes. By their accounts, participants first and foremost expected some emotional satisfaction from their marriages; all women in the sample chose their spouses themselves, and made the decision to marry on the basis of love. Fulfillment and satisfaction constituted the two main ideals of marriage. There is a certain tendency in Turkish society to hold women responsible for a failing marriage; upon divorce women are blamed for not having kept up the marriage and for causing ‘moral decay’ in society. More importantly, these cultural expectations cut across different socio-economic groups. As noted above, however, by getting divorced on the grounds of unhappiness or a lack of fulfillment, women in this study presented a different set of behaviours running counter to cultural ideology.

Moreover, the fact that it was the women who filed for divorce reveals that despite the cultural emphasis manifested in the Turkish vernacular, with such sayings as “man make houses, women make homes” (yuvayı disi kus yapar), “a good woman is a sacrificial mother for her family” (kadın dediğin ailesi için saçını süpürge eder) and “a good woman keeps her man” (kadın dediğin kocasını elinde tutar), women in this study do not seem to conform to cultural conception of gender roles and reveal less commitment to lifelong marriage than did older generations. This is quite in line with what Cherlin notes:
When social change produces situations outside the reach of established norms, individuals can no longer rely on shared understandings of how to act. Rather, they must negotiate new ways of acting, a process that is a potential source of conflict and opportunity (2004, 848).

One salient aspect of changing family dynamics in Turkey is therefore that individuals emphasise having more of a sense of self than in past decades. They increasingly question fulfillment and the level of satisfaction they derive from marriage, and feel more justified in leaving an unrewarding, unhappy marriage – an emerging trend that challenges marriage as a traditional institution.

Another way of reading these conflicts in marriage is by seeing increased individualism as a cause of stress. As Bumpass (1990) points out, when desires and interests clash, individuals face confusion as to how much weight to give to the interest of others at the expense of their own. For Bumpass, the shrinkage of the circle from a larger community towards the individual is best illustrated by the increasing rate of divorce in a society.

In line with the change in marriage that calls for for personal satisfaction and companionship, the tendency to end an unfulfilling relationship has increased. Particularly for the professional women in this study, when expectations of a fulfilling marital relationship were not attained, a resultant decline in marital satisfaction came to light. It was at this point that their professions came up as salient incentives for leaving an unhappy marriage, just as the existing literature holds that women’s economic independence does not directly cause marital separation but leads to an unhappy marriage ending in divorce (Smock 2004) with economic independence functioning as a “facilitating factor”. Our findings lend support to this viewpoint in the sense that the women interviewed brought a non-traditional element to marriage, viewing it more from a cost-benefit perspective. The following quotation from our interviews indicates how marriages are framed:

– That marriage did not contribute to my life at all. On the contrary, it took five years from my life. (Isik, PhD)
– In that marriage I would not have developed myself, I would not have improved myself, I would have stayed with the same principles, I would be a narrow-minded person. After divorce, my social abilities, tolerance towards people and empathy grew. I noticed improvements in my personality. (Macide, Finance Manager)
– My husband and child are not the only things in my life. (Zerrin, Assistant Manager)

Disillusionment with marriage and increased divorce rates render marriages fragile, prompting couples to feel insecure. As many women in this study reiterated, standing on one’s own feet, namely gaining a sense of financial independence, loom
large resulting in “reduced investment in marriages” (Bumpass, 1990: 486). When asked how divorce changed them personally, participants stated:

– Well, I came to be more rational. I learned to think in a more logical way. A feeling of “whatever you do in this life you do it on your own”. It is only you or you, nothing more than you. You have to pursue your life and not depend on anyone… Yeah, I am more rational right now; I guess my feelings are more controlled. (Nurgul, Journalist)

– I realised once again that a woman should stand on her own feet. In our society women like to stay at home and spend their husband’s money. I feel pity for such people! Particularly for those who had an education, training, their parents investing in them – it is just a waste of time and money. If you go to Europe you will see that young people want to work together and build a future together. They don’t dream about marrying a rich husband so that they sit back and enjoy life! You never know what to expect in life, what if you divorce one day, what will you do with no experience? (Mehtap, Administrative Assistant)

Aftermath of Divorce

This section explores the aftermath of divorce. The categories examined include single parenting, remarriage and societal attitudes to divorce.

Single Parenting

Census data across the world reveal that families headed by single mothers or fathers are increasing. The most recent Turkish Demographic Health Survey informs us about the proportion of female-headed households in Turkey. According to the survey, 12.8% of all households are families headed by women – 13% in urban areas and 12% in rural areas (TDHS, 2008). Variations in single-parent families are contingent on the very circumstances causing it, namely death, divorce and separation. Therefore, concomitant to the on-going increase in divorce rates, especially from 2001, we assume an increase in divorced single parents in Turkey. However, it is worth noting that Turkish culture finds it unacceptable for women to set up their own households, particularly after divorce; in many cases women are expected to “double up with other households rather than setting up their own households” (Koc 1997, 90). Moreover, a grandfather or a grandmother compensates for the absence of a non-residential parent. The concept of a single-parent home (tek ebeveyn), in the Turkish vernacular is therefore seldom used; it is a relatively new formation and notion in Turkey.
The most common characteristic of single-parent households formed in the wake of divorce is economic stress, which derives from going from a double-income earner family to a single one. For the most part, a single mother or, in rare cases, a single father provides all childcare expenses, accompanied by the cost of forming a new household from scratch. When single parents do not have a stable job to meet these expenses they can fall into poverty and struggle to allocate time between childcare and employment. With respect to its impact on children, a large body of literature highlights growing up in a single-parent house as an important dynamic affecting children’s lives. As Paterson (1996) indicates, most of the literature associates deviance with the background of the family, and thus shows “single-parent homes frequently at the top of the list of at-risk factors for children”. As a remarkable number of studies reveal, delinquency, teenage pregnancy, failure at school, psychological problems, etc., are correlates of growing up in a single-parent home (Matsueda and Heimer 1987; McLanahan and Booth 1989; McLanahan and Bumpass 1988). Findings from Turkey are no different (Sirvanli-Ozen 2005).

In our sample, 24 participants were single parents. The majority of them lived on their own with their children, except for two women who lived with their families at the time of interview. Since all were also employed, they either had child minders or received help from family and relatives with the childcare. The ramifications of single parenting on familial change therefore deserve attention, particularly the experiences of single mothers in such situations.

First and foremost, the increasing number of single-parent families through rising divorce rates poses a challenge to the existing family structure, since as the numbers are rising and forming a pattern they diversify existing family types, thereby leading to structural change in families.

As stated above, most of the participants in our study were more or less comfortable with their new single-mother roles and saw their children as the single positive result of marriage. They expressly told us that they were glad that they had children. However, this does not necessarily mean that they disavow the hardships of lone parenting: 13 participants acknowledged the burden and challenges of parenting alone. They referred mostly to the initial stage of the post-divorce period. They often stated that financial difficulties and overload emanating from their need to work and to care for the children at the same time led to the problems. So even though the women created strategies to overcome stress, such as getting their parents to help for childcare, they nevertheless felt overwhelmed due to being sole parents and working extra hours to provide better conditions for their children.

Another aspect encapsulated in the experience of single parenting is the child’s emotional reaction to losing a sense of family; to put it another way, missing the father’s presence in the family. In our study, more difficult than being overburdened by childcare was coming to terms with the absence of a father in their children’s lives. Indeed, perhaps the hardest strain facing single mothers was compensating for a “father absence”. One participant summed up the views of many:
– It [the distress] was so severe. No matter how strong you are, no matter how hard you try to withstand challenges, trying to make them not feel it [father’s absence] was really exhausting. That was the most difficult thing I went through. (Perihan, Public Relations Expert)

As regards children’s adjustment to living in a single-parent household, the structural shift from a two-parent household to a single-parent household may not necessarily be that smooth. Children may have to “commute between two separate households”. As one participant put it:

– My little son has never experienced eating at a table with the whole family together. (Belkis, Accountant)

More importantly, the concern that overwhelmingly preoccupies single mothers is the perceived stigma attached to children from single-parent homes. While studies reporting negative life events regarding children from divorced backgrounds make the participants worry about their children, they also think that there is an issue of stigma attached to single parenting, conveyed particularly in the media. Some of the women interviewed were defensive about single parenting, for example, juxtaposing it with unhappy intact families:

– As a matter of fact there are many families that are legally intact but in reality shattered inside. Seeing such families makes us realise that maybe we [single mothers] are in a better situation because you cannot provide a secure and peaceful upbringing to a child in a family where the parents quarrel frequently. After all, you never know what is happening behind closed doors. (Fulya, Training Manager)

Another important dimension of single parenting is its reverberations on societal attitudes, since “it is likely that these behavioral changes [are] accompanied by [a] change in public opinion” (Thornton 2009, 230). The women interviewed made it clear that the monolithic definition of the family marginalises single mothers and their families, and they stressed the need for diverse forms of families to be recognised by the population at large. One participant, in particular, stressed how the monolithic definition of the family in books, schools and media is upsetting for people who actually experience it:

– In schools they teach a certain image of family, which is made up of a father, a mother, and a child. Of course that is one image, but they should also teach alternative family structures like single-parent families, families with father-child
or mother-child only. I mean, at least sometimes they should give examples of single-parent families. (Filiz, Sales Executive)

All in all, in the aftermath of divorce the structural shift from a two-parent family to a single-parent family is imbued with difficulties and challenges for both single parents and children, affected by and affecting public opinion.

Remarriage

Remarriage renders a fundamental change in marriage patterns as well as in family structures. As stressed by Amato (2000):

The shift from [a] dominant pattern of lifelong marriage to one of serial marriages punctuated by periods of being single represents a fundamental change in how adults meet their needs for intimacy over the life course (2000, 1269).

It is worth noting that remarriage in the Turkish context is an understudied topic: no study has focused specifically on the phenomenon of remarriage except for a few studies on divorce which touch on remarriage as part of their research (e.g. Demircioğlu 2000; Ankan 1990). Drawing on these studies we maintain that remarriage is viewed positively by divorced women in Turkey. For example, in Ankan’s study, Social and Psychological Problems of Working Class Divorced Women, 37% of divorced women consider remarriage a serious possibility; in Demirci’s study, where she administered questionnaires to 120 divorced women from different occupations, 70% of women express positive thoughts about remarriage.

In the light of our statistical calculation using the most recent data from Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat), we see that remarriage makes up an increasing proportion of all marriages. As illustrated in Figure II, while between 2001 and 2007 the remarriage rate was going back and forth between 12–13% of all marriages, in 2008 the total remarriage rate rose to 16.6% of all marriages. However, the statistics reveal a gender gap in remarriage in 2008: 8.5% for women and 11.3% for men. That is, men remarry at a higher rate than do women, a pattern consistent with the international literature (Bumpass et al. 1990; Glick and Lin 1986).

When remarriages of only divorced individuals are singled out, however, one notices a closing of the gender gap in remarriage. While 9.4% of divorced men made their second or higher order marriages, as many as 7.9% divorced women remarried in 2008 (see Figure II below).
Motives for Remarriage

Remarriage is a quintessential example of how individuals fulfill their aspirations for a marital state encapsulated with emotional gratification. In our study, a number of women do not consider remarrying; most of the interviewed women see remarriage as a possibility, and seven participants were already remarried. By their accounts, emotional gratification overrides all other demands from marriage. The following expressions convey the main expectation of husbands:

—He has to be a friend 99 per cent first of all. (Filiz, Sales Executive)
—I want someone in my life, a soul mate with whom I want to be and who can love me. (Yasemin, Accounting Manager)
—All I want is to be loved, nothing more than that. (Neriman, Teacher)
—He must be an emotional companion and my confidant. (Burcu, Instructor)
So second marriage for them is not repeating the traditional pattern of marriage, but envisioning a more emotional form of companionship. The quotes also reveal a prevalence of evaluating marriage from a cost-benefit framework.

A significant issue here concerns stability. Researchers find that remarriages dissolve at a higher rate than first marriages (Bumpass et al. 1990; Booth and Edwards 1992; Amato 2000). Three important causes of fragility of remarriages are enumerated by Booth and Edwards: lack of social support, lack of clear norms to follow and to provide guidance, and more readily considering divorce a solution to problems in a marriage than those who have not divorced before. Unfortunately, we lack data regarding the dissolution rate of second marriages in Turkey. With respect to the quality of marriage, however, Bir-Akturk and Fisiloglu (2009) in their study comparing marital satisfaction among those of different marital statuses (such as first-married, post-divorce married, and post-bereavement) stated that remarried individuals reported levels of satisfaction equal to those expressed by first-married couples.

Societal Attitudes to Divorce

Increased tolerance towards divorce per se gives us a means of assessing the challenges to existing family ideology in Turkey. It is clear that in Turkey disapproval of divorce has declined over the past few years. Legal changes since 1988 and new sets of laws from 2001 (in particular) facilitated legal procedures of divorce and made it more attainable. In turn, increasing numbers of divorces have made it more acceptable. However, this does not mean that negative attitudes have disappeared and divorced people escape blame and judgement. Attitudes towards divorce are dynamic and not easily distilled, with the actual divorce itself being viewed as an unpleasant event implying a failure of individuals and deviation from a socially valued form of unity. As the following quotations indicate, individuals still feel that they are held accountable and blamed for their divorce, and divorced women in particular feel this pressure. Arıkan (1996), in her study Attitudes toward Divorce, found that although Turkish people do not reject divorce outright – and even express a certain sympathy for divorce under certain difficult situations – divorced couples may not experience much of this social tolerance, since couples, and women in particular, are expected to keep marriage together and people do not tolerate divorce on the grounds of individual choice. It may be, for this reason, that divorced women in Turkey emphasise negative societal attitudes toward divorced women as an important problem after divorce (Demircioğlu 2000).
In our study, interviewed women made it clear that the approaches and attitudes associated with stigma toward the divorced exist at every level of society. Among those interviewed, a large proportion of the participants (24) stated that they were concerned about possible negative reactions to their divorce and looked for ways to avoid exposure to that negativity. As the following quotations show, the attitudes that are associated with stigma appear spontaneously during everyday interactions:

– I was very hesitant in my workplace. You know what people say about divorced women. Even if I am at university, even if people around me are all educated, they still treat you differently, make you feel you are abnormal. They think: now she is divorced she can do wrong at any time. You see what I mean? It’s for this reason that I have withdrawn from people. (Perihan, Public Relations Expert)

Another participant spoke of how she gained a vantage point after divorce, from where she could analyse people and society in a more crystallised way. In her own words:

– I guess you start seeing realities more clearly, you truly understand your place in society, you see the looks in people’s eyes… I was working when I was married, right after my divorce I noticed changes in people’s behaviours, you become a divorced woman you know, your male colleagues and boss especially treat you differently. (Deniz, Marketing Assistant).

An interesting finding relates to women’s strategies to avoid people’s reactions. Trying to come to terms with their new marital status in a society where marriage is the only socially approved form of unity, women created strategies to cope with emotional distress and demoralisation. Some common behaviours emerged, including not telling people about the divorce, distancing themselves from male friends – particularly those who are married –, and dressing or behaving more conservatively. Nevertheless, some of the participants stated that their situations were better than those of older generations, particularly of their mothers, and that divorce is at least tolerated in principle, which for them is progress. The following quotation evinces this sentiment:

– At times she [participant’s mother] was getting grumpy, I remember, she was shouting at us. But we [participant and her siblings] understood her. I mean, it is not easy living in 1970’s Turkey as single woman. I mean, alone with three kids. She tried not to reveal it to us but I’m sure she was facing a lot of social stuff [referring to negative social attitudes to divorced women]. She stood up for herself, she didn’t need a man to take care of her. I admire her. (Rezzan, Teacher)
More importantly, the women in this sample also have the ambition to change social attitudes for the better. As highly educated and professional women they feel they are role models for other women, and feel responsibility towards them. For instance, around one-third of the women in our sample (9 women) were members of Divorced Mothers Association (DMA), a civil association that women from upper- and middle-class backgrounds formed in order to help each other deal with post-divorce adjustment difficulties, and to help change the somewhat negative attitudes toward divorced women in society for the better. In fact, because they aim to educate people and challenge entrenched false beliefs in society, they considered the interviews a means to articulate their views and reach a larger number of people in society. After each interview session they expressed their gratitude to us for conducting the research and their hope that it will be a contribution to society.

All in all, just as in the case of single parenting, social attitudes toward divorce are affected by increased levels of divorce. Even though negative attitudes to divorce exist at all socio-economic levels, and the women interviewed in this study are concerned about these behaviours, this nevertheless does not change their decision to divorce in the first place. More importantly, many of the participants emphasised combating stigma about divorce and instilling tolerance through being more open rather than remaining silent on the issue. All of these factors have implications for attitudinal and behavioural changes in public, which might potentially lead to a shift in the existing family ideology and practice in Turkey.

DISCUSSION

Divorce is an index of change in the family, not only because increasing divorce rates change individuals’ marital status, but also because diverse family types such as single-parent and step families are formed in the wake of divorce; these have consequences on public opinion. The increased divorce rate of the past two decades in Turkey attests to family stress. Different dimensions of divorce address different challenges to existing family norms. And it seems the most pressing challenge occurs in the aftermath of divorce by either single-parent or remarried families. In this study we show that divorce gives way to structural and ideational shifts in family lives.

Through the lense of the narrative interviews of 31 divorced women, this study reveals that socio-economic reality changes difficulties for gender roles, allowing us to tap the interplay between cultural expectations and ideational shifts, and resultant marital breakup. As 13 participants in our study stated, they were the sole breadwinners due to their husband’s avoidance of contributing towards household expenses, and lack of interest in taking care of the family. In a traditional society where the roles of husbands and wives are highly differentiated, and where male decision making is prevalent regardless of women’s status, withdrawal of men from their primary role can be considered a challenge to the existing family ideology.
What is interesting from a sociological point of view is the unexpected way these traditional gender roles are challenged, namely, highly educated and professional women who deny traditional gender norms in effect are demanding that the traditional male breadwinning role be reinstated, even though this demand might be in the name of equality of sharing financial responsibilities. Men, on the other hand in a patriarchal setting, are shifting away from their socially expected roles of taking care of the family financially. And the conflict-ridden situation lends itself to severe family stress, eventually leading to marital separation. In other words, the conflict is remedied in a non-traditional way, which is a challenge to the traditional family system in Turkey.

Another challenge to the family structure is single-parent families formed in the wake of divorce. The majority of women interviewed, who were single parents themselves, stressed the need for diverse forms of families to be recognised, which may again lead to attitudinal changes in public opinion (Thornton 2009). In addition, the increasing number of remarried families renders fundamental change in marriage patterns as well as in family structures. In our study, no matter what the participants experienced, they definitely preferred the married state and valued the marriage experience in its own right. Moreover, their strong emphasis on emotional gratification and democratic relationships challenges the traditional meaning of marriage, where husband and wife are assigned certain roles in the family and male dominance is the norm.

There can be no doubt that these developments lead to changes in public opinion. Though divorce is deemed a deviation from socially acceptable family behaviour, the fact that the divorce rate is increasing and becoming more common has resulted in a more positive public image of divorce. In this particular study, despite the fact that women faced negative attitudes, they felt that they were nevertheless in a better situation than older generations. Moreover, some of the women who were actively participating in an association dealing with divorced women’s well-being stated that they worked hard to change public opinion for the better. Changes in public opinion of divorce, as one might expect, potentially works towards making the social consequences of divorce more tolerable, which in turn makes the decision to divorce easier.

Finally, our findings must be evaluated in light of the study’s restrictions such as limited sample size and gender. Subsequent research should investigate the impact of divorce on families of different social classes, for both genders, and with a larger sample.

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**INTRODUCTION**

The title of this book is very well chosen. It really focuses on biosocial interactions – the mutual influences of biological and socio-cultural phenomena. There is neither a reduction to biological factors, nor a treatment of social phenomena in isolation from biological ones. This could be encouraging to social scientists, given the many pretensions of biological reductionism that we so often come across these days.

The book has a very clear structure. From a sociobiological perspective it explores age, and sexual, family, reproductive, social-class, racial and intergenerational variations. In the final chapter, the book focuses on ethical and policy aspects. Because of its structure, I shall first summarise the book chapter by chapter. Following that, I shall put forward a number of sometimes critical but mostly positive comments.

**EVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND OF BIOSOCIAL INTERACTIONS**

The book has two main goals. The first is to inform social scientists (and others) about the powerful contributions made by evolutionary biology to our understanding of (the evolution of) human societies. The second is to demonstrate the relevance of new knowledge and insights for understanding the problems facing modern societies.

Looking at the theoretical background, it is important to note that Cliquet is not an old-fashioned Darwinist who thinks in terms of individual selection and survival of the fittest. Cliquet builds on the achievement of the so-called Second Darwinian Revolution (from the 1960s onwards), which produced many insights useful for analysis of human group life. On the very first page of the...
introduction Cliquet makes a number of statements, which are supported by the results of the Second Darwinian Revolution:

- Sex and gender need to be studied by understanding the mechanisms of sexual selection and the origin and evolution of sexual dimorphism (men being taller than women, etc.).
- The study of family structures requires insight into mating strategies.
- Knowledge of selective processes and ‘inclusive fitness theory’ is required for understanding parental investment and fertility behaviour.
- The study of social mobility requires knowledge of ‘polygenetic inheritance’.
- Knowledge of the evolutionary background of the in-group/out-group syndrome is necessary for understanding racism.

Among the results, inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964), kin selection (Maynard Smith 1964), and reciprocal altruism are of immediate importance for the sociobiological study of (the evolution of) human societies. The principles of inclusive fitness and kin selection relate to individuals helping their relatives who, as we know, have similar genes. Reciprocal altruism refers to mutually helpful behaviour in the expectation that the other will ‘return a favour’. The underlying strategy is akin to the well-known ‘tit for tat’ strategy, which can solve the ‘repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Without these behavioural predispositions social life would be impossible\(^2\); they form the sociobiological foundations of the study of social life.

Concerning the theoretical background, the next important development for Cliquet was the introduction of sociobiology by authors like P. van den Berghe (1979) and E.O. Wilson (1975). Kin selection, reciprocity and social coercion emerged as the major foundations of social life from their work. Today, sociobiology concentrates on the biological evolution of social life in animals and hominids, whereas social biology deals with the interrelations of biological and socio-cultural phenomena in humans.

Nevertheless, Cliquet’s sociobiology comprises both sociobiology and social biology as defined in the preceding paragraph. Sociobiology retains his emphasis on co-evolution. For Cliquet, a major finding of sociobiology is the fact that our biosocial nature was formed during a specific era in a specific region by groups of hunters and gatherers: in mid Africa, say 100,000 years.

ago, in the so-called Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). The main hypothesis put forward by Cliquet is that the human genome that came about was adapted to the EEA, but not to the new environment of modern science, technology and humanistic values; in short, our genome is incompatible with the societal results of modernisation. The next eight chapters examine this hypothesis, followed by a final chapter devoted to the ethical and policy implications of the results.

Cliquet distinguishes eight forms of variation in society: individual variation, age variation, sexual variation, family variation, reproductive variation, class variation, racial variation and intergenerational variation. He sets out to explore the evolutionary background of these variations and argues for the existence of maladaptive practices, which amount to retaining practices adapted to the EEA. The list below displays the variations distinguished together with the corresponding maladaptive practice:

- Individual variation and individualism
- Age variation and ageism
- Sexual variation and sexism
- Family variation and familism
- Reproductive variation and natalism
- Class variation and classism
- Racial variation and racism
- Intergenerational variation and eugenism

The precise meanings of the maladaptive practices are explained in the corresponding chapters.

INDIVIDUAL VARIATION AND INDIVIDUALISM

An important theme concerns the level of selection: should individual or group selection be seen as the mechanism? The classical Darwinian position is that selection takes place only at the individual level, parents passing on their genes to offspring. More recently, however, the possibility of group selection has been defended. Helping behaviour and abiding by group norms can strengthen the chances of survival of the (members of the) group involved: group selection, very much in line with the functionalist school in sociology, with representatives like Parsons.

Avoiding the major pitfalls of this approach, Cliquet opts for this position, more specifically between-group selection, which of course is also clearly in line with his general position on biosocial co-evolution. Interestingly, processes of group selection always start with the individual, e.g. helping behaviour. This
implies that the biological theory of group selection has a micro-foundation, quite similar to methodological individualism in the social sciences. The general conclusion Cliquet draws is that we have both individual and group selection.

Cliquet approaches questions concerning the relations between genetic and environmental causes of individual variations in a similar way. He points out that genetic and environmental factors are always involved, though their weights do vary. The relative weights of genetics and the environment can be calculated at population level for traits that vary quantitatively, e.g. body length and intelligence. These features vary quantitatively because many genes are involved in producing the trait, each adding a part to the quantity: polygenetic inheritance.

For intelligence it has been found that about 70 per cent of the differences can be explained by genetic factors, leaving 30 per cent to environmental influences. The within-family biological environment plays a substantial role here: general health; suppression of diseases; improved nutrition; increased (but not too high) age at which women have children; healthy lifestyle during pregnancy; more favourable obstetrical care; avoidance of premature birth, low birth weight and breastfeeding.

Research into biological influences on individual variation is surrounded by ideological controversy. Notwithstanding the study of criminal behaviour, it has yielded an impressive number of results. It is assumed that norm-violating and criminal behaviour are maladaptive. A maladaptive trait is defined as follows:

- Intragenerationally (ontogenetically) it decreases the development of human-specific characteristics (e.g. sociality, intelligence);
- Intergenerationally (phylogenetically) it decreases genetic fitness (intergenerational transmission of genes).

Progress in genetics, neurology and evolutionary biology accounts for most of these results. Note that the factors found do not act in isolation and often work indirectly, for instance via low intelligence. Cytological research (the study of cells) has found a cell type (XYY) the carriers of which are relatively more present in penitentiaries and psychiatric institutions, are very tall, have a high level of testosterone, show somewhat lower average intelligence, and who have a higher propensity towards aggressive behaviour. Multivariate research shows that the XYY karyotype is not directly related to norm-violating behaviour, but indirectly – via a lower level of intelligence. It is also generally the case that a lower level of intelligence is related to norm-violating and criminal behaviour. Geneticists have discovered a mutation (to be precise, of the MAO-A gene on the X-chromosome,) which causes extremely violent behaviour,
though again indirectly – in this case through neurotransmitters. From studies on twins the insight emerged that the presence of particular genotypes (to wit, shared monozygotic ones) in criminogenous circumstances can more easily lead to criminal behaviour. From adoption studies we know that the influence of the biological father on the criminal behaviour of the adopted person is twice to three times as large as the effect of the adopting father. But Cliquet warns that it is important to bear in mind that increases in levels of crime in recent decades in some countries is related strongly to factors such as family breakdown, a break-down of morality, and increased intellectual demands in job recruitment.

As already stated, Cliquet calls the maladaptive trait associated with individual variation “individualism”. His conception of this is close to outright selfishness and inclination to aggressive competition. Of course, Cliquet holds the value of the individual in high esteem. He names the adaptive variant of individualism “individuality”.

**Age Variation and Ageism**

Hominids and humans got older during hominisation. The fundamental factor that triggered many of the others is brain growth. Cliquet argues that ageing and death are evolutionary phenomena. The most influential explanation builds on the fact that after the reproductive period in human life the forces of natural selection disappear, making humans more vulnerable to deleterious mutations until eventual death. Cliquet also mentions the mechanism of antagonistic pleiotropy (the control of more than one phenotypic characteristic by a single gene or set of genes,) where the same individual genes which enhance characteristics during the reproductive period actually reverse them in later years. In contrast to this, continued increases in life expectancy can be foreseen through further medical progress and lifestyle interventions, like decreased levels of smoking, improved nutritional habits, increased physical exercise, a limiting of calorific intake and also through pharmacological interventions.

As to the burden of elderly dependency, Cliquet reports that many demographic-economic simulations have supported the argument that a reasonable rate of economic growth will absorb this problem. Cliquet assumes a more reserved position on the costs of health and welfare. The chapter contains a lengthy and thorough discussion of the many dilemmas that can be observed in medical care for old people in general, and in particular for people in the terminal stage of life.

Cliquet considers some of the dilemmas caused by traditional values, which are not compatible with the pursuit of human well-being in modern society. He observes that ageism is less researched than other -isms and apparently still socially accepted.
Sexual Variation and Sexism

According to Cliquet, sexual procreation is inefficient as it only uses half of the available genes, but due to the genetic variation it brings about it offers more protection against risks. Sexual selection is a major mechanism in the emergence of sexual variation. It is defined as the evolutionary mechanism by which individuals acquire reproductive advantages over other individuals of the same sex and transmit these characteristics to their descendants of the same sex. Among men it is a matter of competition for females; among women it is a matter of choice of male partners. Thus mating strategies are the vehicle here. Women invest more in their offspring and choose a relatively peaceful mating strategy, while men who are predominantly interested in the size of their offspring chose a more violent strategy, which as a side effect gives them a larger and more robust body build. This is a major feature of the dimorphism seen between men and women.

After an analysis of the ontogenetic determinants of sexual variation, Cliquet again argues against a mechanical understanding of the ‘nature versus nurture’ dichotomy: gender is the result of the interaction of biological factors (genetic, hormonal, neurological, etc.) with socio-cultural learning and conditioning processes. From a biological point of view women are the stronger gender. An important reason for this lies in the fact that early on, during the embryonic development of the female foetus, one of the X-chromosomes in each cell is deactivated. This random process leaves the foetus with approximately 50% of his or her X-chromosomes from the mother and father respectively. This leads to a heterogeneous composition of the female body that protects against genetic impairments. Males miss out on this protection.

The concept of “sexism” has been coined to define ideological and social systems in which sexual variation is used as a primary criterion to assign normatively differentiated and valued roles and tasks in society. Sexism has prevailed, though to varying extents, throughout evolution of mankind. Women have only recently begun a process of slow and gradual improvement of their social position.

In modern society sexism is maladaptive. Cliquet considers modern biological knowledge the ultimate basis for female emancipation and puts forth a number of arguments. Biology refuted traditional views on the nature of the sexes, and destroyed the even earlier ideological foundation of sexual inequality and inequity. Bio-medical knowledge has induced revolutionary control over mortality, and enabled control over fertility – the ultimate positive condition for women’s emancipation. Modern technology is increasingly eroding males’ traditional physical advantages with respect to muscular strength and
speed. In addition, sociobiology frames human sexual dimorphism in an evolutionary perspective: it has reduced markedly, but it has not fully disappeared.

*Family Variation and Familism*

The family is a typical biosocial group phenomenon. It comprises sexual relations between the adults and reproductive relations between the generations. Siblings share many genes, and in addition share a largely common environment, which influences their phenotypical development. The evolutionary framework for the study of biological families is based on three conceptual pillars: ecological constraints, inclusive fitness and reproductive inequality, which reflects the dominance of particular individuals in reproduction.

Families are the social extension of intra-uterine life, based upon the needs of slowly maturing human children, several of which have to be produced to guarantee intergenerational continuity. They are not always successful in avoiding emotional deprivation or their consequences in the form of behavioural disturbances and physical retardation.

Even love, a phenomenon that can be found everywhere, is an evolved feature, selected for its function in meeting the needs of slowly maturing offspring. This is the case despite the existence of arranged marriages and the mildly polygamous nature of our kind. Humans have competing drives with variable winners due to changing socio-ecological circumstances.

The modern family transition is caused by three factors: socio-biological factors, socio-economic factors and socio-cultural ones. The shift to a combination of low mortality and low fertility has amongst other things turned partnership into a lifelong probability. The shift of the family from a productive unit to a consumptive unit, with people working outside the family, has contributed to the independence of many family members and to the substitution of social security systems for intra-familial arrangements for coping during times of hardship. Divorce has taken the place of widowhood as the main cause of couple disruption. Enormously extended leisure opportunities compete with traditional family values and patterns, demonstrated not least by the declining desirability of large families. The growing influence of individual preference has also led to situations where individual and societal needs, with respect to intergenerational continuity, no longer always coincide.

Concerning the future of the family, Cliquet argues that with modernisation society clearly evolved from a uniform ideal towards a tolerant acceptance of pluriform variation – an outcome of individual choice. The shift from a social to a more personal choice of partner and relational continuity, including the possibility of splitting up and establishing a new relationship, results in more gratifying relationships and an increase in marital or relational happiness. The frequency of single-parent families, a vulnerable category – under present con-
ditions headed mostly by women –, will probably increase. The number of successive monogamous relationships will increase, in combination with a more supportive attitude to former family members. Unmarried cohabitation and same-sex relations may continue to increase. The option of temporary and variable relationships will gain ground, especially among young men. Because living conditions in modern culture promote emancipatory ideologies, particularly for children and women, all forms of forced partnership or sexual exploitation are expected to become rarer. Finally, it may be expected that most of the population will continue to consider the family the most important unit for physical care and emotional security.

Reproductive Variation and Pro/Anti-Natalism

Humans have strong sexual drives and are geared by evolution to the maximisation of inclusive fitness, i.e. to maximise their genetic representation in future generations, in the context of constraints set by the environment and their phylogenetic past.

The second demographic transition has resulted in a combination of low fertility and low mortality. Fertility is even limited to below replacement levels. In this respect, Cliquet reviews the cultural evolutionary hypothesis and the two-child family hypothesis. According to Cliquet, the availability of many effective methods of birth control is the most important factor. This enabled the Neo-Malthusian transition, in which fertility was reduced by rank-specific birth control methods.

The most important result of effective fertility control is the liberation of men and especially women from the constraints and uncertainties of the past. The number of children and the duration of birth intervals can be planned. It is expected that in the future prospective parents will be selected on the basis of positive attitude to childbearing. This is related to increased parental investment in children, not only by women but also by the ‘new father’. In the long run, below-replacement fertility individuals and couples will be out-selected.

Cliquet makes some arguments in favour of replacement fertility, including avoidance of excessive population ageing due to de-juvenation, the same of sustained population decline, and limiting in-group/out-group conflict due to strong immigration flows. Cliquet strongly argues that old-fashioned pro-natalism, an ideology that advocates childbearing, is losing against the forces of modernity, which include concerns about below-replacement levels. He says the required shift from quantitative to qualitative reproductive efforts in modernisation is completely in line with the evolutionary trends that resulted in hominisation.
Social Class Variation and Classism

Human societies exhibit differences in wealth, power and prestige. In addition, different positions and functions are differentially evaluated. In modern societies the hierarchy of functionally necessary social activities is increasingly determined by knowledge and responsibility; this requires the presence of a particular biological (physical, as well as mental) endowment and equipment of the individual. The sociobiological question here concerns the exact means by which biological variation and social differentiation interplay. Inequalities in social status in human societies are in line with dominance hierarchies among other social animal species.

According to Cliquet, the evolutionary background of differences in social status is ultimately a reflection of differential reproductive fitness: at the individual level we observe the maximisation of inclusive fitness, within-group competition for scarce resources leading to social hierarchies. While at the group level we see group stability favouring the transmission of communication, inter-group conflict or competition for resources.

Cliquet employs a much more precise approach to biosocial interactions, as it is strongly empirically oriented and bi-directionally oriented in its observation of the associations between biological variation and social differentiation. It considers both genetic and environmental mechanisms of biosocial interaction, which can be seen in the important distinction between social assortment on the one hand, and social selection and environmental influences on the other.3

Racial Variation and Racism

This chapter investigates racial variation and racism only indirectly. It is primarily about the biosocial aspects of all forms of inter-population variability and their varying relationships to racism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia.

Biology has a specific definition of race: “a population that distinguishes itself statistically significant from other populations in the distribution of genetically possible alternative characteristics of chromosomes”. This definition differs clearly from the definitions used in racist theories that we may recognise from history. Those definitions are based on group differences, for example skin colour and bodily adaptations to climate. Between-population biological differences have both genetic and environmental backgrounds.

3 By social assortment we mean ‘the sociological processes leading to differences between groups’, and by social selection we mean ‘natural selection based on average reproductive fitness values between groups that differ in a number of genetic traits’.
Race, ethnic group and state/nation are different concepts. Only race is a biological concept; ethnic groups are related to cultural identities (language, religion); state/nation is a political concept. The biological variations between populations have diverse causes:

- Splitting of populations, resulting in genetic isolation and involving ‘genetic drift’;
- Fusion or interbreeding of populations, as a consequence of migration or contacts with neighbours;
- Adaptation of populations, as a consequence of mutation and selection in different environmental living conditions.

Looking at these causes in Cliquet’s book, we can see that thanks to very recent scientific methods it is possible to construct tree-diagrams that show the historic processes leading to the emergence of genetic distance between populations. Fusion often has the consequence of social exclusion on the basis of ‘unfavourable’ phenotypic effects. But heterosis, the strengthening of favourable qualities, is also possible. The most well-known adaptations are skin colour and bodily adaptations to climate.

Ultimately, Cliquet makes it very clear that dogmatic racist theories go against all existing biosocial knowledge we have of variation among and between human populations.

*Intergenerational Variation and Dysgenism*

Intergenerational changes in the genetic composition and genotypic structure form the essence of biological evolution, and are accompanied by phenotypic changes of individuals and populations. Modern culture introduced a number of effects working against natural selection: in medical practices like replacement therapies, but also in differential reproduction with respect to intelligence.

That reality can be complex and surprising, as can be seen in the so-called IQ paradox, i.e. the rise in mean IQ during the twentieth century, where as a consequence of birth control methods a decrease was expected; birth control having started among higher educated people. The most plausible explanations blame environmental influences. Cliquet adds that the dysgenic effect\(^4\) might in the near future reverse as a consequence of progress in genetic knowledge, genetic engineering, increased expectations about quality of life, and adaptation of norms to newly created genetics and demographics.

\(^4\) Dysgenic effects are defined by the accumulation and perpetuation of defective or disadvantageous genes and traits in offspring of a particular population or species.
Ethical and Policy Considerations Regarding the Biosocial Future of Humankind

Clignet’s starting point consists of important discrepancies between humanity’s evolutionary-biological background and the opportunities offered – and demands made – by modernity. According to him, we face six major ethical dilemmas concerning intervention versus non-intervention, quality versus quantity, equality versus inequality, co-operation versus competition, out-group versus in-group.

The discrepancies between the evolutionary-based genetic endowment and the demands of modern living conditions are due to the fact that the human genome is still largely adapted to the EEA: people neurologically adapted to life in small groups; endowed with strong kin and in-group drives protecting them from other groups; given to resource acquisition because of scarcity; combined high mortality and high fecundity and sexual specificities adapted to raising slowly maturing offspring.

In modern societies people live in large groups, limit their fertility, raise offspring who take ever longer to mature, see – or rather don’t see – in-group drives losing their protective qualities, and feel the clash between traditional values and norms and the demands of modern life. According to Clignet, the key to responding to these requirements lies in combating individualism (≠ individuality), ageism, sexism, familism, pro-natalism, classism, racism and dysgenism.

SUMMARY

To readers with a social science background the book offers the best available introduction to biosocial interactions in modernity. After the ‘over-socialised conception of man’ and ‘rational choice theory’ we now have a modestly realistic theory of human behaviour, useful for social science explanations. The fact that there is neither reduction to biological factors, nor a treatment of social phenomena in isolation from biological ones sets Clignet apart from the many pretensions of biological reductionism that we so often come across these days. A major line in reductionism is the unwarranted leap from the correct observation that all human behaviour goes together with brain activity, to the statement that all behaviour is caused by brain activity. Clignet has shown that much more is going on, namely biosocial interactions.

The detailed analyses of the options and dilemmas humans face with respect to modern medicine and social security address important issues, and in that sense we are (nearly) complete. The approach of religion is clearly biosocial. The major monotheistic religions emerged during a particular stage of the evo-
olution of mankind, and still bear the signs of that origin. This frequently leads Cliquet to criticise their maladaptive positions in modern society (e.g. on fertility control and gender relations), Cliquet instead basing his views on what modern societies require for their functioning.

Is this functionalism rejuvenated? If it is, then I must say that this functionalism, unlike that found in sociological ‘grand theory’, is parsimonious and empirically founded. Indeed, functionalist thought has always had a stronger foundation in the biological sciences.

This view of the hominisation process combines scientific description and valuation. Instead of displaying a belief in progress, it demonstrates a measure of optimism. The positively evaluated elements include diminishing sexual dimorphism; improvement of cognitive performance, emotional life and sociability; a considerable decrease of aggression and aggressive competition; increasing inter-group and inter-individual co-operation; and of course, a thorough rethinking of societal values and norms.

Cliquet is explicit about his values. His rejections of aggressive competition in modern society and the affirmative attention given to the treatment of those who find themselves in unfortunate positions as regards work, disability, disease, and in need of social security, safety nets and similar programmes identify him, to be sure with my consent, as a protagonist of the western European – or should I say northern European – welfare state. Cliquet does not address the question of the economic efficiency of this kind of welfare state, which might expose him to criticisms of protagonists of the deconstruction I referred to.

But he is definitely right: extensive economic, historical and comparative research carried out by Peter Lindert shows that the economic growth realised by these European welfare states is comparable to the ‘liberal’ economies of the USA and Britain. Moreover, these welfare states also managed to reduce inequalities to a certain extent.

To give a feel of the debate, I cite Lindert here: “We imagine an experiment in which Country A wisely holds down social spending while Country B raises it to a third of GDP, raising marginal tax rates on both the taxpayers and the recipients. Both the taxpayers and the recipients respond by working less and taking less productive risk, thus lowering GDP.” And then the cynical continuation: “The problem with this consensus is that the data refuse to confess that things work out that way” (Lindert 2004, Part I, 29–30).

Unfortunately, economic policies are still dominated by economists with strong beliefs in neo-classical theories. It appears somewhat paradoxical that by our evolved nature we have behavioural predispositions for both co-operation and competition – and despite that a modern society has emerged in which aggressive competition strongly prevails.

In spite of the strength of Cliquet’s text there are some issues that might have deserved stronger treatment. The picture of our basic hunter-gatherer psy-
chology lacks the detail needed to evaluate individualism (≠ individuality), ageism, sexism, familism, pro-natalism, classism, racism and dysgenism as implied by our evolved psychology. Not until the introduction to the last chapter did I get to grips with this problem. There, life in the EEA was concisely and clearly compared with modern life.

The empirical validity of the second Darwinian revolution could have been demonstrated more clearly. As it stands, the reader is often ‘asked’ to consult his or her memory and very general knowledge in order to confirm the assumed generalities.

The theory of inclusive fitness is also a nice cost-benefit analysis, but the reader is hardly informed about the supporting empirical evidence. I will have to assume that it must be available in the results of experimental evolutionary biology. Kurland (1980), who was mentioned in the text, might be useful as it refers to numerous empirical studies.

Related to this is the fact that the paradox of low fertility and low mortality that entailed the second demographic transition is most convincingly explained by a cultural evolutionary hypothesis and by a psychological hypothesis. As a sociologist familiar with the potentials of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma I was convinced by the tit for tat elements in the explanation for reciprocal altruism.

Overall, this book is admirable. I recommend it to anyone interested in the past, present and future condition of mankind.

LITERATURE